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Abstract v
ABSTRACT
Computer security is a very technical topic that is in many cases hard to grasp for the average
user. Especially when using the Internet, the biggest network connecting computers globally
together, security and safety are important. In many cases they can be achieved without the
user’s active participation: securely storing user and customer data on Internet servers is the
task of the respective company or service provider, but there are also a lot of cases where the
user is involved in the security process, especially when he or she is intentionally attacked.
Socially engineered phishing attacks are such a security issue were users are directly attacked
to reveal private data and credentials to an unauthorized attacker. These types of attacks are
the main focus of the research presented within my thesis.
I have a look at how these attacks can be counteracted by detecting them in the first place
but also by mediating these detection results to the user. In prior research and development
these two areas have most often been regarded separately, and new security measures were
developed without taking the final step of interacting with the user into account. This inter-
action mainly means presenting the detection results and receiving final decisions from the
user. As an overarching goal within this thesis I look at these two aspects united, stating the
overall protection as the sum of detection and “user intervention”.
Within nine different research projects about phishing protection this thesis gives answers
to ten different research questions in the areas of creating new phishing detectors (phishing
detection) and providing usable user feedback for such systems (user intervention): The ten
research questions cover five different topics in both areas from the definition of the respec-
tive topic over ways how to measure and enhance the areas to finally reasoning about what
is making sense. The research questions have been chosen to cover the range of both areas
and the interplay between them. They are mostly answered by developing and evaluating
different prototypes built within the projects that cover a range of human-centered detec-
tion properties and evaluate how well these are suited for phishing detection. I also take a
look at different possibilities for user intervention (e.g. how should a warning look like?
should it be blocking or non-blocking or perhaps even something else?). As a major contri-
bution I finally present a model that combines phishing detection and user intervention and
propose development and evaluation recommendations for similar systems. The research
results show that when developing security detectors that yield results being relevant for end
users such a detector can only be successful in case the final user feedback already has been
taken into account during the development process.
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Sicherheit rund um den Computer ist ein, für den durchschnittlichen Benutzer schwer zu
verstehendes Thema. Besonders, wenn sich die Benutzer im Internet – dem größten Netz-
werk unserer Zeit – bewegen, ist die technische und persönliche Sicherheit der Benutzer
extrem wichtig. In vielen Fällen kann diese ohne das Zutun des Benutzers erreicht werden.
Datensicherheit auf Servern zu garantieren obliegt den Dienstanbietern, ohne dass eine ak-
tive Mithilfe des Benutzers notwendig ist. Es gibt allerdings auch viele Fälle, bei denen
der Benutzer Teil des Sicherheitsprozesses ist, besonders dann, wenn er selbst ein Opfer
von Attacken wird. Phishing Attacken sind dabei ein besonders wichtiges Beispiel, bei dem
Angreifer versuchen durch soziale Manipulation an private Daten des Nutzers zu gelangen.
Diese Art der Angriffe stehen im Fokus meiner vorliegenden Arbeit.
Dabei werfe ich einen Blick darauf, wie solchen Attacken entgegen gewirkt werden kann,
indem man sie nicht nur aufspürt, sondern auch das Ergebnis des Erkennungsprozesses dem
Benutzer vermittelt. Die bisherige Forschung und Entwicklung betrachtete diese beiden Be-
reiche meistens getrennt. Dabei wurden Sicherheitsmechanismen entwickelt, ohne den fina-
len Schritt der Präsentation zum Benutzer hin einzubeziehen. Dies bezieht sich hauptsäch-
lich auf die Präsentation der Ergebnisse um dann den Benutzer eine ordnungsgemäße Ent-
scheidung treffen zu lassen. Als übergreifendes Ziel dieser Arbeit betrachte ich diese beiden
Aspekte zusammen und postuliere, dass Benutzerschutz die Summe aus Problemdetektion
und Benutzerintervention’ („user intervention“) ist.
Mit Hilfe von neun verschiedenen Forschungsprojekten über Phishingschutz beantworte ich
in dieser Arbeit zehn Forschungsfragen über die Erstellung von Detektoren („phishing detec-
tion“) und das Bereitstellen benutzbaren Feedbacks für solche Systeme („user intervention“).
Die zehn verschiedenen Forschungsfragen decken dabei jeweils fünf verschiedene Berei-
che ab. Diese Bereiche erstrecken sich von der Definition des entsprechenden Themas über
Messmethoden und Verbesserungsmöglichkeiten bis hin zu Überlegungen über das Kosten-
Nutzen-Verhältnis. Dabei wurden die Forschungsfragen so gewählt, dass sie die beiden Be-
reiche breit abdecken und auf die Abhängigkeiten zwischen beiden Bereichen eingegangen
werden kann. Die Forschungsfragen werden hauptsächlich durch das Schaffen verschiede-
ner Prototypen innerhalb der verschiedenen Projekte beantwortet um so einen großen Be-
reich benutzerzentrierter Erkennungsparameter abzudecken und auszuwerten wie gut diese
für die Phishingerkennung geeignet sind. Außerdem habe ich mich mit den verschiedenen
Möglichkeiten der Benutzerintervention befasst (z.B. Wie sollte eine Warnung aussehen?
Sollte sie Benutzerinteraktion blockieren oder nicht?). Ein weiterer Hauptbeitrag ist schlus-
sendlich die Präsentation eines Modells, dass die Entwicklung von Phishingerkennung und
Benutzerinteraktionsmaßnahmen zusammenführt und anhand dessen dann Entwicklungs-
und Analyseempfehlungen für ähnliche Systeme gegeben werden. Die Forschungsergebnis-
se zeigen, dass Detektoren im Rahmen von Computersicherheitsproblemen die eine Rolle für
den Endnutzer spielen nur dann erfolgreich entwickelt werden können, wenn das endgültige
Benutzerfeedback bereits in den Entwicklungsprozesses des Detektors einfließt.
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Chapter1
Introduction
Computer security is one of the oldest computer topics of all and with each new use for
computers, new threats and security issues come up. When the Internet started to become
popular and accessible for the masses at the beginning of the 1990s, security threats also
started to evolve there (see section 2.4 for more details and references). One of the most
popular of those threats forms one of the central aspects of this thesis: phishing. Phishing
being a form of online identity theft using socially engineered attacks will be more closely
explained and defined in section 2.1. Two aspects of the Internet form a fertile ground for
this relatively new kind of attacks: more and more security related actions are carried out
using it while the average technical knowledge of each user is getting less.
Phishing as a social engineering attack, in contrast to many other security threats, does not
only make use of security flaws of software but uses a social component to trick the users into
making a security mistake. Whilst phishing started off because some people wanted to get
on the Internet for free and hence stole user account data to go online, phishing nowadays is
much more focused, professional and mostly dedicated to monetary revenue, and it is still on
the rise as just recently reported by Kaspersky Labs [146]. In a typical phishing attack a user
receives an email claiming that something is wrong with one of her accounts and she needs
to reenter the data. A website link is included in the email leading the user to a convincing
looking website that is in fact a fake copy of the original website. In case the user enters her
credentials on the website, the phishers get hold of them and can furthermore impersonate
the victim and conduct transactions on her behalf.
This criminal act of stealing personal data is hard to impede especially by classic law en-
forcement. However, anti-virus companies, browser vendors and other Internet stakeholders
tried to create software detectors that stop those attacks from happening. In case such an
attack is found, the user usually gets some kind of notification about the threat and has to
decide how to continue. These two main parts of detection and intervention are, what lies in
the center of this thesis with a focus on usable security.
4 1 Introduction
For some of the work within this thesis other researchers have been involved to a small
extent. In many cases parts of the programming work or the execution of a user study
have been conducted as part of a bachelor or masters thesis under my supervision. At the
beginning of the respective project chapters all involved persons and resulting publications
will be named. Except for literal quotations and referenced figures all content of this thesis
has been created by myself.
1.1 Usable Security
Computer security measures in general are not ill-developed. Taking a 2048bit-SSL certifi-
cate1 as an example, it would on average take 6.4 quadrillion years with a standard desktop
computer to crack such a key [68] or in other words 6.4 quadrillion desktop computers would
need one year. SSL certificates and encryption work also very well despite some minor at-
tack possibilities [339]. Hence, the math for most computer security problems seems to be
fine, but still a lot of security attacks towards computers, companies and users happen each
day. In such cases security experts often like to blame the users as being “the weakest link in
the chain” to shove away responsibility for a security issue: users disclose their passwords,
fail to encrypt confidential information, switch virus checkers off and do so many more ir-
rational things from a security perspective (see Sasse and Flechais [255] book chapter about
usable security for more details).
But why does this happen? Asking this question already brings us right into the heart of
usable security. Usable security is all about finding out why the user is the weakest link of
the security chain and how this can be avoided.
Security and usability are two areas that contradict each other to some extent. Think of a
door looked with 10 different locks. It will be safer than a door with only one lock but the
persons that want to enter will have to do a lot more work. The challenge for usable security
is to get security and usability into the right ratio. As Adams and Sasse already point out it is
important not to blame the users if they try to circumvent too complex security measures. As
a result of this, the design of security measures should be centered around them [3,331,338].
Social engineered phishing attacks on the Internet are one, if not the most prominent example
for an area where usable security is extremely important. Bardzell et al. [21] elaborate on
the human-centered design considerations for phishing in their book chapter which offers a
very good starting point to familiarize oneself with this topic more closely. They explain
some of the base assumptions that have to be made about users and online security and
give some general recommendations for user-centered security development. To ease such
1 A certificate in general binds a public key needed for encryption of a secure connection to other properties
of the issuing company. Certificates can be signed by other parties to validate that a certificate is trusted by
this party. Extended validation certificates contain more information about the issuer and have a more
controlled validation process before they are signed by a certificate authority [39].
1.2 Problem Statement 5
development other researchers have taken general usability criteria by Jakob Nielsen [216]
and applied them to usable security [143].
1.1.1 Usable Warning Design
The design of computer warnings driven by usability can be seen as a smaller subfield of
usable security in general that is of great importance for this thesis. Developing new warn-
ings and evaluating their performance has been done with warnings in the physical world for
years now (e.g. by Wogalter [316]).
Some of the findings of this research can be applied to computer warnings too, but computer
warnings have special properties that set them apart from other warnings in the physical
world. While the focus of classical warning research is more on properties like form, color,
light, size, imagery or texture, these kinds of warnings are hard to personalize but easier
to set apart from other information around them. On the other hand many properties of
computer warnings are not changeable (e.g. light, texture), but the possibility of including
personalized contents is one of their strengths. We will elaborate on this more closely in the
related work section 3.3.
1.2 Problem Statement
Encrypting information up to a level that cannot ever be decrypted again using methods and
technologies we know up to now, seems an easy task for security development but in many
other cases developing security countermeasures for attacks seems to be much harder. Virus-
checkers are supposed to find malicious software running on the computers of their victims
but the virus checking software itself heavily relies on a given database of already known
attacks that has to be updated over and over again. But what would happen if each virus
appearing at each user would be a completely individual one? This would render current
anti-virus software useless to large extents.
In the case of phishing, a similar counter-measure is used today. Malicious severs and URLs
are put on a blacklist index and users being protected by this blacklist will not fall for a
phishing site hosted under such a domain. While the approach still works somehow well
for virus detection, phishers actually already have found ways to make each phishing attack
unique for each user. This can render blacklists useless in the near future (a more detailed
explanation of this will follow in section 3.2). In the end this means that the search for
new detectors that are beyond standard blacklists is necessary as the loss of effect of current
methods is imminent.
Research for such detectors is going on for several years now but as such detectors are
usually unable to perfectly judge the tested websites the user is needed in a final stage to
decide on the authenticity of the suspected website. With the user being the target of the
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attacks and the person who is in charge of finally judging attack attempts, the main goal of
this thesis is to provide new insights on protection against phishing by putting the user and
his behavior in the center of the considerations.
Besides the problem of the attacks themselves phishing is successful because of more general
Internet properties. As a global medium it brings information and offers from all over the
world right into the users’ living room within milliseconds. On the other hand as fast as data
is transmitted inbound as fast important security credentials are lost to a phisher outbound.
These properties additionally go hand in hand with the problem that security is never the
primary goal of a user [296] on the Internet. Users want to be secure without security being
their major concern.
Looking at this problem space a lot of questions arise: how can attacks be detected? How
many of them can be automatically found? Can warnings help to alert the user of this threat?
How should those warnings look like? Can HCI and usable security help to maximize the
power of such approaches?
This thesis and its projects are not the first ones to do work in the general direction of
phishing attacks – please find a lot of related work from the area in chapter 3 – but within
this thesis I tried to address the special aspect of bringing the technical security side and the
user based interface side together and look more closely at their interplay within the scope of
phishing attacks (see section 1.5). The essence of the research at hand can be defined using
three terms: protection, detection and user intervention.
1.3 Protection: Detection plus Intervention
From the point of view of this thesis anti-phishing measures can only work well in case two
different aspects come together to form a final phishing protection of the user. Hence we
want to establish the following definition:
detection+user intervention = protection
I understand the process of phishing detection as a technically-originated search for existing
attacks within a set of candidate websites. Usually a software detector will therefore take a
website as an input and test whether it is a phishing website or not. The detection process
ends with the output of the result.
User intervention (latin: intervenire=ˆcome between) is hence the follow-up step taking the
result of the detector into account and using it for further actions towards the user. From
simply blocking the network traffic associated with this website up to leaving the traffic un-
touched and displaying the result somewhere everything that follows between the detection
and the user interaction with the website counts as user intervention.
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Figure 1.1: Matrix for true and false positives and negatives in the area of phishing
detection.
Phishing protection finally stands for the fact that a phishing attack launched against a user
is not only detected but that it is also guaranteed that the user is not actually harmed by the
attack and finds her way successfully around it. Besides the optimum case of protection the
process can also lead to other results (see section 1.4). I claim that without respecting both
summands of the equation within the development of new concepts something important
will be missing which can be exploited by an attacker to reach his goal.
A perfect detector that has no effect on the actual interaction would be worth nothing without
a proper user intervention method and a well working user intervention method including
a perfect warning dialog would not work in case no phishing website detection has been
performed. Within this thesis I will have a look at the interplay between those components
and show that they have a much stronger coupling than one might initially think.
1.4 Technical Terms of Detection
Throughout this thesis, especially when measuring phishing detector performance or the
performance of users when classifying websites, a lot of different technical terms from signal
detection theory will be used over and over again. As a point of reference I want to give a
short introduction by exploring these properties. Whenever applicable I will try and give a
practical example for the technical terms wherever used.
The four most important measurements for a detector are true positives, false positives, true
negatives and false negatives (see figure 1.1 for an explaining matrix):
• Tasks that have been positively classified as an attack by the detector/user may either
be:
• True Positives (TP): This means the detector/user has correctly detected an at-
tack. The number of TPs is high whenever security awareness has been raised in
the right moment or the detector is performing well.
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• False Positives (FP): In such a case the detector/participant mistakenly thinks
a non-malicious website denotes an attack. Detectors that are too sensitive and
classify many websites as being phishing will have a high number of FPs. In case
of a user intervention concept, one that frightens participants instead of properly
raising security awareness in the right moment will have a high number of FPs.
• Cases where users/detectors do not detect any attack and assume the website is legiti-
mate are counted as negatives:
• True Negatives (TN): In this case true negatives are legitimate websites that are
identified as such. A detector that has a low number of false positives will auto-
matically yield a high number of TNs as original websites are correctly classified.
In case a participant sees an original website a TN is achieved if the participant
has justifiably no doubts about the originality of the website.
• False Negatives (FN): This happens if attacks are not spotted, so whenever a par-
ticipant believes an attacking task is a legitimate one. In case of false negatives
attackers would have been able to trick the participant into an attack. For a de-
tector these are phishing attacks that the detector missed during the classification
process.
Summing this up, the goal of any work on anti-phishing will usually be to increase the
number of true positives whilst keeping the number of false positives as low as possible.
False negatives and true negatives are reverse values that can be calculated depending on the
TPs and FPs (e.g. 100%−TP% = FN%).
Having those values assessed, two important other factors can be derived: Accuracy and
Precision [298, 337]. Accuracy is the number of true positives and true negatives – the
number of correct decisions – divided by the number of all results. Precision is the ratio
of how many hits were correct, thus being the number of true positives divided by the sum
of true and false positives. As these are only compound values I will usually refrain from
reporting these numbers within the thesis and report the FP/FN/TP/TN.
In case of many detectors, threshold values are involved that can be adjusted to define the
numbers of websites being classified within the four different categories mentioned above.
To see how classification values depend on this classification receiver operating charac-
teristics (ROC) is a well known method of displaying the dependencies between true and
false positives concerning certain thresholds [174]. For a ROC curve the amount of true pos-
itives (y-axis) in dependence of the amount of false positives (x-axis) is plotted for different
thresholds. The larger the area under this curve gets the better a given detector is. A diagonal
line throughout the chart is equal to random guessing. A ROC curve has been used in the
result section of subchapter 5.8 in figure 5.43.
Another type of evaluation that I used within this thesis is plotting the run of the curve of
false negatives against the run of the curve of false positives for different thresholds on the
x-axis. This kind of diagram makes it easy to find the thresholds for which the number of
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false positives is equal to the number of false negatives. This equilibrium value can be used
to compare different detectors. An example for this kind of diagram can be found in the
evaluation of the project in subchapter 5.8 in figure 5.42.
1.5 Main Contributions
Besides giving a thorough overview and analysis of the phishing problem and the related
work about phishing detection and user intervention methodologies I present nine projects
that have been carried out to find new methods for phishing detection and/or user intervention
and advance the field in the direction of user-centered approaches to phishing protection.
The prototypes use a range of different possible input factors for the detectors to gather in-
sights about which type of detection might be best suited for a detector with special regard
to the human-centered properties of detection. One result of this thesis regarding these prop-
erties is that visual comparison is most promising from a user intervention point of view but
has to be refined to result in better detection performance.
Different types of user intervention methods (indicators or warnings) are used within the
projects and I even present a new general kind of warning dialog called “semi-blocking”
warnings that can be used in special cases to block the users from performing insecure ac-
tions without immediately disturbing them in their current course of actions.
For detector and user intervention evaluation within the different projects a wealth of differ-
ent evaluation techniques have been used, from classical lab and field evaluations to modern
online evaluations. The thesis reports the different characteristics of those evaluation strate-
gies.
The projects and the research framing this thesis finally leads to answers to 10 different
research questions split up into five levels regarding phishing detection and user intervention.
These levels are: definition, HCI, measurement, enhancement and reason (see chapter 4 for
details). Besides answering those research questions (see chapter 6) the thesis also includes
a more practical part offering guidelines to various aspects of detector and user intervention
development (see chapter 7).
After looking at this interplay of detection and user intervention for phishing incidents in
the browser I will also have a look at how the findings within this example field of socially
engineered security threats could be possibly generalized.
1.6 Structure
In total this thesis consists of eight chapters organized in three parts. About all chapters will
be concluded with a section of take home messages that are meant to recapture the essence
of the respective chapter and its subchapters before moving on to the next one.
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Chapter 2 The Act of Phishing: This chapter gives an introduction into the phish-
ing problem and its characteristics without yet targeting research concerned with
the problem. The chapter answers the question of what a phishing attack is and why
a great need for counteracting phishing attacks exists. It provides an overview on
the different kinds of phishing attacks and tells the history of phishing. In the end
of the chapter a look at the design space of phishing attacks and current browser
security indicators is taken.
Chapter 3 Related Work: In this chapter the scientific related work towards dif-
ferent parts of the problem space is covered. Starting with related work towards
the phishing problem the chapter continues with an overview over problems with
existing detection methods and user intervention methods. After a short interlude
on phishing education new research concepts for detection and intervention are
presented before reporting more general literature about user study methodology.
Chapter 4 Overview of Research Covered: After having laid out the foundations
of this thesis, this chapter will set the work of this thesis apart from the research of
related work and will introduce the different research questions that will be covered
within this thesis.
Chapter 5 Nine Research Projects on Phishing and Usability: The by far
longest chapter of this thesis contains the nine different projects that have been
carried out, each one in its own subchapter. Each subchapter will start with an
indicator of the research questions covered within the sections and will end with
individual answers towards each of the tackled research questions.
Chapter 6 Aggregated Results and Derived Recommendations: This chapter
will summarize the results towards all ten different research questions within the
five levels. Afterwards a short discussion about the generalization of the results
towards more general research areas will be given before presenting a final model
summarizing the interplay between detection and user intervention.
Chapter 7 Recommendations and Guidelines: This chapter provides a more
practical go on the results presented before by applying them to possible future
detection and user intervention concepts, also discussing the question whether a
web without phishing is at all possible and how the situation could change in the
future. The chapter ends with evaluation recommendations presenting different
options for user studies and giving recommendations when to use which of those
options.
Chapter 8 Conclusions and Future Work: The final chapter concludes this thesis
with a retrospection to the contents and findings and provides a brief future outlook
on how future research should look like in general.
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Take Home Messages
å 1.1 Usable Security: Usable security brings together the often contradictory search
for perfect security combined with usability for the users. Social engineered phishing
attacks have an even more important property hence being an optimal research subject
for usable security.
å 1.2 Problem Statement: Phishing detectors are developed for several years now and
they can yield promising but no perfect results. Since fully automatic detection is
unrealistic, it is important to involve the user in the final decision that is actually not
her primary goal. How can this problem be handled to make phishing protection more
successful?
å 1.3 Protection: Detection plus Intervention: Anti-Phishing is more than just tech-
nically trying to detect phishing websites and there is more to it than just display-
ing a nice looking warning using a good user intervention strategy. I argue that its
only the combination of both that can be successful and hence define: detection +
user intervention = protection.
å 1.4 Technical Terms of Detection: When measuring detection success it is all about
true positives, false positives, true negatives and false negatives. These values can be
combined to accuracy and precision or with the help of different thresholds be plotted
to ROC curves or other diagrams.
å 1.5 Main Contributions: Throughout nine different research projects this thesis col-
lects findings for 10 different research questions laid out in five levels. On this way a
variety of different concepts, evaluations and parameters have been tested that allow
me to draw final conclusions about how perfect protection should look like and how
the interplay problem can be best assessed.
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Chapter2
The Act of Phishing
Phishing is perhaps one of the most pressing problems of usable security for today’s average
user. Each phishing attack has not only a technical but also a social component making it a
perfect study subject for the research interleaved between HCI and security.
Millions of dollars each year are lost by people falling for phishing [190] and not only fi-
nancial damage can be caused with credentials that have been obtained through phishing.
Stealing credentials can enable adversary companies or governments to infiltrate sensitive
infrastructures. In a recent example the complete network of the New York Times had been
infiltrated with stolen credentials allowing the attackers to gather information and even ma-
nipulate the contents of one of the worlds most important news sources [231].
This chapter provides detailed insights on what a phishing attack is (section 2.1) and reports
the most important reasons for counteracting phishing in section 2.2. Section 2.3 will provide
a landscape of all important attack vectors1 and explain which of those have been covered in
the projects of this thesis and why. A brief history of phishing and a possible future outlook
can be found in section 2.4 before section 2.5 will take a closer look at the current design
space of phishing websites. Finally section 2.6 will briefly explain what possible indicators
in one of today’s browsers a user would have to identify phishing.
2.1 What is a Phishing Attack?
Literature and Internet are full of definitions for what “phishing” really is. Possible defini-
tions range from very figurative descriptions to very broad, scientific and general definitions.
Techterms.com [282] an Internet dictionary addressing the general public defines phishing
very figuratively whereas phishtank.com [233] a website dedicated to the collection of exist-
1 An attack vector is a way that is used to bring an attack towards the user (e.g. email)
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ing attacks already includes possible attack vectors and possible protection into their defini-
tion. A similar definition is given by a blog article on computerworld.com [147] (not listed
above). In many definitions email is named as the only possible attack vector [251]. This
misses other attack vectors like for example social networks. More universal definitions are
given by the anti-phishing working group (APWG) [14] and scientific literature [221] (p. 2;
not listed above).
Phishing 1}Phishing is similar to fishing in a lake, but instead oftrying to capture fish, phishers attempt to steal your personal informa-
tion.~ – techterms.com [282] –
Phishing 2}Phishing is a fraudulent attempt, usually made throughemail, to steal your personal information. The best way to protect yourself
from phishing is to learn how to recognize a phish.~– phishtank.com [233] –
Phishing 3}Phishing is an email fraud method in which the perpe-trator sends out legitimate-looking email in an attempt to gather personal
and financial information from recipients. Typically, the messages appear
to come from well known and trustworthy web sites.~– Rouse, techtarget.com [251] –
Phishing 4}Phishing is a form of online identity theft that employsboth social engineering and technical subterfuge to steal consumers’ per-
sonal identity data and financial account credentials.~– Anti-Phishing Working Group APWG [14] –
Perhaps one of the most valid and important definitions has been given by Steven My-
ers [137]:
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Phishing 5}A form of social engineering in which an attacker, alsoknown as a phisher, attempts to fraudulently retrieve legitimate users’
confidential or sensitive credentials by mimicking electronic communica-
tions from a trustworthy or public organization in an automated fashion.
Such communications are most frequently done through emails that direct
users to fraudulent websites that in turn collect the credentials in ques-
tion.~ – Steven Myers [137] –
As the above definitions illustrate the process of phishing involves several steps each of
which also gives the potential of counteracting the attacks. This thesis heavily focuses on
the fraudulent websites used for collection and possible ways to counteract phishing there.
This results from the fact that most of the user interaction during the phishing process hap-
pens there and hence this process of interaction offers the largest possibilities for successful
intervention. Taking this into account the following definition might be suitable for Phishing
in regards to this thesis.
àPhishing Phishing is an act of trying to get hold of sensitivedata and valid user credentials by luring users into entering
these on legitimate looking websites. Attackers try to maximize
the number of successfully fooled users whilst minimizing the
chance of their attack being detected and removed by an au-
thority.
As outlined in section 2.3 this protection of the user on websites can only be accomplished
when looking at the complete process of phishing from the perspectives of each individual
stakeholder.
From a user’s perspective a phishing attack might look like a simple visit on one of her
favorite websites that shows a slightly weird behavior. Perfect attacks will completely go
unnoticed and could happen as follows:
Alice is looking at her inbox and looks at an email she just received from her favorite busi-
ness networking platform indicating that a new business contact “Sofie Rasmussen” seems
to request her profile (see figure 2.1). She wants to accept the invitation and presses the
button shown in the email. Her browser opens and the LinkedIn login page appears. She
enters her credentials and submits the form. It somehow seems that the credentials were
not entered correctly as the login page reappears. Alice enters her credentials again and is
successfully logged on to her account. She cannot find an invitation of “Sofie Rasmussen”
and logs out again. Probably the contact has revoked the request.
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Figure 2.1: Screenshot of a real phishing email received in July 2012. This email
passed our university’s spam and email-filters and reached its intended recipient.
In the above example Alice just fell for a well made phishing attack and she isn’t even aware
of it yet. Her first login to LinkedIn was not on the real LinkedIn website but instead she had
entered her credentials at a phishing website mimicking the real LinkedIn login portal. After
the first submission the phishers collected her data and simply redirected her to the real login
page of LinkedIn which made the second login attempt successful. “Sofie Rasmussen” did
not show up as she never tried to get in touch with Alice.
The attacker’s perspective of a phishing attack is completely different. He has to get hold of
email addresses of possible subjects, has to set up a convincing website that is able to get
hold of the credentials and finally has to make use of the credentials gathered. A detailed
report on how phishers compromise hosts is given by Watson et al. [292]. They set up a
honeypot2 server that reported all steps done by attackers to compromise the system and set
up a phishing attack.
The above example is only one of many different attacks that could happen and the state of
the art phishing attacks will be more closely explained in the forthcoming chapters.
2.2 The Need to Counteract
Many important authorities have made up their mind what the biggest problems about phish-
ing are and why the problem needs to be taken care of. However, the possible advice given
in these documents most often does not reach the intended recipient.
2 A honeypot is a trap setup to deliberately catch malicious attacks and learn from them [302].
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The National Consumers League (NCL) as Americas oldest consumer organization [214]
has published a 66 page document titled “A Call for Action” [215] in 2006 to show the
importance of anti-phishing countermeasures. The document summarizes the results of a
special anti-phishing retreat held by major governmental and commercial institutions. They
report an increase in Phishing attacks from 176 in January 2004 to 4,367 in October 2005.
Data from phishtank.com [234] (see section 5.1.2) shows a total number of more than 25,000
attacks in January 2013. That is 140 times more attacks in less than 10 years. The NCL also
found signs of declining trust of users to the Internet.
Attackers gather in groups like the “rock-phish group” for example to develop ever more
sophisticated attack types. Moore and Clayton [203] discovered some of their methods us-
ing relaying of domains and “fast-flux” networks (see section 2.3). Their websites stay up
longer (avg. 454 hours) than the average 58 hours of a standard attack. However, this time
frame is still large enough to collect data of users. Eugene Kaspersky speaks of an explo-
sion of cybercrime and malware [170] and suggest drastic measurements to protect users.
They should have a personal online ID that they need for Internet access on any website.
Although a measure like this could help to find attackers more easily it would still create
new possibilities for fraud and more importantly privacy issues.
Richard Clayton [52] thinks that the biggest issue with this kind of fraud is the more or less
direct transfer of real world authentication protocols to the virtual world where it is much
easier for an attacker to disguise as a trusted party.
The NCL [215] also gives some recommendations for possible actions to be taken. The
first of those is user education a highly controversial topic that is more closely examined in
section 3.4. Besides this a consumer experience should be “secure by design”. This principle
that can only be fulfilled to a limited extent with the current Internet architecture. Although
most banks and online retailers use secure channels for transmitting consumer data they
still have no control at all over users falling for an impersonation attack on a server outside
of their companies control radius. Besides this, the NCL suggests black- and whitelists
to get hold of the problem. However, these state of the art measures are not enough to
stop more phishing attacks being launched (see section 3.2). As the NCL outlines, a better
understanding of users about phishing attacks would be a step in the right direction but this
seems to be impossible without better technical detection methods that are superior to black-
or whitelists (see section 3.2.1). Such concepts and the way the can be developed are in the
heart of this thesis. Phishers learn from their victims and as they do research should look at
users and attackers to create working counteractive measures.
As the phishers successfully form groups to be more effective counteracting agencies would
also need to. In 2008 Moore and Clayton [205] proved that with better cooperation between
“take-down”-agencies many more attacks could have been taken offline earlier. However,
world-wide cooperation of law enforcement or private “take-down”-companies is hard to
establish, similar as changing protocols of huge systems like the Internet that is deployed
globally (see section 2.3.1 for the steps of a phishing attack and the counteracting possibil-
ities). With a definitive need to take action I try to counteract attacks not at the technical
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bottom layers (like protocols). Instead the concepts presented later on try to detect attacks
and protect the user right before the impact of the attack.
Florênico and Herley [93] argue that the problem for the end user is smaller than perceived
by the general public. Illegally made online banking transfers usually can be reverted and
the customers in fact have no financial loss in the end. They argue that the mules used
by the phishers to launder the money are the ones that actually loose money as they end
up with a negative account balance after a transaction has been revoked. For some financial
transactions this might be true but the core problem still persists: sensitive data of individuals
is stolen and misused. The misuse with this data not necessary needs to be of financial kind
and even if the victim is reimbursed the crime committed should still be stopped.
2.3 Phishing Attack Overview
Defining the scope or the types of a phishing attacks is even harder than finding a legitimate
definition for the term of phishing. What is part of the attack? Is it only the action taken
inside the browser or is the whole process from planning to the final monetization. The first
subsection (2.3.1) has a look at different birds eye views on phishing attacks and defines
the exact area of an attack that it is part of this thesis. Subsection 2.3.2 first gives a short
explanation of common attacks outside of the scope of this work and explains how these
are related to the overall problem. Finally in subsection 2.3.3 the current attacks that are
important for the research in this thesis are explained.
2.3.1 The Lifecycle of a Phishing Attack
Several books and papers have looked at phishing from a birds eye view at different heights.
Some papers describe the linear process of phishing in several steps. According to Steven
Myers [212] a phishing attack in general consists of “The Lure” (e.g. email spamming),
“The Hook” (e.g. a phishing website) and “The Catch/Kill” (e.g. identity theft using the
credentials”). Aaron Emigh [81] uses a more detailed eight-step-model. Step 0: a prepara-
tion phase (e.g. for registering a domain) is followed by sending out a malicious message
(step 1) that is somehow responded to by the user (step 2). This is followed by the prompt to
provide confidential information (step 3) and the user’s answer to this prompt (step 4). This
confidential information is then transmitted back to the attacker (step 5) and used to imper-
sonate the person (step 6) which can then be followed by means to engage in further fraud
(e.g. monetizing the data) (step 7). The National Consumers League sees Phishing as a six
step process, consisting of “Plan Attack”, “Launch Attack”, “Gather Data”, “Research How
To Use Data”, “Attempt Crime” and “Launder Proceeds”. Figure 2.2 shows the different life
cycles side-by-side. Besides the fact that they differ in granularity the specified end of the
life cycle differs a little. While Myers sees the fact that data was obtained more or less as
the end of the lifecycle, Emingh expected further fraud to be going on with the data and the
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Figure 2.2: An illustration of the lifecycle of a phishing attack as described by My-
ers [212], Emingh [81] and the National Consumers League [215]
National Consumers League even takes the “laundering” process of the gained goods (e.g.
money, credentials) into account.
It is important to mention that at every step of this lifecycle an intervention to prevent phish-
ing would probably be possible. The aforementioned references [81, 212, 215] give some
examples for that. In case it would be possible to guarantee that malicious people cannot get
hold of a domain or website in the first place, this would stop phishing as well as if it would
be impossible to use the gained confidential information in the end. In this thesis my focus is
mainly on the steps two to five (according to Emingh [81]) which is the phase where the user
is actually inputting her secrets. These steps seem to be the most promising to build upon, as
protecting the user there, can be accomplished without the need to change well established
structures like Internet protocols or law enforcement borders.
The exact possibilities for the execution of the different attack steps are endless and this
makes it possible to unfold the phishing life-cycle into what could be named as a “map of
phishing”. Looking at the different stakeholders (“bad guys”, “good guys” and “consumers”)
Jeffrey Friedberg [96] created a graphic titled “Internet Fraud Battlefield” (see figure 2.3
or A.1 for a larger version). Ollmann [221] focused more on different ways and purposes
of phishing attacks in an overlook on “the methods used in phishing” (see figure 2.4). I
tried to compile the most important facts for this thesis into a flow chart: the “map of phish-
ing” (see figure 2.5). It shows the different attack vectors, the most common phishing types
and scenarios, the possible delivery channels and the different ways of data collection using
either malware, malicious websites or the very uncommon dial-in attempts. All these ac-
tions finally aim for different purposes. All these attacks are highly interactive such that a
malicious website can be used for multiple purposes (e.g. to gather information and install
malware using an exploit) [62]. Markus Jakobsson [135] also presents an approach for cre-
ating graph-based models of individual phishing attacks. These can afterwards be used for
different means (e.g. for calculating the probability for a successful attack).
Walking through the “map of phishing” one of the more important attack vectors for phishing
at the moment definitively are email messages. With all the possibilities that spam emails
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Figure 2.3: The “Internet Fraud Battlefield” gives an overview over different attack
vectors, consumer vulnerabilities and the possibilities for final fraud [96] (see figure A.1
in the appendix for a larger version).
in general offer, it is easy to reach a large audience in a matter of seconds with a small
amount of effort. Spam emails and phishing attacks are heavily correlated [208] and spam
is not only sent out together with the launch of an attack, instead more emails are sent out
as long as the attacks stay online. About 21% of the spam usually arrives a day before
the attack is detected, 46% within a day of the detection and 33%, more than a day after
the detection. Social networks and social media as a target of phishing attacks have been
growing immensely [179] but they are also used as attack vectors [178]. Other attack vectors,
like banner advertisements or instant messaging are used far less. Besides actively contacting
the victim it remains also possible to create own malicious content and have it indexed by
search engines to wait for users to visit the malicious website on their own [81].
Regarding the different types of phishing that can occur, the number of different terms
steadily rises. Besides the “standard” phishing attack, spear phishing is a special form of
phishing that uses specific knowledge about the victims for better impersonation [220]. As
an example emails are crafted that look as if they come from the victim’s employer. Whaling,
is a special form of these kind of attacks that focuses on important people in huge companies
or government representatives [221]. Clone phishing uses original communication contents
(like a standard invoice of company or a boarding pass email) and clones the content of such
an email by just changing the contained links or the attachments [19].
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Figure 2.4: The different methods used in phishing as identified by Gunter Oll-
mann [221]
Several other types of Internet attacks are closely related to phishing but do not match the
definition of phishing used in this work. Scams for example are sent out to people with the
target of tricking them into participating in some form of activity that will be worthwhile for
them. At some point during the scam the victim is asked to execute a specific action (e.g.
paying a fee) that seems to be worth it. For this kind of attack usually no website or other
technical means are needed to make it different from a classic phishing attack. Scams also
have other limitations: they are specially crafted to not convince as many people as possible
but only convince people that are also likely to fall for the later action [124]. Drive-by-
pharming is another type of attack carried out by malicious emails to modify the users home
router settings for malicious use [274]. In this case no confidential information is collected
which differs a lot from phishing attacks.
No matter from which attack vector an attack originates from, there are a lot of different
scenarios that are used to convince the user to react to the stimulus. Typical email topics can
be the need for a security upgrade of the users account, incomplete account information, a
special financial incentive or other account problems [212]. Besides, the impersonation of
well known content of company emails is increasingly often used. This coined the above
mentioned term of “clone phishing” attacks. Another well-known attack type to find user
credentials is the so-called “man-in-the-middle attack” [85]. In this case an attacker sits
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Figure 2.5: The “Map Of Phishing”: An Overview of attack vectors to purposes for
phishing attacks. Some items are compiled from other literature [96, 221]. The blue
highlighted area shows the central aspects of this thesis.
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between the user’s computer and the companies server in the network (either by introducing
itself as a proxy-server or by other means). All traffic that passes this network entity can
now be read by the attacker extracting confidential information without the user noticing
this. For encrypted connections this is nearly impossible as the attacker either would need
to know the secret key of at least one party or would have to set up an encrypted relay
attack, which could be noticed by the user. Using eavesdropping it is hence possible to
overcome even two-factor authentication3 [149]. Since this type of attack does not have a
social engineering component, it cannot be labeled as a phishing attack. To impersonate a
third party and acquire user credentials a connection to the original server is not most of the
time not required.
In conjunction with such attacks the term “spoofing” is often heard. Originating from net-
work security this term usually stands for masquerading as another network entity. “Email
spoofing” denotes the fact of sending emails that virtually seem to be sent from a trustworthy
source. “Web spoofing” is hence more or less a synonym for a phishing attack. And lastly
“IP-spoofing” allows to send packages into the Internet that seem to come from a different
source than they really are [115]. This can hardly be used for phishing attacks as answers to
such packets do not reach the sender of the spoofed network package.
Depending on the attack vector different delivery channels can be used to redirect the user
to a point of a data extraction. In the most basic case this can be an email containing an
HTML-form for data entry. Since standard email clients usually warn extensively about
these types of forms and since they are never used in trustworthy company communication
they are seldom used. Software exploits of mailreaders or Internet browsers can be used
to directly execute malicious code on older systems but users with up-to-date systems are
most of the time protected of those attacks. Usually a somehow masqueraded URL (or
link) is one of the major entry points for phishing websites whereas malware attacks usually
come as attachments. Some other messages try to make the victim call a certain automated
phone service that will then ask for confidential details in an automated manner. This dial-in
phishing over VoIP is often called “Vishing” [30].
A joint report of the US department of homeland security, SRI international identity
theft council and the APWG summerizes all these attacks under the overall term “crime-
ware” [80]. Concerning malware, any installed software can usually gain full access over
the infected machine. Malware does hence not only pose a risk to confidential credentials
of the user but to much more. For a user and other software it is hardly impossible to de-
tect ongoing attacks, once successfully installed on the victim’s machine. For these kinds of
attacks virus scanners and other detectors are the more important means for detection; HCI
is less important for their development process. This is the reason why this thesis mostly
focuses on socially engineered phishing websites that try to gather confidential information.
In addition to that phishing itself is more often conducted using such websites than through
3 Multi-Factor authentication uses multiple authentication factors for one authentication attempt [306]. A
password would be considered only as one factor. Adding a physical token to the authentication process
(e.g. a smartcard) would then be two-factor authentication. German banks use one time passwords as a
second factor for authenticating bank transactions.
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malware. On a malicious website the attacker can ask directly for the data he is interested in
whereas using malicious software he has to extract the data needed from the vast amount of
data that can be gathered on the victim’s computer.
Looking at the Google Transparency Report [112] showing numbers of malware and phish-
ing websites on their indexes phishing is on the rise although there are about 2.4 times as
many malware sites as phishing websites registered – 149k phishing websites vs. 360k mal-
ware websites on 2013/07/14.
Moore and Clayton [207] offer another interesting perspective on how attack targets in terms
of Internet hosts4 can be selected by phishers. Nearly 20 percent of all hosts that are infected
with malicious websites are found by the attackers using search engines. For example,
searching for the version number of a blog software that is known to have a vulnerability
makes it possible to find working websites for attacks in no time.
In the following sections, first of all the types of concrete attacks that are out of focus of this
thesis will be briefly explained followed by information on typical phishing attacks that are
covered by the research in this thesis. For further reading a master thesis by Stan Hegt [120]
gives more detailed information about the different attack types of phishing attacks.
2.3.2 Attacks out of Scope
Concerning malware-based attacks a variety of possibilities exist to inject malicious code
into the victim’s computer. Provos et al. [240] analyzed the most important mechanisms.
Missing web server security can be used for an attacker to introduce malicious content to a
website as well as possibilities to put user contributed content onto a website that does not
do input sanitization. Adverts that are propagated to many websites could contain malware
as well as third-party widgets on a website.
These content injection attacks can be used for both: malware downloads or redirects to
malicious websites. Looking at possible types of malware keyloggers5 or screengrabbing6
software can be used to record I/O-channels of the victim’s computer. Later manual or
automatic analysis can yield passwords and usernames that were entered on different web-
sites [81]. Session Hijackers allow attackers to read out the session-ID of a user on a spe-
cific website after the victim has logged-in. Such a session-ID (usually stored in a cookie)
identifies all subsequently made requests towards the server as being originated by the same
user. Setting a valid session-ID on a different computer allows the hacker to impersonate the
currently logged in user from another machine [81]. Web Trojans are software versions of
phishing attacks asking for credentials in specifically designed popups [81]. Spyware can
be seen as an overarching term for software sending specific user data back to the servers of
4 A Host is a computer connected to a network – in this case the Internet [303].
5 A software running in the background of a computer capturing the keyboard input.
6 A software running on the computer capturing the screen contents.
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an attacker [236]. Adware usually is a less intrusive software that tries to generated revenue
for its use by displaying ads [236]. A rootkit is a software program that tries to open up
super user privileges for a third party without the original user noticing this [188]. This can
be often accomplished using a specific type of malicious bot7.
As mentioned before this work does not focus on the attack vector that was used to redirect
the user to the phishing attack – in most cases an email. Nevertheless it is is also possible
to detect possible attacks already at this level. Drake et al. [75] describe the typical contents
of such an email and the tricks being used in there: impersonation of a company’s logo
or style; the presence of a different reply-address; a plausible premise for the email and
the inquiry to quickly respond together with security promises are only some of the many
possible indicators for a phishing email. Although all indicators seem very sound it is hard
to detect this kind of semantic information in an automated manner.
2.3.3 Attacks in Scope: Impersonation
Whenever a malicious website is set up, the attackers can choose to impersonate a cer-
tain brand for the credentials that they want to collect. To make their impersonation more
trustworthy they have the possibility to use three different styles of impersonation: design
impersonation, URL impersonation and process impersonation.
• Design Impersonation Cloning the design of a website lets the malicious site look
more closely like the original. In general, this can simply be achieved by copying the
HTML code and all images of the original website to a different host.
• URL Impersonation In most cases it is not possible for phishers to compromise the
actual host that should be impersonated and if so they will eventually have direct
access to all user credentials without setting up a malicious website. This means,
phishing websites have to be set up on other servers with a different URL. However,
the attackers use a lot of different attacks to make a URL look more convincing and
closer to the original.
• Process Impersonation Besides the design of a website the way a website behaves
and its interaction possibilities can also be cloned to some extent. Many websites
contain non-static content that is generated based on certain personalized and non-
personalized aspects (e.g. news feeds, recent items, friend feeds). Impersonating this
content based on user preferences is hard for an attacker that does not know that data.
A standard login form may already raise the user’s suspicion if it asks for more data
than the original website usually does.
To be able to speed up the setup process of attacks and to ease the design impersonation
phishers make use of different software tools [212]. Rootkits as mentioned before automate
7 A bot is a small software to perform tasks on computer and interact with another network entity [51].
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the process of hacking into a computer and maintaining the possibility for super user access.
Phishing kits automate the setup procedure of a phishing website sometimes even including
the design impersonation for an existing website. For other attacks phishers also use so
called “corporate schemas” that contain the standard look and feel for a specific brand and
can be quickly used for the setup of a phishing website. Phishing kits are in widespread use
and are even used to defraud other attackers. Some of those kits collect the credentials not
for the phisher that used the kit but instead for the original creator [57].
URL Attacks
Making the user believe that he visits a correct URL already starts with the email that con-
tains the link. Different techniques are used to display a legitimate looking URL such that
the user clicks on that link [189]: Using HTML-mails the link-text can differ from the actual
link destination and JavaScript methods can be used to obfuscate the final URL even more.
In some cases IP-addresses instead of URLs or the @-symbol are used to confuse the user
when looking at the URL. Everything before the @-sign of a URL is used as the username of
the connection8. Such a username can also have the name of the original URL of the website
that is impersonated. Other options are to use hexadecimal characters inside the URL or a
redirection service that is more trustworthy.
In other cases similar sounding domains are registered by the attacker using stolen credit
card information or dubious hosting providers. Substituting similar looking characters (e.g.
an “i” for an “l” in “paypai.com”) makes it also possible to generate different but similar
looking domain names. A special form of this is the homograph attack [103, 115]: it makes
use of unicode characters that are visually very close. Domains with those characters can be
registered as well, and hence look visually just about the same as the original URL. Other
authors refer to it as the IRI-attack (Internationalized Resource Identifier) [100].
In other cases the original URL is enclosed in the subdomains of the website or in the path
portion of the URL. For faking subdomains the attackers must have access to any domain to
be able to control possible subdomains. Some free hosters also offer to choose an arbitrary
subdomain for a blog (e.g. “xyz.wordpress.com”). The path portion can be controlled on any
webspace by simply creating folders with the desired name of a target website. Table 2.1
shows a list of the different URL attacks and an example of a real phishing website with that
type of domain found at phishtank.com. Many kinds of URL attacks will play an important
role in the project presented in subchapter 5.4.
8 In some cases a website needs a username and password transmitted to the web server. This can be encoded
as an optional parameter in front of the URL using the @-sign.
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Type URL Phishtank-ID
Brand-Name http~SSfuulidoIcomSverifySpaypalS P'- ]'_
DeceptiveUName http~SSposterpayIorgSpostepay_itSprocesso_verificaIphp P'- ] '
DifferentUPort http~SS@--I@-]B@--BxPIadslBstaticIispIbelgacomIbe~ xAASukukukukS P'- ]P'
Hexadecimal
http~SSbandoviciIczechianInetSaolScapsIphp?bidderblocklogin+hc=P+hm=uk
f[APd'@fyj@b@vif_C@[ bidderblocklogin+hc=P+hm=ukf[APd'@fyj@b@vi
f_C@[ bidderblocklogin+hc=P+hm=ukf[APd'@fyj@b@vif_C@[ 
P'--]@ 
Homograph http~SSwwwIpаypalIcomSu[theufirstujajuisutheuunicodeucharacteruAxA-_A] [nouid]
IP-Address http~SSP'_I@ -I@xI]@S~ghvacnePS f@P@_P-]AAcf-xxx_[x @APe ] P]AaS P'- x ]
Path-Domain http~SSwwwIhostelflorenceIitSpaypalIcomSwebscrSsecureS P'- ]']
Redirect http~SSbitIlySP B_NGG P'---- 
Subdomain
http~SSpayaplIcomIcgiIbinIwebscrIcmdIloginIsubmitIdispatchI xx dxAaP_cAd
bP@[_[[_d_faeexdAb'e['xa@dxx_dAfa'fxfdInicoleforestIfrSUpdateS-Pdexa-
d a@Pa[[@PaP ]-fddx@x[feAS
P'- ] _
Substitution http~SSpaypailIwebstartsIcomS P'A_-  
User-Name
http~SScgiIebayIcomIclsdrporIcoIukSwsSeBayISAPIIdll?cfom=_P'A- @@-_A'[ 
@[x []P-]' [xxPPA+email=hanestshirts@idealstatueIcom P'-Px _
Table 2.1: Examples for the different types of phishing URLs taken from original phish-
ing URLs found by phishtank.com (except for the homograph attack).
2.4 A Brief History of Phishing and a Possible
Future Outlook
Phishing as defined in this thesis originated in the 1990s. America Online (or AOL) was an
Online Service that was popular back then. For a reasonable amount of time it allowed to
create accounts with any credit card number that passed a standard validation check. Many
hackers used this to create AOL accounts for free. These accounts lasted until AOL first tried
to bill the respective credit card detecting that it did not really exist. When AOL closed this
security hole – by immediately checking the credit cards at registration time – the hackers
switched to what was then known as phishing. They contacted arbitrary AOL customers and
posed as employees of AOL asking the customer’s password for security purposes. Using
these passwords they were able to log in to the user’s AOL accounts and could steal more
confidential data there [212].
2.4.1 The Term “Phishing”
Most literature about phishing refers the term of phishing back to a Usenet newsgroup post
of 1996 in the hacker newsgroup “alt.2600” [212, 221].
A full reprint of this Usenet post and its replies can be found in the appendix in figures A.2
and A.3. Reading the whole post one can even understand a little bit of the phishing history
and how people used to make use of generated credit card numbers.
28 2 The Act of Phishing
AOL for free?}It used to be that you could make a fake account onAOL so long as you had a credit card generator. However, AOL became
smart. Now they verify every card with a bank after it is typed in. Does
anyone know of a way to get an account other than phishing?~– mk590, alt.2600, 28 Jan 1996 [200] –
In fact, in the above post the term is already used as if it was common language. No further
explanations come with it and the people replying to the post did not ask for any. Looking a
little further back in the same newsgroup I stumbled along a post that from about one year
earlier. A user called “Rick Buford” replied to a post from a user that had problems creating
a new AOL account.
AOL Cert: lugs-lousy}not anymore..just got a new one today....So Long and Thanks for all the Phish....~– Rick Buford, alt.2600, 5 Feb 1995 [278] –
This clearly is a reference to Douglas Adams fourth book of the “The Hitchhiker’s Guide to
the Galaxy”-series called “So Long, and Thanks for All the Fish [4]”. But the misspelled
“phish” could be another much earlier reference to the term of phishing in this case. As
Ollmann [221] states, hacked accounts where actually called “phish”.
Another clear evidence for the term of “fishing” being synonym for password stealing is a
scientific paper from 1990 (five years earlier) [118]. This paper describes what could be
also called one of the first malwares. A small computer program hooking into the I/O of
a computer waiting for the word “Logon:” to appear and then record the username and
password of a system user. This tool was called “FISHES”.
But where does the “ph” come from? Some sources claim that this is borrowed from the
older act of “phone phreaking” [165] where the telephone communications standards are
misused to make unauthorized calls.
The Evolution of Phishing
Phishing evolved quickly [221] and got more professional over the years making use of new
technologies like keyloggers and later on screengrabbers. New terms like “spear phishing”
and “pharming” – redirecting users to phishing websites by technical manipulation of the
network – evolved. The timeline in figure 2.6 provides and overview how phishing evolved
over the years.
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Use of message
boards and
newsgroups for 
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in "safe browsing"
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Padlock Icon
"Rock Phish"
Toolkit 
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Phishing attack
record reported by
APWG:
40,621 attacks/month
Figure 2.6: A timeline of the history of phishing (based on [221] with additional
sources [15, 165, 187, 200, 251, 272, 278, 286])
As phishing got increasingly popular over the years the fight against it slowly began. First
the attacked companies started the fight against phishing on their own [241]. In 2007, huge
companies like Google started initiatives to protect the users [187]. A central blacklist server
for the Firefox and the Google Chrome browser was set up. Early research on why people
fall for phishing started after the year 2000. This kind of research will be more closely
explained in section 3.1.
Over the years phishers have learned to adapt to appearing countermeasures and have per-
fected their attacks using techniques like fast-flux networks, distributed phishing attacks and
generated domain names, common countermeasures like blacklisting can be easily avoided
(all to be explained later in section 3.2). Using the aforementioned phishing kits and corpo-
rate schemes incredibly convincing fake websites can be created.
Although the amount of phishing is not dropping, it does not seem to be an overly lucrative
business. Extracting money from accounts may be hard [93] and the more people engage
in phishing the less profitable it gets as the number of victims is limited and even drops as
more people attempt the crime [125]. But it’s not all about money and as more information
about companies and ourselves is going online everyday the reasons for stealing confidential
information rise, too.
But how about the future? Will phishing be able to find ever new ways of countering the
methods that are developed to counteract it? Figure 2.7 shows how better detection drives
the phishers into creating websites that cannot be automatically detected. Within this thesis
30 2 The Act of Phishing
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Figure 2.7: With better methods to detect phishing websites the phishers move to areas
that are outside of the scope of the automatic detectors. A perfect detection is hardly
possible. I argue that HCI research is able to close the gap.
I argue that with the help of HCI research it is possible to close the gap to such an extent
that phishing becomes unprofitable. Technical means of detection as they have been used in
the past allow the attackers to adapt by changing the technical realization of their phishing
website in the future, because this representation is part of the user’s perception of the attack.
If detection and finally protection uses ways that are built upon the users understanding and
perception of an attack the attacker would need to alter the attacks in a way users would be
able to notice.
This general idea is independent of today’s technology and should persist for new kinds
of attacks that could be launched using future technologies of the Internet. For now these
changes could make use of new multimedia possibilities introduced in HTML5. As this
development cannot be foreseen durable anti-phishing solutions need to be independent of
this. Although all projects in this thesis are measured against today’s attack styles they have
been carefully designed with the idea in mind that for such attacks the user is and ever will
be the weakest link.
2.5 Design Space of Current Phishing Attacks
The design space of current phishing attacks is still very broad. While the most common
phishing attempt at the moment of writing this might be an impersonation of the online
payment provider paypal.com, a huge variety of other phishing attempts for different brands
exist as well, together with attacks that even do not target a specific brand (although these are
more seldom). In former times phishing emails and websites often already stood out due to
bad native language or incorrect brand impersonation attempts. Using the means explained
above the quality rose over the last decade.
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Phishing Website Original Website
Figure 2.8: Paypal.com phishing website and the original website. Both in a Google
Chrome browser accessed at 12th March 2013. The teaser image and text used on the
phishing website is a few days older than the teaser image used at that exact same day
on paypal.com
2.5.1 Typical Phishing Examples
To get a proper understanding of how a typical phishing attack today may look like, I want
to focus on two different concrete examples of phishing attacks found today.
PayPal Phishing Attack
Figure 2.8 shows the screenshot of a phishing attack of paypal.com and the original website
of paypal.com at the same day. The screenshots have both been taken with the most recent
version of the Google Chrome Browser on Windows 7. Besides a different teaser image the
websites content area is absolutely identical. The different teaser image is most probably
due to the fact that this picture was used by the original website at the time when the website
was captured and prepared by the phishers. From the website contents alone it would be
impossible to recognize the malicious website as a phishing web page but looking at the
URL one can clearly see that the phishing website is not served over a secure connection
and it has a completely different URL and domain. Still the phishers included the brand
name as a folder and as the name of the document that is loaded to make the URL look
somehow convincing.
A respective email that points a user towards such an attack may look just like the one in fig-
ure 2.1. The email talks about the fact, that the user account is limited and that the users help
is needed to resolve the issue. The email states a fake ticket-ID to make it more trustworthy
and the sender address is faked to appear as “service@paypal.com”. In fact, for the original
paypal.com similar scenarios exist. For example, if an original PayPal account is accessed
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Figure 2.9: German email that leads to a paypal.com phishing attack. The email talks
about the fact that account access is limited and that the user needs to help in resolving
this conflict.
from a country other than the residence country of the user PayPal accounts sometimes re-
ally are put into a limited state. From the visual side again, it is nearly impossible to find out
that this email is fake except for the fact that it does not contain any personal information
about the person addressed. As a security measure PayPal usually adds personal details like
the name of the user to such emails. When hovering the link in the email a user can detect
the fake URL that in this case points to: “www.paypal-privatkunden.de/login”.
Form Phishing Attack
Compared to the almost perfect phishing attack just explained a few other less professional
phishing attempts still exist. These attacks most often just try to get access to an email ad-
dress getting the email address and the users password. As many users reuse their password
for many different services they can then use this data to login almost everywhere. In case
this does not work the attackers can still use the password retrieval functions of almost any
website to reset the password of an account.
In the current example the pishers even did not setup their own phishing website or hosting.
They just used the publicly available methods of Google Docs9 to create free online surveys.
9 http://docs.google.com
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Figure 2.10: Form phishing example original URL from 12th February 2013
Figure 2.10 shows the form loaded inside a browser. The form just asks for username,
password (twice) and the email-address of the user. The form headline states “management
system” in German with a minor grammatical mistake. The respective email to the user can
be seen in figure 2.11. It looks as it has been sent from a private Spanish email address
and just uses plain text. In this case the contents talk about the fact that the email inbox of
the user exceeds the assigned quota. Again the quality of the German language is somehow
poor.
These are just two specific phishing attacks of today, but how exactly does today’s phishing
landscape look like? For one of the projects carried out for this thesis a large test set of
phishing websites was used. I report the quantitative findings and give an overview over
several thousand phishing websites in section 5.1 of this thesis.
2.6 Looking at Today’s Browsers: Security
Indicators in Use
As described in the previous section, it is close to impossible to detect a good phishing
attack just by looking at the content area of the browser. This area can be freely designed by
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Figure 2.11: The email sent to attract users for the form phishing attack (shown in
figure 2.10).
any website that is visited and hence can adopt to any given style. The rest of the browser
interface can be modified by the loaded HTML-content only in a limited sense and thus
offers a range of indicators related to the security of a user. The only possibility for an
attacker to forge these indicators is to display a completely fake browser inside the content
area [75]. Ye et al. [330] systematically show how such an attack would work. However,
users often are confused about the security indicators as websites misuse them inside their
own content areas to generate trust [276].
In this chapter I will give a short summary of the types of indicators that can be found in
current websites and how different browsers handle those. This chapter explains the standard
indicators (SSL icons, https, SSL ceritifcate infos) and so on. They will be needed later on
in projects that try to find better alternatives.
Figure 2.12 shows and overview of how today’s browsers look like when they are on a secure
SSL encrypted website and how they look like on a phishing website. Most of the security
indicators focus on the fact whether the connection to the website is encrypted or not. In
most browsers all this information is combined in the location bar of the browser where the
user can enter a web address.
Figure 2.13 shows the different indicators in more detail. The encryption based indicators
are the https-protocol indicator, the padlock icon and the site identity button (that offers the
possibility to open the not always visible site identity dialog). The only security indicator
for users that does not rely on encryption is the URL highlighting done in many browsers.
Encryption itself does not guarantee that the connecting party is trustworthy. It only tells
the user that the connection is protected from eavesdropping (or man-in-the-middle attacks).
Yet, nearly all of the phishing websites do not use an encrypted channel (due to the additional
effort of registering SSL certificates). Each browser handles and interprets the different
indicators a little bit different.
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Figure 2.12: The different security indicators of different versions of a browser on a
properly encrypted and trusted website (left column) and on phishing websites (right
column). From top to bottom different browsers are displayed: Mozilla Firefox, Google
Chrome, Microsoft Internet Explorer, Opera. A larger version of this figure can be
found in the appendix in figure A.4.
Figure 2.13: The different security indicators of today’s browsers and how they look
like in different browsers.
Figure 2.14: After pushing the security information button on a web browser different
security dialogs appear. From left to right: Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Microsoft
Internet Explorer, Opera.
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• Protocol Indicator: A web browser is able to fetch data using different protocols
(e.g. HTTP and FTP). A URL is preceded with such a protocol prefix such that the
browser knows how to talk to the foreign server. All web browsers assume HTTP
as the standard protocol if nothing is entered by the user. In this case all traffic is
transmitted unencrypted and all network nodes that receive the packages of this con-
nection are able to read the package contents. If a connection should be encrypted
the HTTPS-protocol is used. This protocol prefix tells the browser to establish an en-
crypted connection. A user hence can recognize an encrypted connection looking at
this prefix. For user convenience many of today’s browsers generously hide the proto-
col prefix of an URL (especially for HTTP). Only the Internet Explorer still displays
this prefix for HTTP connections. In case of an encrypted connection Firefox, Chrome
and the Internet Explorer display the https-prefix. Opera is the only exception where
this protocol prefix is never displayed.
• Padlock Icon: The padlock icon is used to indicate an encrypted connection since the
early days of web browsers. It used to be part of status bar below the main website
window but research showed that this indicator is especially overlooked [59, 67]. The
most recent browsers hence brought the icon up and made it a part of the location bar
or rather the site identity button.
• Side Identity Button: Every encrypted website has a certificate associated with it
that holds the keys to set up an encrypted channel and other information about the
issuer of this certificate. For the special case of extended validation certificates even
more information about the company that acquired the certificate is available. The
site identity button appears in the location bar as soon as this information is available
and shows some preliminary information about the connected party. In some browsers
the button is even present on unencrypted connections and can also be clicked there.
Opera is the only browser that does not display the name of the trusted company and
instead only displays the text “Trusted” on its site identity button. Once clicked the
site identity button brings up the site identity dialog. Usually the site identity button is
placed leftmost in the location bar before the URL itself. Only the Microsoft Internet
Explorer reserves a small space on the right side of the URL.
• Site Identity Dialog: This dialog is usually hidden from the user and has to be ex-
plicitly opened by clicking on the site identity button in the browser. Depending on
the browser the opening window displays different information about the encrypted
connection or the website that is visited in general. Figure 2.14 shows the site identity
dialogs of different browsers. All browsers at least display some information about the
trusted party the user is connected to. In some cases, additional information about the
encryption itself (at least using an icon [288]) or information about the user’s visiting
habits to this website are included. In many cases this dialog offers access to even
further technical information or explaining resources about the contents of the dialog.
• Status Color Coding: In addition to all the aforementioned indicators the browsers
also use color coding to display the status of the connection. A connection encrypted
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using an extended validation certificate is usually displayed in green. For standard SSL
certificates some web browsers use different colors (Firefox uses blue for example)
whereas other browsers don’t make any difference in color coding for the different
certificate types. In some cases only the site identity button changes its color; the
Internet Explorer changes the background color of the whole location bar and Google
Chrome for example also changes the color of the protocol indicator.
• URL Highlighting: The only security indicator of the URL bar that is present for
all kinds of connections (no matter of the encryption state) is the URL highlighting.
Browsers colorize the different parts of the URL differently to ease the understand-
ing of those. The most important issue here is to highlight the basedomain10 of the
website, because this part really tells the user to which server she is connected. Some
phishers try to use subdomains to cover the fact that their website is not the real website
the user is visiting creating URLs like “www.paypal.com.fake.org". The real domain
name here of course is “fake.org” the other parts of the domain are just subdomains.
With domain highlighting this should be easier to recognize. However, Lin et al. [166]
showed that this method does not work well, as the URL bar itself is generally over-
looked by users.
The current state of the art of security indicators is similar in today’s major browsers with
some small differences for the different components that have been mentioned above. An-
other major difference can be found in figure 2.14: to maximize screen real estate for web-
page display, the Microsoft Internet Explorer shares the same horizontal area for website
tabs and the location bar. This reduces the size of the location bar and makes it hard to fit
all important information into it. Only a short portion of URLs can hence be seen by the
user and information on the site identity button is cropped after a few characters. For web
browsers on mobile devices the situation is even worse. To use the small size of display
best, browser manufacturers hide as many connection details as possible [12]. This makes it
nearly impossible for the user to spot changes in URL or encryption during mobile browsing.
Take Home Messages
å 2.1 What is a Phishing Attack?: There are numerous definitions of phishing. Some
more user-centered other more general. This thesis uses a definition that has the phish-
ing website as its central element.
å 2.2 The Need to Counteract: Counteracting phishing attacks is important. Not only
because of the loss of money but also because of a potential loss of trust of users into
the Internet as a whole.
10 The base domain is the part of the domain actually identifying the server. Usually this is the
top-level-domain (e.g. .org) plus the next preceding part of the domain (e.g. paypal). For
“logon.security.paypal.com” the base domain would hence be “paypal.com” (see the project in
subchapter 5.4 for more details).
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å 2.3 Phishing Attack Overview: Although a root cause for phishing lies in existing
Internet protocols, developing and deploying new ones is nearly impossible and would
potentially come with huge privacy issues.
å 2.4 A Brief History of Phishing and a Possible Future Outlook: The term “Phish-
ing” goes back to password “fishing” (probably taken from a computer malware called
“FISHES”) combined with the “ph” of the term “phone phreaking”.
å 2.5 Design Space of Current Phishing Attacks: From a perfect visual copy to a
one-minute survey with spelling mistakes; all kinds of phishing websites still do exist
but the majority of the attacks is well made and the number of such attacks is ever
increasing.
å 2.6 Looking at Today’s Browsers: Security Indicators in Use: Most browsers use
six different types of security hints: URL highlighting, https-indicator, site identity
button, site identity dialog, padlock icon and color coding. Only the first indicator has
nothing to do with the encryption state of the website.
Chapter3
Related Work
Research literature on the topic of phishing and usable security is very diverse. Given the
fact that this thesis tries to unite two different research approaches to the topic – detecting
and reporting phishing by the use of HCI – related work of both fields has to be considered.
This chapter hence is organized as follows: Section 3.1 first gives an introduction into de-
tailed properties and cost of phishing attacks. Researchers and marketing research compa-
nies have collected a lot of details on the problem of phishing and investigated on how and
why people fall for it. In section 3.2 the currently deployed concepts and the need for fur-
ther research in this area are discussed. Section 3.3 looks at the reasons why current user
interfaces and warning dialogs fail. How does a computer warning differ from real world
warnings and what research has been conducted in both fields? Section 3.4 is dedicated to
the controversial topic of phishing education. Some researchers hope that user education is
the answer to the problem whereas others claim that user education dedicated to security is
pointless. The next two sections (3.5 and 3.6) elaborate on previous research done to en-
hance either detection or user intervention. Another important aspect for all kinds of work in
this area is the way evaluation is carried out through user studies. Section 3.7 reports about
this.
3.1 The Phishing Problem
This section contains an in-depth overview on the severity of the problem of phishing. First
actual numbers about phishing losses and other parameters of phishing attacks are reported,
followed by related work that deals with the question why people are falling for those attacks.
40 3 Related Work
57 million phishingDemailsDreceived inDtheDUS perDyear GARTNER /WW“
2.78 million fallDforDattacks inDtheDUS perDyear GARTNER /WW“
1200 millionDUSD phishingDdamageD inDtheDUS perDyear GARTNER /WW“
500 millionDUSD phishingDdamageD inDtheDUS perDyear TRUSTeD /WW“
137 millionDUSD phishingDdamageD globally InD/WW“ TowerGroup /WW“
25.7 millionDEuro phishingDdamageD inDGermany InD/W,, BKA /W,/
61 millionDUSD phishingDdamageD inDtheDUS perDyear HerleyDandDFlorênico /WWC
1244 USD damage perDattack InD/WW7 GARTNER /WW7
37.3 million phishingDincidents perDyear Kaspersky /W,„
24.1 million IP3addressesDforDtheDattacks perDyear Kaspersky /W,„
93462 phishingDincidents firstDhalf ofD/W,/ APWG /W,/
122 phishingDemailsDreceived perDuser perDyear GARTNER /WW7
12.1 percent ofDlinksDbyDmail6DrestDbyDbrowser Kaspersky /W,„
54 percent recoverDfromDtheDloss GARTNER /WW7
0.23 percent emailsDareDphishing Symantec /W,/
0.39 percent emailsDareDvirus-malwareD Symantec /W,/
68 percent pretendDtoDknowDtheDtermD„phishing“ FurnellDetDalPD /WWM
0.4 percent enterDdataDonDaDphishingDwebsite perDyear FlorênicoDandDHerley /WWM
25 credentialsDcollectedD ,stDday MooreDandDClayton /WWM
12 percent ofDattacksDregisterDownDdomains firstDhalf ofD/W,/ APWG /W,/
23 hours averageDuptimeDofDanDattack firstDhalf ofD/W,/ APWG /W,/
9500 websites areDaddedDtoDtheDGoogleDblacklist perDday Provos /W,/
female usersDareDmoreDlikelyDtoDfall ShengDetDalP /W,W
18DtoD25 yearDold usersDareDmoreDlikelyDtoDfall ShengDetDalP /W,,
risk-averse usersDareDlessDlikelyDtoDfall ShengDetDalP /W,/
technology-savvy usersDareDlessDlikelyDtoDfall ShengDetDalP /W,„
FinancialDDamage
OtherDFacts
Table 3.1: Compiled list of facts about phishing attacks in numbers. Sources: [38, 92,
102, 105, 125, 141, 146, 163, 167, 203, 213, 239, 243, 246, 261]
3.1.1 Phishing in Numbers
To get to know more about the phishing problem in general it is important to look at dif-
ferent aspects of phishing and the numbers that have been generated by researchers and re-
search companies. Perhaps the most important number that comes into mind when thinking
about phishing is the average yearly loss that consumers have to endure because of phish-
ing attacks. The estimated numbers here are very diverse ranging from millions to billions.
But besides this there are other interesting facts covered in this section. Table 3.1 gives an
overview about the most important numbers mentioned in this section.
Monetary Loss Through Phishing
Estimating the global loss due to phishing is very hard as only a small number of incidents
can be used to extrapolate the whole global costs. Myers [212] defines three different types
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of phishing costs. “‘Direct costs” that attribute for the total value of money that really is
stolen; “indirect costs” incur to users and companies due to phishing attempts (e.g. costs for
consumer information) and finally “opportunity costs” where the act of phishing changes the
behavior of users such that they for example might not use online banking because they are
too afraid. In this section only estimated numbers on “direct costs” will be reported.
In a 2004 publication of Gartner research [167] they estimate that 57 million US adults
receive a phishing email per year (30 million being “absolutely sure”). They further estimate
that 19% (11 million) click on such a link and 3% (1.78 million) even remember giving
personal information to the attackers – one million more unreported incidents are estimated.
In fact this results in an estimated loss of 1.2 billion US dollars per year in the US only.
A Gartner report of 2005 mentioned in InformationWeek [148] reports a little lower figures
with a total US loss of 929 million dollars. In 2006 a followup report [105, 190] reports
an increased average of 1,244 USD stolen per attack (257 USD in 2004) and an average
number of 112 phishing emails per year and consumer. They also report that only 54% of
the consumers recovered from the attacks.
Another 2004 report from the TowerGroup [246] has estimated that the global amount is only
137.1 million USD. John Leyden [162] references this number and compares it to another
global value of a survey by TRUSTe amongst 1,335 US Internet users that reports 500 million
dollars global loss [163].
In an online interview [117] an 18 year old hacker called “lithium” claims to be phishing
since the age of 14 and having stolen over 20 million identities on his own. He claims that
social networking sites with people of 14 years and upwards are the best targets for phishing.
The number of accounts phished by him each day is reported to be 30,000. Selling the data
to scammers he claims to make 3,000 to 4,000 USD. Besides proxies and traffic encryption
he uses egold as a payment provider to not get caught.
More recent numbers are mentioned in the key findings of the Javelin Identity Fraud Report
2013 [141]. They claim that 21 billion US dollars have been stolen which is a rising number
compared to the years before but lower than the all-time-high of 47 billion US dollars in
2004.
In contrast to the aforementioned sources some researchers think that the phishing problem
and the loss of money is largely overestimated. Herley and Florêncio [125] argue that as
the money available to phishers is a limited resource the possible revenue for each phisher
decreases with the number of attacks increasing. This results in an economic curve that at
some points reaches its “equilibrium” where phishing attempts are not lucrative anymore.
The authors think that phishing already passed this point and is on the decline instead of
the rise. They argue that survey-based measurements overestimate because of a range of
introduced biases. In their estimate 0.37% of the web users are phished each year with only
half of those really loosing money. Applying an estimated loss of 200 USD per attempt they
end up with a total loss of 61 million USD per year.
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More Phishing Facts and Figures
The Pingdom1 website monitoring company each year compiles a report about the “Internet
in Numbers”. In its 2012 report [235] they mention a total number of 144 billion email mes-
sages that are sent per day and the fact that 0.23% of those are phishing in nature. Detailed
numbers on this are found in a Symantec intelligence report [213]. 26% of these emails
originate in the UK whereas 20% originate in the US. The phishing website locations are di-
verse: Here 54.7% are hosted in the US with Germany on the second place hosting 4.8% of
the phishing websites. 56% of the websites created, use automatic toolkits whereas banking
websites are by far the most attacked sector with 38.6%.
A huge source for concrete data on phishing attempts is the APWG (already mentioned
earlier). From time to time they publish a survey on phishing statistics they have gathered.
In the most recent one available [243] Rasmussen and Aaron present a lot of details on
phishing attempts that happened in the first half of 2012. Their report is based on 93,462
incidents that appeared on 64,204 different domains using 202 different TLDs2. This means
that per domain on average 1.46 phishing attacks are hosted. About two percent of those
attacks use IP-addresses instead of domain names whereas 12% make use of maliciously
registered domain names. The rest of the attacks are hosted somewhat differently (e.g. at free
hosting services). Overall 486 different institutions/brands have been attacked. Concerning
the homograph attack (mentioned earlier) only 58 of the websites make use of IDNs3, hence
the number of homograph attack domains must be less than 0.09%. About 80 percent of the
attacks are carried out using hacked servers and only some attacks are hosted on registered
domains or free web space. The number of phishing URLs that are “disguised” using URL
shortener services is small (only 0.005%). The time that phishing websites stay online is
getting shorter each year. For the attacks mentioned here the average uptime of an attack
was 23 hours and 10 minutes.
When measuring those times, most of the time a certain bias is introduced as researchers
do not collect the malicious links from own emails they received but rather use collection
sites like PhishTank. Using the appearance of a phishing site in such a list as the time of
appearance of a phishing website at all may be wrong. The phishing site could have been
online for quite while until it is reported to the respective directory. A correct measurement
for the time of appearance of a website would usually be the point in time when the phishing
website is first made public (e.g. by sending the first phishing email containing the link).
Determining this point in time is nearly impossible.
1 www.pingdom.com
2 A top-level-domain (TLD) is the most important part of a domain name (e.g. .com, .org, .de) [237].
3 IDN stands for internationalized domain name and denotes domain names that make use of glyphs or other
non-standard characters from the unicode character set. In fact a IDN is registered using a specific notation
that uses only ASCII characters. This notation is called “Punycode”4 [83].
4 In Punycode notation special characters are basically skipped and replaced by a dash at the end of the original
string. Finally the missing characters are prepended encoded to be readable by a state machine [56].
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In Germany the Bundeskriminalamt also keeps track of Cybercrime incidents in an annual
report [38]. For 2011 they report 6,422 phishing incidents and losses of 25,7 million Euro.
Niels Provos from the security team of Google Safe Browsing [111] reports that 9,500 mali-
cious websites are added to their index each day [239]. About one third of these entries are
phishing attacks [112] the rest are malware websites.
A very recent report from the Kaspersky Labs [146] sees phishing still being on a major rise
(87% up in one year). In their 2013 report they saw phishing attacks on 37.3 million users
within one year. The number of distinct attacking IP-addresses also rose to 24.1 million. That
means that there is one IP-address available for less than two attacked users. According to
their report Germany is after the US and the United Kingdom the third most attacked country
in the world. The most interesting finding from this report is the fact the the attack channel
of email links only makes up 12.1% of the attacks whereas the majority of 87.9% is spread
out using other websites. CTO Nikita Shvetsov reports that phishing is now a separate and
clearly visible threat [256].
Moore and Clayton [203] report in their work about web server statistics they gathered from
real phishing websites. They drew many conclusions from this data. The most important
one perhaps being that approx. 25 victims enter sound data on a phishing website the day it
is first set up and 10 more data sets follow with each day the same page remains online.
3.1.2 Who is Falling for Phishing and Why?
As mentioned in the beginning security is never the primary goal [296] but is this fact enough
to account for all the people falling for phishing attacks? In fact many of the phishing baits
sent out even catch users by saying that they are about the security of the user’s account.
This subsection elaborates on different research works that have looked at the issue of why
people fall for phishing and why phishing attacks seem sound to them.
“Why Phishing Works” by Dhamija et al. [67] is one of the first and most cited papers for
research about user behavior and phishing. In a study they showed 20 phishing and non-
phishing websites to 22 participants and let them determine which ones were fraudulent. In
one case more than 90% of the participants were fooled by an attack. From this data they
deduced three major problems why users fail to detect websites: A “lack of knowledge”
about computer systems and security indicators is on the one hand a problem why users
are not able to judge attacks correctly. Using “visual deception” the phishers craft texts,
images and look and feels that are so close to the original ones that the users are unable
to notice any difference. In combination with “bounded attention” of the users they fail to
notice the presence or absence of security indicators. More recently in 2011 Erkillä [82]
summarized related studies of the past years and adds another important property to the list.
The strong feeling of the user to be secure in the browser and to be in control of what happens
make users ignore security warnings more easily. According to Papachristos [229] the visual
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properties seem to be extremely strong as user judgments about website parameters like
“visual appeal”, “usability” or even “credibility” are made within fractions of a second.
Downs et al. [72] asked 232 participants of a survey about their behavior towards certain
suspicious emails, websites and URLs. People that were able to correctly define the term
role play, where significantly less likely to fall for the attacks. They also found out that the
level of perceived severity of possible consequences cannot be used to predict participant
behavior.
Sajano and Wilson [273] looked more generally at the reasons why people fall for scams and
report eight principles as reasons for that: the distraction – users taking care only for what
they want to do, neglecting the security components around that procedure – and the social
compliance principle – people should not question authority – perhaps being the ones most
important for phishing.
Rick Wash [291] looked at the folk models that people make up about security and hackers.
According to his research people see hackers as “digital graffiti artists”, “burglars who break
into computers” or “contractors that support criminals”. He argues that the models that users
make up about attackers should be taken into account when creating security help and advice.
He also gives a list of possible pieces of advice and matches those to his folk models.
Similar to that Friedman et al. [98, 99] looked at how people understand things like “secure
connections” and what they fear about security on the Internet. They compared rural to
suburban to high-tech users and found interesting differences. E.g. technology-savvy users
are more afraid of information loss (92%) than rural users (54%).
Downs et al. [73] conducted interviews with 20 non-expert computer users to understand
their decision-making when encountering suspicious emails. The participants saw eight
emails in a roleplay within-subject study and were asked how they would behave with each
of the emails (three emails were non-phishing). The authors report three strategies that make
people fall for phishing: “This email appears to be for me”, “It’s normal to hear from com-
panies you do business with”, “Reputable companies will send emails”. Asking for the cues
that make the users suspicious 95% mentioned a spoofed “from” address, secure site lock
icons (85%), broken images on a web page (80%) and unexpected or strange URLs (55%).
Florêncio and Herley [92] have collected a lot of data about password usage on different
websites by using data gathered through the Microsoft Windows Live Toolbar in a period of
approximately three months. Results show that in average 6.5 different passwords are used
for 25 accounts that a user has in average. Stronger passwords are reused more seldom than
weak passwords and per day a user types in average 8.1 passwords. Concerning phishing,
the authors used a by-URL analysis that was cross-referenced with a list of known phishing
attacks to show that annually at least 0.4% of the users submit a password to a phishing
website.
Furnell et al. [102] looked at the security perceptions of 415 personal Internet users in 2007.
Although 93% of the participants of their online survey rated themselves to be intermedi-
ate or advanced level users only 20% are “very confident” with the security of their home
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computer. Concerning different types of threats, “phishing” is by far the least known threat.
Only 68% claimed to understand this security related term – compared to at least 83% un-
derstanding for all other terms.
In a study with 398 subjects rating emails and websites according to their degree of phishi-
ness Tsow and Jakobsson [284] discovered that URLs can change authenticity ratings and
that the overuse of security advice can have negative effects.
Mannan and van Oorshot [176] looked at the problems that users face especially with online
banking and its guidelines. Whenever a bank tells their customers to watch out for suspicious
login URLs but uses a long and complicated login URL themselves it gets hard for the users
to follow the advice. Similar problems occur with guidelines about SSL indicators (like the
lock icon). Asking users about their behavior not even all of them (93%) sign out at the end
of a banking session.
To better understand the problems that phishing threats pose to the user Dong et al. [70]
tried to model user-phishing interaction. They also argue that throughout the user’s decision
making process to a take an action or not the perception construction is most important as
this defines whether a user will fall for an attack or not. A misperception occurs due to three
different reasons: insufficient information, misinterpretation and “incomplete expectation
perception ability drop”.
In 2010, Sheng et al. [261] looked at phishing susceptibility of users more closely. They
showed phishing emails to 1001 mechanical turk5 users and did a regression analysis on
different demographic properties afterwards. The results showed that female users are sig-
nificantly more prone to fall for phishing as male users. The same is true for the age group of
users between 18 and 25. Participants that rated themselves as more technologically knowl-
edgeable and more risk averse people were less likely to fall for phishing attacks.
Blythe et al. [33] did an online survey with 224 respondents to measure their ability to
differentiate between spam and phishing emails. The users succeeded in detecting an average
of 7.2 of 10 phishing emails whilst misclassifying 5.7 of 10 genuine emails as phishing. The
authors also found that including a logo in the phishing email makes a significant difference.
3.2 The Current State of Detection Methods
Current web browsers and other computer software like anti-virus software are already trying
to protect the computer users from the phishing problem using various ways described in this
section. Some of these methods have their roots in economic product development rather
than research. Whatever measures taken so far they are still not yet protective enough and
the phishers find ever new ways of avoiding the detection methods. This chapter will first
5 Mechanical Turk is a platform dedicated to offering companies a platform to have humans work on human
intelligence tasks they get paid for. Such tasks can also cover the participation in research
experiments [10, 299].
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look at the most common protection method of black- and whitelists moving on to additional
security toolbars that can be installed in the browser. After that the possibilities of virus
scanners, typo checkers and law enforcement are discussed before taking a look at whether
a complete change to the Internet architecture could possibly solve the phishing problem.
3.2.1 Black- and Whitelists
Blacklists are the main source of phishing protection that today’s browsers offer to their
users [260]. The browsers match a visited website URL against a list of known malicious
websites and disable the access to that website using a warning screen. The Mozilla Firefox
and the Google Chrome browser both use the “Google Safe Browsing environment” [111]
while Microsoft’s Internet Explorer has a so called “SmartScreen Filter” [194]. In case of the
Google Safe Browsing environment [111] for example two different types of protection exist
for privacy reasons: An “enhanced” mode looks up every entry in an online blacklist whereas
the second mode maintains a local blacklist of phishing pages for privacy reasons. To enforce
this detection a single “phishing warden” exists for the application monitoring all HTTP
requests to determine whether the request is blacklisted. URLs are not sent unencrypted
over the network: instead a shared secret is generated using a HTTPS connection which is
then used to encrypt the URL traffic to the blacklist server.
In fact blacklist based solutions today can be completely sidelined by attackers. This can be
accomplished by completely personalizing each URL sent to the users. If the URLs are then
blocked on basis of the URLs each submitted URL will only belong to one attacked user
and it will be useless to add it onto a blacklist once it has been detected. Using IP-address
based blocking can also be subverted by phishers using “fast-flux networks” [203]. In such
cases page requests are handled not by a single computer at a specific IP, instead an army
of computers is used, swapping the DNS records of a website to ever new computers and IP
locations. Even when storing the captured credentials phishers have invented a clever tactic
by storing the information gathered on other online services encrypted or hidden in a way
they cannot be found (e.g. embedded in images) [140]. This makes it possible to retrieve the
information even if the machine hosting the attack is taken down.
Sheng et al. [264] did an empirical analysis of phishing blacklists using 191 fresh phishing
reports being less than 30 minutes old. During their tests most of the blacklists caught less
than 20% of the attacks initially. Even after 48 hours the coverage of all blacklists was still
below 90%. However, blacklists do work well concerning false positives. For a second test
set of 13,458 legitimate URLs not a single URL was accidentally reported as being phishing.
A recent study by NSS Labs [219] looking at how current browsers are capable of detecting
754 samples of “malicious software” showed a major improvement of the Internet Explorer
browser to detect 83.17% through URL reputation but but finding another 16.79% through
application reputation for the given test set. The report does not cover extensive data about
false positives.
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At least for a large number of today’s attacks blacklists still seem to be the right answer but
could cease to work, once more attackers have adapted to the blacklist protection. Jung and
Sit [144] have examined DNS6 blacklists for spam filtering and found that the traffic pro-
duced by spam and blacklist lookups is increasing and that the number of blacklists entries
between blacklists can differ to up to 87%.
3.2.2 Security Toolbars
The list of existing toolbar protection approaches is long and Stepp and Collberg [277] tried
to summarize them. They cluster toolbars into different categories. “Information-oriented
tools” report more information to the user than would usually be present (e.g. “SpoofGuard”,
“SpoofStick”, “Trust Toolbar”). “Database-oriented tools” rely on database information be-
ing maintained on other servers and are dependent of this backend that could possibly take
better decisions (e.g. “Cloudmark”, “eBay Toolbar”). Finally they talk about “Domain-
oriented tools” relying on the fact that malicious websites have nearly no possiblity to fake
the original URL of a website (e.g. “PwdHash”, “RoboForm”).
In 2007 Zhang et al. [335] evaluated a large list of those toolbars and other existing anti-
phishing tools including the blacklists used by Firefox and Google as well as some toolbars
dedicated to user security (e.g. the eBay toolbar). For a total of twelve different tools
they evaluated which percentage of phishing websites are correctly identified and how those
detection rates evolve as time passes by. Depending on the method used, between 28% and
91% of the phishing websites were initially discovered by the tools. Tools having a high
detection rate usually had a lot of false positives (92% for the tool that detected 91% of the
phishing websites). This shows that these tools do not work perfectly. In an interviews series
conducted with 31 security experts Sheng et al. [262] compiled 18 recommendations for
phishing countermeasures of the future. The fifth recommendation addresses the detection
rate of such tools:
}Web browser vendors should continue to improve the performanceof integrated browser antiphishing warning systems, with a goal to catch
90% of phishing URLs within an hour after they go online.”~– Sheng et al. 2009 [262] –
3.2.3 Virus Scanners
Virus scanning software more and more tries to protect their users from any security problem
anywhere on their computing hardware. To accomplish this they even monitor the network
6 DNS is the Domain Name System that is used to built up and resolve Internet Domain Names to
IP-addresses [202].
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traffic going to the computer’s web browsers and try to disable problematic traffic. The
measurements taken are similar to the ones used by toolbars. Blacklists are used as a first
line of defense usually combined with some HTML heuristics afterwards [253].
3.2.4 Typo Checkers
For web browsers additional plugins exist that protect the users from mistyping URLs [226,
227]. This can also protect the user from similarly spelled phishing domains. The problem
here is that it is hard to determine whether the different domain name has not been typed on
purpose. On the other hand, some of the plugins only work for hand-typed URLs and not for
ones that have been clicked in emails or for links on websites. In those cases the phishing
protection is lowered to a minimum. The research question in how far URL typos can be
used for phishing detection is tackled by one of the projects of this thesis in section 5.4.
3.2.5 Law Enforcement and Website Takedown
As with classical real world criminals the creators of phishing attacks should be tracked
down by law enforcement agencies. Due to the global nature of the Internet and the speed at
which phishing attacks are brought up and taken offline, this is close to impossible.
More importantly website and hosting operators need to take down a phishing attack once it
occurred on a system. Although the average online time of a phishing already is at a historic
low of 23 hours (as reported above) [243] Moore and Clayton [204] examined the impact
of website takedown. They found that the first day of an attack usually yields the largest
number of credentials by examining website logs of real phishing websites. However, the
numbers of credentials entered does not drop to zero after a longer period of time. In one ex-
ample a phishing website that was online for more than a month still received a steady stream
of phishing responses. This shows that although website takedown cannot be a final answer
to the problem it needs to be carried out as fast as possible. Sheng et al. [262] also have
proposed some recommendations for law enforcement. They suggest to improve interna-
tional cooperation, provide law enforcement with better capabilities and to get corporations
to submit more fraud data to law enforcement agencies.
3.2.6 Changing The Internet Architecture
As already mentioned earlier the core of the problem lies in the Internet architecture that
allows the avoidance of methods mentioned in this chapter and allows to spoof websites of
other companies (see section 2.2). However, changing the Internet architecture is close to
impossible. Hartman [119] has proposed changes to the architecture that would make phish-
ing impossible. The overarching goal would be to protect against the fact that confidential
3.3 The Current State of User Intervention 49
information is disclosed to any parties that are not allowed to receive the data. According
to Hartman more sophisticated login methods like smartcards should be supported; it needs
to be possible to have a trusted user interface for websites. Another necessity Hartman pro-
poses would be that a website does never receive a “strong password equivalent” (as it is
today). He proposes to have passwords that are used to authenticate but are never transmit-
ted in full to the authentication partner. If the partner would not be the intended recipient he
would then be unable to reuse the received token for login at the original website. Most of
Hartman’s propositions (in case they could be implemented and deployed) target authentica-
tion processes. The implementation of those would hence not protect the user from phishing
of other confidential information. Similar to this RSA7 [252] proposes the use of two-factor
authentication to counter phishing attacks. In fact a proper use of one-time passwords8 for
example can help to avoid the successful logon of attackers. Again this would only pro-
tect authentication credentials and implies and additional security hurdle users have to pass.
Oppliger and Gejek [225] discuss other possible protection methods on the browser and on
the client side.
3.3 The Current State of User Intervention
To this point the lack of phishing protection has been presented to be mostly due to a lack
of proper detection methods. But once a suspicious website is found the way of proper
intervention9 comes into play. This other side of the coin is equally important. This chapter
first looks into general warning research from the “offline world” that has a long and detailed
tradition and then moves on to warning research in the computer and more specifically the
web browser space to find out why warnings do not work as intended by their creators.
3.3.1 Classical Warning Research
Creating warnings in the “offline world” is very different than it is on the screen. On the one
hand the number of possible parameters that can be changed for a warning is much larger
(e.g. material, size, colorspace, actively lit); computer warnings are limited to the same pixel
and color space that all other display elements occupy. On the other hand computer warnings
can be much more flexible including dynamic elements or even changing contents.
7 RSA is an american network security company selling authentication tokens [311].
8 One Time Passwords are additional security tokens that can only be used once. For another authentication
attempt another password is needed. This kind of authentication has the advantage, that a password that has
been captured by an attacker is useless to him as it can not be used for a second authentication attempt
performed by the attacker. To work as intended the range of possible one time passwords should be large
and the duration of validity for each password should be short [308].
9 As defined in the introduction of this thesis the term “intervention” is used here for any means a system
(mainly a browser) takes to inform the user of a risk or to avoid the entering of critical information by the
user.
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Figure 3.1: Left: Communication-Human Information Processing Model (C-
HIP) [315] [redrawn]; Right: the enhanced Human in the Loop Model (HITL) [60]
[redrawn]
Michael Wogalter has compiled a major collection of warning research in his “Handbook of
Warnings” [316] that gives a good introduction into general warning literature. In the scope
of this book he defines a warning as follows:
Warning}Warnings are safety communications used to inform peo-ple about hazards so that undesirable consequences are avoided or mini-
mized.~ – Michael Wogalter 2006 [317] –
Besides, warnings have four important functions: they are used to communicate safety infor-
mation, should be able to influence peoples’ behavior, prevent injury and property damage
and finally serve as a reminder [317].
As a surrounding basis for warning research Wogalter presents the Communication-Human
Information Processing Model (C-HIP) [315] (see left side of figure 3.1). It starts with a
source of warning information that is translated in several stages to finally end up in some
specific form of behavior. Inside the receiving person a variety of parameters influence the
final resulting behavior: attention switch (can the warning attract attention?); attention main-
tenance (is it really examined?); comprehension (is the meaning understood?); beliefs and
attitudes (with which the warning has to comply) and finally the motivation to really carry
out the intended behavior. The whole model is designed as a loopback process between the
different stages that also takes environmental stimuli into account. Although not primar-
ily made for computer warnings it matches perfectly to the problems that occur with the
perceptions of computer warnings.
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Lorrie Faith Cranor [60] extended this model (see right side of figure 3.1) to fit even more
closely to computer security with the goal that user security problems can be explored during
the design phase of new software. She also also applies her model to anti-phishing tools to
show how her metrics could be applied there.
In classical warning research the methodology is similar to what will be used later on in
this thesis. It makes use of self-reported data through interviews and questionnaires but also
measures quantitative data using head movements, eye tracking and response time [268] (see
section 3.7 for more details).
Together with active warnings (bound to sensors) the problem of false alarms came up [31]
(e.g. smoke detectors). This false alarm effect is also called the cry-wolf phenomenon. It un-
derstands both the human receiving the warning and the sensor reporting it as detectors and
defines responsiveness as a function of both elements. A lot of different theories about this
way of signal mistrust have been set up by warning researchers and several mediators have
been found that have an impact on warning mistrust: signal urgency, hearsay information,
signal stimulus modality, signal reaction mode and information redundancy. To get rid of
the problem the detection threshold can be adjusted, operators can be trained to handle false
alarms or the workload of checking the warning could be optimized.
Another major problem with security warnings – similar to the cry-wolf phenomenon –
are habituation effects. Users get used to those warnings and always perform a standardized
action with each warning to get rid of it. Amer and Maris [11] conducted an experiment with
88 participants to prove this. The participants had to enter sales data into a computer form.
After submitting each data block a warning dialog was presented that needed the choice of
“yes” or “no” to enter the data. The measured reading times of the warning declined quickly
from 15 seconds in average to about 2 seconds. After the eighth exposure of the warning
a different warning dialog was presented that looked similar to the first one but required
an inverted answer. In this case only 11% of the users spotted the change and pressed the
correct option of the warning dialog.
Wogalter et al. [320] see computer displays and the world wide web as a chance for better
warnings rather than a problem, offering more flexibility for displaying data. Within this
thesis we can see that the possibilities gained through computer screens are not used well
and the problem of false alarms is even bigger with computers than it is in standard warning
scenarios.
3.3.2 Computer-Specific Warning Literature
Research how users perceive computer security and its warnings has also started early and
forms the basis of the research on usable security. One of the most fundamental papers was
written in 1999 by Alma Whitten and J.D. Tygar [296]. Whilst testing users for their under-
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standing and ability to use PGP 5.010 the majority of the users failed. The authors derived
different “problematic properties” from the experiment, the most important one being “the
unmotivated user property” in other terms that security is a secondary goal to users.
In 2004, Dourish et al. [71] found users being frustrated towards security. They perceive
security as a barrier and want it to be either delegated towards technology or other individuals
or organizations. Users don’t use technical means to apply security but rely on other methods
like obscuring (e.g. by not mentioning exact details in an email conversation where the
communication partner can understand the details from the context). Windows user account
control (UAC)11 for example is not correctly applied by 69% of the users [210].
Cormac Herley [123] thinks that this rejection of security by the user is rather rational be-
cause the overall costs of security cannot cover the benefits that arise by conforming to
security. He uses password rules, certificate errors and security teaching to prove his point.
Bravo-Lillo et al. [34] built a detailed mental model of user behavior to warning messages.
They differentiate between novice and advanced users stating that novice users have a binary
understanding of warnings (either that their computer is infected or the warning is not actu-
ally a problem). Advanced users are able to judge the safety of their actions before engaging
in them and consider more factors for their decisions.
This shows that computer warnings in general already pose a problem to the users’ under-
standing and will to obey them. Other literature has looked specifically at warnings inside
the browser meant to protect the users from phishing. Whalen and Inkpen [294] already
looked at eye-tracking data in browser security in 2005. In two phases they observed the
viewing behavior of participants during web browsing with and without security priming.
Without security priming not a single instance of security checks on any security indicator
was found at all, even though the participants had to carry out tasks involving seemingly
confidential information. This shows that indicators like the https-protocol indicator or the
lock-icon simply are not noticed. After security instructions 25% of the participants still did
not look at any security indicator. The most examined indicator was the lock icon (69%).
Bardzell et al. [21] describe important issues of the human context of phishing. They empha-
size that compliance with security protocols is not automatically done by users; it depends
on their perception of the risk that may happen. A lack of understanding of security and
privacy problems poses a problem that users cannot understand the security indicators they
nevertheless do not notice.
Tyler Close from the W3C [53] identified some general problems for web browser warnings
today. A poorly defined area for the browser chrome – the area of the browser surround-
ing the website contents – makes it possible to fake web-browser indicators, for example
by using picture-in-picture-attacks (displaying the picture of a non existent browser within
10 PGP stands for “Pretty Good Privacy” and is a computer software made for cryptographic data handling
primarily used in email communication [310].
11 UAC is used by Windows operating systems from Vista upwards to limit standard application rights. If
needed the user can elevate a software to administrative rights by confirming a security dialog [196].
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the browsers content area). Despite, some of the information in the chrome can already
be altered by an attacker to the degree that the user cannot easily spot the difference (e.g.
subdomains instead of real domain names). As a last point Close mentions the bad user
understanding of the chrome area. Besides the fact that picture-in-picture attacks are not
very often used the browser chrome technically is the most trustable area of the browser user
interface. I will make use of it for example in the project in subchapter 5.6.
In section 3.2.2 we already saw that the detection rate of security toolbars is not optimal, but
even more important is the fact whether users would be able to take notice of suggestions
made by the toolbars. Wu et al. [324] presented 30 subjects with 20 different emails, five of
which were phishing attacks. They created three different toolbars to see how many people
would fall for attacks despite being warned by the toolbars’ indicators. In average 52% of
the attacks were successfully showing that security toolbar warnings don’t work well yet.
Egelman et al. [78] evaluated web browsing phishing warnings two years later. They com-
pared two actively blocking warnings (Firefox, IE), to passive warnings (not blocking the
interaction with the website) and a control condition with no warning at all. 70 participants
were assigned to four different warning conditions and were presented with spoofed emails
that arrived at their personal inbox after purchasing two items on shopping websites. All but
two people fell for the emails and clicked on the phishing link but the first active warning
was able to prevent all of the users from entering data on the phishing website. For the
second active warning still only 45% of the users entered their data. Looking at the passive
warning and the control condition 90% of the participants entered their data, showing that
passive warnings are more or less useless in this context.
Sunshine et al. [280] looked at the effectiveness of SSL warnings. In their study, 409 survey
respondents were asked about how they would behave for certain SSL warning situations.
They showed that for warnings that are harder to ignore people that don’t understand the
warnings are more likely to heed these. People that understood the warnings acted depending
on the type of warning. In this experiment no attacking websites were used. The warnings
were shown on original websites and hence could have denoted man-in-the-middle attacks.
3.4 Phishing Education
Security education is a highly controversial topic among researchers and although many
companies and agencies offer security advice and learning material on phishing [37,222,287]
the general idea of phishing education contradicts the fact that security is never the users
primary goal [296] to some extent.
Jakob Nielsen [217] and Stefan Görling [113] see user education as being the failure of de-
velopers to come up with systems that are secure enough by design. He argues that with
the help of HCI, security must not be “added” but “should be integrated with the users an-
ticipated behaviour”. Besides, the level of education and the actual behavior of the user are
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not necessarily the same thing. However, after interviewing 31 security experts, Sheng et
al. [262] found that most of them agree that education and awareness are phishing counter-
measures that need to be emphasized more.
In contrast to Nielsen and Görling, Sheng et al. [263] showed that phishing education using
the playful approach of a game does a better job in teaching people about phishing URLs
than tutorials or other training materials do. Playing a game called anti-phishing phil, users
arrived at 87% correctness rate when classifying URLs between phishing and non-phishing.
Existing training material (74%) and a crafted training material (80%) performed worse.
Nevertheless all materials increased success above the baseline of about 65%. With concepts
like this several companies offer the service of training employees towards phishing. Besides
Anti-Phishing-Phil being offered as a product [321] other companies like phishme.com [232]
even offer the possibility to deliberately spear phish employees for educational purposes.
They claim to have successfully “phished and educated” over 3.1 million people.
Also in 2007 Kumaraguru et al. [155] designed a phishing email training system that is
supposed to be used within the standard email reading tasks of a user. Within this study the
researchers also found that a comic strip as teaching material is better suited than textual
notices or a text and graphics intervention. In another work Kumaraguru et al. [156, 157]
looked at how retention and transfer of phishing education can be enhanced. Participants
received three sets of emails. One before training, a second one immediately afterwards
and a third one, one week later to measure the success of training and its retention. Using
embedded training material the immediate and delayed correctness rates where much higher.
Sheng et al. [261] combined Anti-Phishing-Phil, the comic strip used by Kumaraguru et al.
and other training materials in a larger questionnaire study with 1001 respondents. The
percentage of attacks people fell for dropped from 47% to 28%. All education materials
performed similarly well in this study.
3.5 Research Concepts for Detection
As security is most often taken as a solely technical topic, first security research on phishing
also tried to find technical means to counteract successful phishing attempts. This chapter
covers research approaches that try to detect or prevent phishing from a technical perspec-
tive. Although this thesis focuses mainly on the detection of phishing attempts, a reasonable
amount of related work exists that tries to make phishing impossible by designing new types
of authentication for example. Some of these concepts are briefly explained in section 3.5.1.
When trying to detect phishing websites automatically, the different features that can be
used for such a detection are limited: technical connection properties, textual content, visual
appearance or combinations of those. Hence the successive sections report about phishing
detection methodologies that have been developed on basis of this classification.
3.5 Research Concepts for Detection 55
3.5.1 General Phishing Defense
A big problem about phishing is the fact that users can enter any kind of credentials at any
website. Impostors can collect and store these credentials and reuse them anywhere else. If
it would be impossible for the users to resubmit the credentials of another site at a phishing
website the problem would be solved at least concerning authentication credentials. Ross et
al. [249] created “PwdHash” that does not use the user’s actual secret credentials to login to
a website but instead creates a hash out of the user’s password combined with the domain of
the website or other information. Like this the users original password is never submitted to
the server. Since the domain of a phishing website differs, the hash value generated with the
same password would be a different one and the original user credentials would remain safe.
A major downside of this principle is that it already has to be present when registering new
accounts. Besides this, Chiasson et al. [48] did a usability study on the system and found out
that it significantly reduces usability of the password input sequence. Only 42% of the users
were able to successfully mitigate their password towards the new system. A similar system
has been created by Yee and Sitaker [332]: “Passpet” allows the user to create and store
user credentials for websites by associating a pet name to each website. Upon revisiting the
website the credentials for the website are automatically resolved. Passwords here are also
generated by a hashing process using a master password for the whole browser. Individual
site passwords are transparent to the user.
Other methods try to detect or fool phishing websites by submitting random data to the web-
sites. The concept of Chandrasekaran et al. [42] envisions to retrieve URLs from suspicious
emails, visit them in an automatic manner and feeding such a website with artificial creden-
tials. If a website does not properly reject those credentials it could be a phishing attempt
that collects this data. “BogusBiter” by Yue and Wang [333] submits a large number of user
credentials to suspected websites whenever the user submits her own credentials. The ad-
ditionally submitted credentials are very similar to the original credentials submitted by the
user and the real login credentials are injected somewhere between all other fake credentials.
Using this technique it should become cumbersome for an attacker to manually filter the
submitted credentials for the real one.
Another set of approaches introduces an additional authentication token that is not controlled
by the user itself and can hence not be accidentally entered on a different website. Parno et
al. [230] suggest to store a secure credential on the users mobile phone that is then used
for every authentication attempt. In case of failure of this additional device the user then
would not be able to authenticate anymore. BeamAuth [6] uses a browser bookmark and the
fragment part of the URL12 to store an additional authentication token there. This token can
be read by a JavaScript function and can be transferred together with the standard credentials
to the server. An attacker would be able to only steal the standard credentials but would miss
12 The fragment part of the URL is appended at the very end after a hash symbol and is usually used to
navigate the browsers viewport to a specific place on the loaded page [27] (e.g.
http://www.website.com/book.html#secondchapter)
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the token taken from the bookmarked URL. The problem here is that a user not having his
login-bookmark ready will not be able to authenticate to the website.
Other approaches tend to find phishing attacks by looking at the password entry behavior of
a large user base. Florêncio and Herley [91,94] let a central server monitor which credentials
are used by which users on which domain (for privacy reasons only hashes of the credentials
and domains are stored). If it occurs that different users reuse their credentials from domain
A on a different domain B that is unknown this might denote a phishing attack and although
the credentials of those users would have been lost one would still be able to immediately
tell which users have fallen for the attack and alert them.
Jakobsson and Myers [138] want to introduce a feedback loop into the password entry pro-
cess. For each character of a password a user enters on a website, a response image will be
displayed by the user, slowly forming a series of those images that should be easily recog-
nizable by the user. If the image does not look like the one the user is used to, she either
entered the wrong password or entered her password on a different website (hence a potential
phishing website). This could already be detected with the first few characters of a password
such that a user could stop revealing the complete password immediately. For this concept
the way and the speed of the average password entry are a problem. Entering a password
character by character waiting for a server response in between can be very cumbersome,
especially as some users don’t even bother to look on the screen during password entry.
One final set of concepts tries to preprocess webcontent to make it more trustworthy.
Miyamoto et al. [198] want to sanitize malicious web content by cleaning it on a proxy
server before sending it to the users browser. Known phishing inputs should simply be re-
moved from the websites before arriving at the user. The ability to correctly differentiate
between phishing and non-phishing websites is a requirement needed by their system with-
out stating any possible detection method. Shin et al. [266] propose the reverse by creating
“prooflets” denoting signed HTML code that is guaranteed to come from a specific source.
All concepts presented in this section are only useful for the protection of user account
credentials. Other credentials or information like credit card data, social security information
or bank account data could still be requested by phishers on their websites without being
noticed. A general protection concept for all critical information still has to be found.
3.5.2 Detection Attempts for Different Features
Although black- and whitelists are known not to be the final answer to the phishing problem
they still are an effective concept in productive use. Hence a couple of researchers thought of
ways to enhance the concept. Prakash et al. [238] tried to use predictive blacklisting to find
new phishing websites by combining known websites. They discovered around 18,000 new
phishing URLs from a set of 6,000 initial blacklist entries. Using five heuristics they generate
new URLs (e.g. by replacing the TLD) and validate their existence and their similarity with
a known phishing website afterwards. A very similar approach was taken by Felegyhazi
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et al. [84] who derived 3.5 to 15 new blacklist entries from an existing entry. Instead of a
blacklist extension Cao et al. [41] propose to manage an “automated individual white-list”
that alerts the user whenever she is about to conduct suspicious logins. The system needs
a training phase to build up the initial whitelist for the user and afterwards uses a classifier
to distinguish real from fraudulent logon websites. They show that the number of unknown
new login websites that appear decreases to nearly zero within a week. Although the general
black- and whitelist concepts can be enhanced they still lack the problems of missing or
incorrect entries and the problem of a missing zero hour detection. For projects within this
thesis black- and whitelists are hence not primarily used. In cases where it is important to
reduce the number of false positives a detector has, a whitelist might come in handy (e.g. in
one of my projects in section 5.5).
URLs cannot only be used to put them on black or whitelists. A lot of related work takes
them into account to compute the probability of a phishing attack. Ma et al. [172, 173] use
lexical and host-based features of a URL to train a machine learning classifier. The lexical
features are taken from different related work [153, 189] whereas the host-based features
contain WHOIS13 properties – like the date of registration – or domain name properties –
like the Time-To-Live14 of the DNS record –. Using a test set of 15,000 benign and 5,500
malicious URLs they compared different sets of the acquired features and using the full
set of features they were able to reduce their error rate to 1.24%. Garera et al. [104] also
trained a logistic regression classifier with features to detect four different phishing URL
types (IP-address attacks, attacks using the brand name in the path, large hostname attacks,
misspelled domains). As features they make use of URL properties stored by Google like
the PageRank15 or a quality score of a website but also use domain based features and try to
identify possible obfuscation types. Using their approach they arrive at a false positive rate
of 1.2%. Blum et al. [32] use the “confidence weighted algorithm” and base their research
on the research by Ma et al. [172, 173] excluding the host-based features but extending the
lexical feature set to 25 lexical features. They achieve an error rate of 3%. Within this thesis
I also studied the idea of making use of the URL as means to detect phishing. The project
in section 5.4 explains how we tried to use the spell checking algorithms of major search
engines to detect phishing attempts using the URL.
Moving away from URL and domain name features other properties of websites have also
been used for detection. For the forthcoming related work a classification and logical order-
ing is not easy. Researchers make use of HTML content, machine learning, visual properties
of the HTML content, or visual similarity between rendered images of a website in all dif-
ferent kinds of combinations. The following paragraphs start with the more content oriented
related work moving to the visual similarity related work. To get a better understanding of
13 WHOIS is a protocol that allows to query properties of registered domains (e.g. the owner) [314].
14 Time-To-Live of a DNS record limits the validity of a propagated DNS record before it needs to be
reacquired at the host server owning the DNS record [312].
15 PageRank is an index of the importance of a website measured by Google. The basic algorithm is based on
the number incoming and outgoing links a website has. An equal starting score assigned to every website is
split up and accumulated for the incoming links [309].
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7 Chou1et1alZ pXXf ✓ ✓ ✓
8 Zhang1et1alZ pXX8 ✓ ✓ ✓
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RX Xing1et1alZ pXRR ✓ ✓
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Rp Wenyin1et1alZ1 pXXU
Rv Whittaker1et1alZ pXRX ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Rf Xiang1et1alZ1 pXRR
R/ Dunlop1et1alZ pXRX ✓
RU Liu1et1alZ1 pXXU ✓ ✓
R7 Medvet1et1alZ1 pXX8 ✓ ✓ ✓
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pX Chen1et1alZ1 pXX9 ✓
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Table 3.2: Different types of detection approaches and their usage throughout the re-
lated work of this subchapter. In general the chaper is moving from content based
detection methods to visual similarity based detection methods taking publication time
into account where possible.
the different methods table 3.2 shows an overview of the different related work mentioned
here.
In 2004, Chou et al. [49] presented one of the first combined concepts using URL check
for misleading URLs, image checks for crosslinked images, link checks (similar to the URL
checks) and password checks (Is a password requested? Does the form use https?) to com-
pute a total spoof score (TSS) of the visited website. Evaluation of SpoofGuard was done
rather informally with fourteen malicious websites and some manual false positive testing
by the authors.
Zhang et al. [336] use the very simple concept of TF-IDF (term frequency-inverse document
frequency) for their detection approach. With TF-IDF the most important words of a doc-
ument are extracted by comparing the number of occurrences of all words in the document
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to the occurrences of the words in the language in general. Using a test set of 100 phishing
websites and 100 legitimate websites the TF-IDF approach achieved a 94% true positive rate
but also had a 30% false positive rate. Hence, the authors added some basic domain and
URL features and optimized their detection rate to 97% true positive and 6% false positive.
Wardman et al. [290] try to use MD5-hashing16 to detect similar phishing attacks. Since
small changes in the HTML code of a website would immediately result in a different hash
value they use MD5 values of all files a website consists of and compare how many files
between two different websites match. They managed to automatically classify 34.1% of a
phishing test set they used.
Xiang et al. [329] try to do “soft matching” of website content against blacklist entries using
the “shingling”-technique. Using a sliding window approach the content of a certain number
of recent Phishing attacks is analyzed and then compared to potential new phishes using n-
grams17 of the website content. They achieve a true positive rate of 70% with their test data
together with a false positive rate of 0.12%. This work extended their prior work [328] using
TF-IDF to find important terms in websites and process the search results of those terms to
validate the currently visited page.
Rosiello et al. [248] extend their AntiPhish-approach [152] with a DOM-Tree18 component.
Within the tag structure of an original and a potential phishing website they try to measure
the similarity by finding the longest similar subtree. Choosing a threshold that detects all
given Phishing websites in their test set, they end up with a false positive rate of 16.9%.
Other researchers rely on machine learning to find phishing websites. Whittaker et al. [295]
from Google Inc. combined features from the page’s URL, the hosting information and
the page’s HTML content. The logistic regression classifier is trained once per day with a
sample of 10 million URLs. Using their model they achieve a high true positive rate of 92%
and a nearly non existing false negative rate of 0.01%. Besides these findings they show
that any website having a Google PageRank of more than 0.5 can usually be neglected as a
possible phishing attempt.
CANTINA+ is another feature-based approach from Xiang et al. [327] in 2011. Before
using machine learning techniques they prepend a hash-based duplicate remover to filter
out websites that are 100% identical and a login form detector to only process websites
16 Hashing is used to map input information to a different (usually much smaller) output. The hash value then
can be used to differentiate between the different inputs. For each hash function it should be very hard to
create a different input the produces the same output (hash collision). Such functions can be used as
cryptographic hash functions. Inputs close to each other should result in very diverse outputs [301]. The
MD5 algorithm is such a function used to generate hash values.
17 N-grams are small subsequences of a larger text symbol sequence that can be used for certain types of
algorithms. Trigrams of words (3-character sub-sequences) are for example used to do language detection
of texts [307].
18 The Document Object Model (DOM) is a convention how nodes in XML, HTML and similar documents
can be represented and addressed. The nodes form a tree-like structure that can be traversed to reach each
node within the document [159].
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containing login forms. Afterwards they use a set of different URL-based, HTML-based and
web-based features including the aforementioned PageRank or the age of the domain. They
evaluated against phishing websites from PhishTank and legitimate websites from Alexa and
the Yahoo19 website directory. Finally they achieve a true positive rate of 93% together with
a false positive rate of 0.4%.
But which machine learning algorithm is best suited for phishing detection? Miyamoto
et al. [199] compared nine different machine learning techniques including the often used
Support Vector Machines (SVM) and logistic regression. By using the feature set of the
classic CANTINA approach (containing eight binary features) they showed that AdaBoost
is the machine learning algorithm that performs best. Within this thesis and its project I
did not make use of machine learning techniques as it was not required for the respective
prototypes. For large classification and optimization task it may still come in handy although
in the case of phishing. However, machine learning also follows known algorithms that can
be exploited by attackers [22].
Another tier of research started to take the visual style of a website into account by trying
to mitigate the effect that Phishers can alter HTML code quite easily without changing the
visual outcome of the rendered website. GoldPhish by Dunlop et al. [76] hence applies
optical character recognition (OCR) to the screenshots taken from websites visited by the
user. Afterwards they submit the captured text line-by-line to a search engine and check
whether the indicated website appears in the top four results. With a limited test set their
system achieved a true positive rate of 98% and had no false positives.
Moving more towards the visual properties, Wenyin et al. [168,169] included “style similar-
ity” into their approach (together with layout and block level similarity) taking features like
font-family or the background-color of a document into account. The approach was tested
with eight phishing websites and 328 original websites. Using a threshold that detects all
phishing websites resulted in a false positive rate of 1%. A threshold value generating no
false positives failed to detect one of the phishing websites (13%).
Medvet et al. [191] compute a page signature out of text elements and image elements,
taking style of the text elements into account but also data of the images (e.g. width and
height) as well as the color histograms. Having two different signatures a similarity score
can be computed assigning different weights to each individual feature comparison. Using
41 positive pairs (that should match) and 161 negative pairs (that should not match) they
achieve and overall false negative rate of 7.4% and a false positive rate of 0%.
Huang et al. [130] included the images on a webpage into their analysis together with URL
keywords extracted from the domain name and content keywords found through TF-IDF.
From the images on a website they tried to find the logo image by intersecting the images
from the different subpages of website. The extracted images are then matched against each
other and the result of this matching is combined with the detection results from the text-
19 www.yahoo.com
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Figure 3.2: Chen et al. [45] use their “Contrast-Context-Histogram” to detect similar
websites finding four image clusters and comparing their similarity.
based features. With a test set of 200 phishing and 270 non-phishing websites they achieved
a false positive rate of 1% and a false negative rate of 6%.
A first attempt to only use visual similarity between websites was done by Fu et al. [101] us-
ing the Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) that is usually used to solve the problem of distribut-
ing goods of producers to consumers. After normalizing website screenshots to a smaller size
and using a degraded color space of 4,096 different values the images are compared using
EMD. The test set used consisted of nine phishing websites compared to 10,272 legitimate
URLs retrieved from Google using certain keywords. Training their thresholds with 1,000
websites the remaining websites achieved a true positive rate of 89% and a true negative rate
of close to 100%.
Chen et al. [45] use their own “Contrast-Context-Histogram”-feature for phishing detection.
It uses neighboring pixels of relative brightness around certain keypoints (see figure 3.2 for
an example). Afterwards four clusters are built on the two webpages and compared against
each other. They evaluated their concept with “several” phishing websites compared against
300 websites of well-known banks and auction services. Within their test set they achieve a
high accuracy between 95% and 98%.
Another team of researchers (also Chen et al.) [47] motivate their comparison approach using
gestalt theory20 thus showing the importance of HCI in the field of phishing research. As a
20 Gestalt theory reasons that the arrangement of individual visual items as a whole determines the meaning of
an image [293].
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similarity metric they use the normalized compression distance (NCD)21. Using bzip222 as a
compressor they tested the similarity value gained by 24 pairs of phishing and non-phishing
websites showing that the NCD values within a pair are lower – hence more similar – than
between comparison with the other websites. In a test with 320 phishing websites for 16
legitimate websites they achieved roughly 95% true positives and 1.7% false positives (here
using LZMA23 as a compressor).
A mix of nearly all possible features is used by Bannur et al. [20]. They use URL proper-
ties, structural properties, page link information, semantic information but finally also visual
features – in this case spatial properties like the roughness, histogram information of the
images, and finally SIFT to identify local visual objects. Using machine learning the fea-
tures were evaluated against a test set of 60,000 phishing and 120,000 non-phishing websites
(70% used for training, 30% used for testing). Including the URL and content-based features
they achieved accuracies up to 98%.
Afroz and Greenstadt [7, 8] call their concept to detect phishing websites “PhishZoo”. In a
first profile making phase profiles of websites that should be protected are extracted. Logo
images have to be manually selected. When searching for phishing websites, the exist-
ing profiles are compared against potential phishes. The selected Logo image is compared
against all images of the website using SIFT. Using 1000 phishing websites and 200 non-
phishing websites results in an accuracy of 96% although the image matching takes up to 17
seconds for a single phishing website against all created profiles.
Besides the aforementioned concepts even more related work does exist (e.g. [2, 228, 334])
but it all comes down to new variations of the aforementioned variables. At a first glance
this mass of related work in the detection domain might look as if the problem of phishing
detection is already solved. However, when looking at today’s number of ongoing attacks
one can clearly see that the problem is still out there. Besides, there are also some other
problems with prior research (not necessarily applying every concept). In some cases of
related work there was no real representative test set. Testing a detector with only a couple
of phishing websites is not enough no matter how well the approach might seem to work. In
other cases a problem of the mixture between HTML-detection and visual detection might
arise. Detection properties that are derived from HTML or the URL can often be changed by
the attacker without the user noticing. Thus combined approaches that rely on such metrics
might loose in effectiveness once the phishers would adapt to them. Other approaches have
very fine grained detection approaches but rely on direct comparison between two websites
that is very time costly. In a real-world scenario a potential phishing website would need to
be compared against millions of websites (phishing or legitimate). If a single comparison
21 NCD is broadly spoken a measurement for how difficult it is to turn one object into another object. This is
usually measured by looking at how well a combination of both objects can be compressed. Similar objects
can be compressed to a higher extend [164].
22 bzip2 is a compressor using the Burrows-Wheeler compression algorithm. Besides recoding of characters to
save space a “move-to-front transform” is applied that can afterwards be compressed by other means [300].
23 LZMA stands for Lempel-Ziv-Markow chain algorithm and is a lossless compression algorithm with a
higher compression rate than bzip2 [305].
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would take around 17 seconds the user would most probably have died before receiving a
result from the detector. In many of the papers the detection time needed is not reported at
all. A last problem exists that can be applied to all related work in the detection area, in case
there is no 100% certainty about a website being phishing or not, the user would be needed
as a last resort to decide whether to visit a website or not. Taking warning science and HCI
into account as a second stage of testing is hence a must for every detection algorithm. In
one of my projects (see chapter 5.8) I also address the issue of detecting phishing website
through visual similarity but in contrast to the aforementioned approaches I try to solely rely
on this factor (as it is the only factor based on human perception) and evaluate it together
with a warning design as a holistic HCI concept.
Besides the numerous ideas for detection that do not incorporate user behavior at all, one
single piece of related work stands out of this crowd. Ronda et al. [247] developed an
approach where they try to match the visited website against search term results of the most
important words but instead of aggregating those automatically they let the user type in what
he thinks the website is about. If a page is visited that has a PageRank of more than five or
in case it is a special whitelisted page the warning technique is not triggered at all.
3.5.3 Making Use of a Community
Another option to overcome failures of automatic detection is to add a crowd component
to the detection process. Some researchers and tools try to do so though community-based
approaches. Experts- and semi-experts may help other users in detecting malicious websites.
A partial-established industry product that supports this kind of protection is “Web of
Trust” [322]. Based on their own experiences users can rate any website they visit using
four categories: trustworthiness, vendor liability, privacy and child safety. Everyone that
uses the WOT browser plugin – 73 million downloads so far — can then access the average
ratings of other users. If the average ratings are beneath a certain threshold a popover warn-
ing appears whenever a WOT-user visits such a site. Concerning phishing the approach has
a basic problem. Generally spoken WOT is not more than a weighted black- and whitelist
for known domains. Hence, for unknown phishing attacks no data exists that could be used
to rate the website. In addition, it is unknown how far those website ratings of other people
can influence the behavior of other users. I addressed this problem in one of my projects
covered in section 5.3.
From a research perspective such concepts can be framed using the term “social naviga-
tion”. This means using aggregated data of decisions or opinions of others to provide
users with guidance and enhance usability, security and privacy for them [108]. Goecks
et al. [108] looked at problems that may arise using “social navigation” using the manage-
ment of browser cookies and firewall management as two examples. They propose to use a
two step decision process to solve the problem of users always going with the recommended
decision without using common sense. DiGioia and Dourish [69] looked at file sharing
permissions as an example.
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More phishing oriented related work exists, too but has been previously mentioned. The
PhishTank (introduced in section 5.1.2) service itself makes use of human helpers to ver-
ify the blacklist entries for their phishing blacklist and was evaluated by Moore and Clay-
ton [206]. Participation of users in the PhishTank system is power-law distributed. This is
contradictory to the principle that in community-based systems the mass participation could
be used to correct biased answers of single users.
3.6 Research Concepts for User Intervention
Not all security researchers focus on providing new methods for detection or technical pre-
vention. Some also address the user interface problems that come along with any detected
problem: How to display the right warning to alert the user of the (potential) problem that is
occurring? Security dialogs are known for their habituation effects as proved by Amer and
Maris [11] (see section 3.3.1 for details on the different problems). To overcome those prob-
lems some solutions have been proposed. These are mostly of a general nature and phishing
as an application area is nearly never used. In the first subsection of this chapter ideas of
altering dialog contents and options to reduce habituation are explained followed by some
related work dealing with how dialog contents should look like in general to achieve the best
effect.
3.6.1 Adaptive Dialogs
A new concept called polymorphic dialogs was presented by Brustoloni and Villamarín-
Salomón [36] in 2007. They make use of email-attachments to demonstrate their concept.
Traditional email software either does not warn the user about risky attachments at all (e.g.
Thunderbird) or simply hides the attachment without notifying the user (e.g. Microsoft
Outlook). Instead, the proposed polymorphic dialogs change and rearrange their possible
answers whenever they appear. In addition they propose to possibly audit the users dialog
behavior and for example temporarily suspend the user from working. They evaluated their
concept with a role-playing exercise with 20 participants. The additional audition warnings
led to users accepting significantly less unjustified risks.
Keukelaere et al. [151] presented the concept of adaptive security dialogs. The basic idea
here is to have more complex security dialogs for less experienced users and less complex
ones for security experts. This way inexperienced users get a more detailed explanation on
their options while experts “waste” less time dealing with the warning. For these adaptive di-
alogs additional data about the security performance of the user or other environmental data
is taken into account. Therefore the authors introduce different new types of dialog boxes
(see figure 3.3). Evaluating their concept with 24 participants, people read the new warnings
for a significantly longer time and more people did not open dangerous file attachments of
simulated email messages.
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Warn & Continue Multiple Choice 
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Figure 3.3: Different types of adaptive warnings used by Keukelaere et al. [151]
As shown in the papers these measures seem to work up to some extend but also introduce
major drawbacks for the user. Recording user answers and monitoring the results causes
severe privacy problems and modifying the warnings that they look different each time,
contradicts to the usability principle of consistency [218].
3.6.2 Guidelines and Applications Thereof
Concrete approaches in enhancing Internet warning interfaces are rare but have been done
for example by Bravo-Lillo et al. [35]. They compiled five major guidelines from a large
number of computer literature sources which come down to the needs to 1) following a
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consistent layout, 2) comprehensively describing the risk, 3) being concise, accurate and en-
couraging, 4) offering meaningful options and 5) presenting relevant contextual and auditing
information. Using those rules they optimized existing warning messages and tested them
in an online survey study. For most of their test cases understanding of the warnings did
not increase significantly but they were able to measure an increase safe response rate of the
participants.
The five guidelines mentioned above have their foundations in other work: Egelman et
al. [78] highlight the importance of 1) interrupting the primary task, 2) providing clear
choices, 3) failing safely, 4) preventing habituation and 5) altering the phishing website. The
last recommendation being particularly coined for phishing research. Egelman describes
more of the rules as design patterns within his PhD thesis [77]. He sees importance in 1) ac-
tive warnings, 2) noticeable contextual indicators, 3) providing recommendations, 4) at-
tractive options, 5) conveying threats and consequences, 6) considering levels of severity,
7) separating trustworthy content, 8) harden dismissing and again 9) failing safely. Besides
researchers, the operating system companies also have design guidelines that to some ex-
tent address how warning design should be done [16, 26, 195]. Microsoft for example offers
specific strategies of when, where and how to use error messages [193].
Cranor et al. [61] looked into design of user interfaces for privacy instead of security. As
well as SSL the P3P specification describing privacy attributes is also very complex and hard
to understand for the average user. Cranor et al. use a bird as a simplified representation of
the matching of a privacy profile to the user needs and create a textual policy summary
that should be more easily understandable by the user. For their evaluation they refer to
eleven design criteria for privacy design presented by Belotti and Sellen [25]: Trustworthi-
ness, appropriate timing, perceptibility, unobtrusiveness, minimal intrusiveness, fail safety,
flexibility, low effort, meaningfulness, learnability and low cost.
Friedman et al. [97] reconsidered the design and notification process of cookies in the
browser by even taking auditory feedback into account. They think that “informed con-
sent” and “just-in-time-intervention” are key aspects for such kinds of user interfaces and
created a sidebar that shows and classifies cookies on websites as they are delivered to the
user’s computer. A form of “just-in-time-interventions” has also been used in one of my
projects trying to protect the user from phishing websites (see section 5.5).
“Dynamic Security Skins” presented by Dhamija and Tygar [65, 66] try to establish user
interface trustworthiness. Using their concept each user has a fixed randomly assigned image
that appears with every login form. In addition to that they propose the idea of using a
secretly exchanged hash between the server and the users commputer that is used to generate
a background image for security relevant fields of the website and can also be regenerated
by the user browser chrome.
Shin and Lopes [265] presented the SSL information visually in browser forms. They repre-
sent SSL status information directly in the form field either as a traffic light inside each field
or by changing the background color.
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Sobey et al. [270] (masters thesis: [269]) also evaluated ways of displaying the identity status
(SSL-status) of a website in the browser. Using a larger area for the indicator in the browser
chrome somehow enhanced the recognition of the indicator but they suggest that there have
to be stronger cues for security indicators that also properly convey whether a component is
interactive.
The concept of TrustBar by Herzberg and Gbara [126,127] uses a large status bar with logos
to show who is identified by an SSL certificate and by whom this certificate is identified.
Using a large status indicator for SSL statuses is also used in my project in section 5.6 but
without wasting additional screen real estate.
WebWallet by Wu et al. [325] uses the graphical concept of separate ID cards to reveal the
user’s intention where she wants to submit her credentials. Immediate entry of password
data is blocked by their add-on and for each website a new ID card has to be generated or an
old one has to be reused. If the ID card URL does not match the website URL an unintended
disclosure of user data is detected.
Wogalter et al. [318] presented a set of general guidelines for warning design that is not
limited to user interfaces but should hold for every arbitrary warning. Salience (to get no-
ticed) is one of the most important aspects for any warning. This can be achieved by high
contrasts, the use of color or even special effects (like flashing). Addressing the wording
of a warning four message components are essential: 1) a signal word to attract attention;
2) the possibility to identify the hazard; 3) the explanation of possible consequences and
4) information on how to avoid the hazard. Concerning the layout continuous text should be
avoided in favor of bullet points for example and warnings need to be presented proximate
to the hazard (time- and spacewise). Visual clutter around the warning should be reduced to
make the warning stand out. Pictorial symbols can help the understanding and salience of
a warning and other channels besides the visual channel may also be used were applicable
(e.g. audio signals).
The wording and pictorial symbols of warning messages have been even more focused in
warning research. In the study of Amer and Maris [11] the arousal strength of signal words
and signal icons in warning dialogs was measured. They showed that a red cross combined
with the word “critical” was the strongest possible wording and icon combination for a com-
puter warning dialog followed by “urgent”, “warning”, “error” and finally “notice”. Hellier
et al. [121] showed that such scales remain stable no matter which other kinds of words
appear in the same context.
Standardization organizations like the W3C have also tried to set up standards for security
user interfaces within the world wide web. Tyler Close [53] outlines the main goals that
security information in the web browser needs. He sees the consistency of terms, indica-
tors and metaphors, as an important point as well as raising the user awareness for security
information. To counteract faked information a reliable presentation of the security infor-
mation is necessary whilst minimizing the number of scenarios in which the user is needed
to make decisions. Close differentiates between three different use cases of security on the
web: 1) providing information, 2) believing content and 3) installing software. Depending
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on the context of source and sender he depicts 22 different scenarios of Internet usage that
can be used as scenarios to apply them against given approaches.
Markus Jakobsson [136] reports on different findings concerning the graphics and textual
appearance of warnings or security related content in general. According to him, spelling
and design of messages and websites are important. Emails that do not mention a concrete
contact person are for example less trustworthy. Another interesting finding here was that
too much emphasis on security can result in reverse effects. Very strong phishing warnings
on real websites make people distrust in the website itself. For third party security logos (e.g.
“‘Trust-e”24) it is important whether the third party brand is well known. The personalization
of messages is another possibility to create trust among readers. Another way is to enable
content verification over different channels (e.g. by phone).
Personalization is also mentioned by Adelsbach et al. [5] whereas they refer to it in a graph-
ical context. If users can select personalized content (e.g. a background image) a stronger
relationship to the security indicator is established.
The use of a user-centered design process for security is really important because the human
component of computer security has been neglected far too long [21]. Wogalter et al. [319]
even considered the application of the user centered design process to the text design of
classical warnings.
As important as the correct design of computer security warnings is their evaluation. Lorrie
Faith Cranor [59] published a journal article about the questions that need to be asked when
evaluating a security indicator or warning. Some of those being “Does the indicator behave
correctly when [or when not] under attack?”, “Do users know what they are supposed to do
[...]?” or “Do they actually do it?”.
3.7 User Study Methodology
Evaluating usable security concepts is especially hard. Security problems can only be sim-
ulated safely in the lab but this makes user studies artificial. Together with the problem that
security may not be the primary task of the user it is extremely hard to create correct study
methodologies for valid results. As one of the results of this thesis I have formalized the
cornerstones of a standardized user study for the evaluation of anti-phishing protection in
section 7.2 at the end of this thesis. Within this section of the related work chapter I want to
present similar related work that gives recommendations for warning and detector evaluation
in the security field.
Wogalter et al. [318] for example give a summary over the possible evaluation process (for-
mative and summative), like design mock-up testing or testing a final warning. He recom-
mends to measure subjective feelings of users using Likert-type scales or by using objective
measures of warning effectiveness.
24 http://www.truste.com/
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Egelman et al. [79] give a good overview over the general challenges a researcher faces
when doing security-related user studies. Observing users when they deal with security
related issues in general is a big problem, as qualitative techniques – like interviews – do
have strong limitations in this case. Stuart Schechter [257] reports on some rules on how to
write up security research correctly. The reporting of the tested hypotheses, the threat model,
the user study methodology and the measurements are most important to him.
Research experiments that set up their own attacks or spoof are extremely problematic, as
they do not only hurt the privacy of the attacked “victims” but already by delivering an
unwanted email to a user the researcher conducts a legally critical action. Because of this
these types of experiments have to be checked by an IRB (institutional review board) in
most countries first. Jagatic et al. [134] actually attacked users in an experiment to show the
problems of socially engineered phishing attacks. This study led to large debate about such
a type of attacking study [17, 55, 133].
Raffetseder et al. [242] summarized some experiences about building anti-phishing browser
plugins on the more technical side. They report that building a prototype for one single
browser is one thing but porting it to different browsers can get very cumbersome.
Depending on how the user study is performed other researchers have given advice for more
distinct problems. Downs et al. [74] report how mechnical turk workers try to gamble re-
search tests and how that can be avoided. Ross et al. [250] report about the average demo-
graphics of such participants, becoming increasingly international.
Other even more general related work can help in the design of usability questionnaires by
using standardized questions [161], gives an overview of how to best balance within-subject
conditions using Latin-squares [110] or evaluates which type of Likert-scales are best [63].
Looking at the user studies that have been carried out so far the number of real field stud-
ies is close to zero. One example from related work is the paper of Karlof et al. [145].
Within this thesis I also gathered field findings within two of my projects (see section 5.5
and section 5.6). Table 3.3 provides a good overview over different phishing user studies
that have been conducted and the different dimensions that can be possibly modified. The
list of possible dimensions reaches from the type of study performed (lab or field) to the
number of participants, conditions and the statistical tests used for evaluation of the results.
As mentioned above those dimensions are examined more closely at the end of the thesis in
chapter 7.2.
Take Home Messages
å 3.1 The Phishing Problem: Phishing is a severe problem causing at least millions
(some reporting billions) of financial damage each year. Users fall for the attacks
as security is never their primary goal. They are easily distracted by similar looking
layouts and don’t notice security indicators present in the browser.
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å 3.2 The Current State of Detection Methods: The global nature of the Internet
makes law enforcement as a technique to stop phishing impossible. Today’s most
widely deployed anti-phishing measures are based on black- and whitelists. This tech-
nique does not only leave room for zero-hour attacks but can also be completely side-
lined by clever attackers.
å 3.3 The Current State of User Intervention: Current warnings and notifications
are not noticed by the users. They are frustrated towards security and most of the
time do not understand what the warning messages mean, leading to habituation and
negligence.
å 3.4 Phishing Education: Phishing education is highly controversial. Although some
research proved the positive effect of training materials and that the learning effect
can be retained for some time the question still remains whether people will change
their behavior with better education and whether they want to invest their time in
participating in training sessions.
å 3.5 Research Concepts for Detection: All different types of technical features that
are available have been used by researchers to build phishing detection methods
(URLs, HTML code, CSS, images, layout, . . . ). In combination and with machine
learning techniques they can achieve detection rates of 95% and more. But most of
the approaches neglect other important factors like computation time, false positives
or the possibility of phishers to adapt to the detection algorithm.
å 3.6 Research Concepts for User Intervention: The design of new user interfaces
for interventions is mostly done for arbitrary user interfaces not focusing on phishing.
Using adaptive dialogs or concepts that transform security information into visual cues
the compliance of the warnings can be enhanced to a small extent but mostly at the cost
of usability. A lot of guidelines have been proposed that can be used by researchers
and practitioners when designing new warnings.
å 3.7 User Study Methodology: The way of evaluating detection and user intervention
approaches is vital for the success of new approaches. Whatever type of evaluation is
performed it is most important to carry out evaluation as close to real world security
problems as possible. Keeping artificiality and security priming as low as possible
contradicts with what researchers can do in their ethical and legal environment.
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II
PROTECTION THROUGH HCI

Chapter4
Overview of Research
Covered
Before diving deeper into the research that has been conducted within the different projects
that constitute this thesis (chapter 5) this short chapter gives and overview about what this
thesis addresses, what contributions I make and how the research described here differs from
the related work seen in chapter 3. The chapter ends with a short overview of the general
structure of the remaining document.
4.1 Delimitation to Related Work
Related Work and other resources provides enough motivation and evidence that usable se-
curity and in my special case phishing is a topic well worth working on. The monetary loss
through phishing attacks is – no matter how large it really is – definitely an argument for
more research in this area (see section 3.1). At the moment the established countermeasures
(like blacklists) are in the process of wearing off as the first phishers have found methods
to completely circumvent them (see section 3.2) but phishing is not at all a solely technical
problem. It is a socially engineered attack for which the user plays a very important role. Al-
though this can already be seen from the definition of phishing in itself research in the area
has mostly be on the security side of things (e.g. how to built better phishing detectors?)
(see section 3.5). Usable security research has shown how and why existing methods and
warnings fail (see section 3.3) but has not yet been able to come up with a proper solution
for the problem.
These two sides of the coin phishing detection and user intervention are at the core of this
thesis. Most of the related work done so far can be categorized belonging either to the one
or the other side. Within my thesis I try to examine both parts as a whole. On the one hand
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Figure 4.1: A warning message of the Internet Explorer asking the user whether he
wants to submit information to the Internet.
to find new ways of phishing detection derived from HCI aspects of the socially engineered
attacks and on the other hand to find proper modes of user intervention mechanisms that can
be interpreted by the users more correctly. With this a full understanding of the problem
and solution space of phishing detection gets possible and a general idea can be generated
of how approaches need to look like.
Other work not doing this could easily fall short of solving the problem. Detection concepts
that lay a heavy focus on technical aspects that are easily interchangeable by an attacker
will never be able to provide a future-proof protection. For example if the HTML code of
websites is used for detection phishers could just change this HTML code without changing
any other representation and without the user noticing. On the other hand user intervention
without any properly understandable reason also falls short. The Microsoft Internet Explorer
for example used to warn the user whenever information was submitted to the Internet (see
figure 4.1). As a medium of information exchange submitting information to the Internet
will in most cases be intended and safe.
Looking at the fields of related work previously mentioned in chapter 3 this thesis will not
specifically extend the research on the amount of phishing damage does nor have I conducted
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specific studies to find out more about why phishing is actually successful. A small amount
of new findings in this area is always generated as a matter of fact when testing anti-phishing
concepts with users having a standard browser control group (e.g. the project in section 5.5).
Also phishing education has not been touched explicitly within my research. As stated above
the focus of this thesis lies in testing and generalizing new methods of detection of phishing
attacks, better user intervention and focusing on the interplay between both.
Besides the focus of this thesis being on the problem of phishing the main idea of the in-
terplay between threat detection and user intervention is much more general problem. Most
findings of this thesis should also valuable for a much broader area.
4.2 Main Research Classification
As pointed out before there are two main dimensions in the fight against phishing covered
within this thesis. On the one hand the problem of phishing detection and on the other hand
the problem of getting user intervention right.
For both of these dimensions we structured that research that has been carried out on five
different levels:
• Definition: As the areas evaluated here are relatively new a clear definition of what is
scope of the research and what defines the edges of the problem space is important.
• HCI: As both dimensions of this thesis extend existing research fields (security re-
search and warning research) the role of HCI and how these fields can take profit of
HCI is another important level of this thesis.
• Measurement: To be able to compare and improve different approaches it is impor-
tant to know how to measure their quality. Finding such a measurements for both
dimensions hence was a task of this thesis.
• Enhancing: The development of new concepts and methods can the be used to find
answers to specific subproblems with the overarching goal to enhance the state-of-the
art. The identified ways of measurement and the field of HCI are especially important.
• Reason: Finding a method that works well for a given problem might create a different
problem somewhere else in return. As an extreme example it would suffice to get rid
of the Internet as whole to get rid of 100% of all phishing attacks. Yet this is not an
option. Reasoning about when and where to use which kind of method and what that
might mean for other areas is a last important level.
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Figure 4.2: Overview of the ten main research questions of this thesis being split up in
two dimensions on five different levels.
4.3 Research Questions
Taking the two research dimensions and laying them out with the five different investigation
levels a matrix of the ten research questions is formed. These questions will all be described
within this section. Figure 4.2 gives and overview over the 10 research questions as well as
providing shortcut codes for the different research questions. These will be used throughout
the thesis to refer to the research questions whenever they are tackled by a project.
Phishing Detection
• What is Phishing Detection? Similar to the diverse range of definitions of a phishing
attack or the different definition of phases of a phishing attack (see chapter 2) it is also
important to define what phishing detection is.
• How can HCI be Used to Build Detectors? Phishing detectors have been built for a
couple of years now but what are the special properties that a phishing detectors needs
to have and how can they be derived using HCI and its methods?
• How can Detectors be Evaluated? Once a detector is built it is important to assess
its quality. But how can this be done? How can results be compared to other results
taken in other countries or years ago? What are important aspects that have to be part
of tests?
• What kind of Detection Works Best? Once it is possible to measure the performance
of a detector it is possible to compare different types of detectors. But what kind of
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detection works best? Is is practicable? And is it future proof or can attackers adapt to
it?
• What Detection Overhead and Thresholds are Reasonable? No matter how well a
detector works it always requires a certain amount of computational effort and never
has a perfect hit rate? So how good does a system need to be and how much is it
allowed to intervene without disturbing too much?
User Intervention
• What is User Intervention? Protecting the user from phishing is also about inform-
ing the user about threats and helping him to avoid those. But what are the exact
boundaries of this process of user intervention?
• How can HCI be used to Enhance Intervention Mechanisms? Related work shows
us the many downsides current computer warnings and intervention mechanisms have.
Either they go unnoticed or are annoying and lead to habituation effects. Having these
findings from HCI how can new intervention mechanisms be designed to reduce those
problems?
• How can User Intervention be Measured? What is the success of user intervention
and how can this be measured. Is it enough to make sure that the user saw a user
intervention or is it important that a correct action is taken? Or is the most important
measure in the end that the user has been protected from any harm?
• How to Enhance User Intervention Quality? Taking HCI into account new user
intervention methods can be developed but which are the properties of a high quality
intervention method?
• When Should Intervention be Performed to Which Extent? Whatever type of user
intervention is designed, it always interferes to some extent with the user. But to which
extent should this be performed and which options should a user have to control the
intervention outcome. Does anyone at all need to be able to go a phishing website?
What about security researchers?
4.4 Project Overview
To be able to find answers to the research questions nine different projects have been carried
out in the course of this thesis. Each single project only addressed a certain number of
research questions and has its own separate findings. After the projects have been discussed
one by one in chapter 5, the following chapter 6 summarizes the results and reports overall
findings for the different research questions. At the beginning of each project chapter a small
indicator graphic informs the reader about the different research questions tackled and at the
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end of each projects the research question specific findings are stated. An overview of all
projects and the research questions involved can be found in figure 4.3.
The following list gives a brief overview on each of the projects:
• 5.1 Phishing Website Test Set: Having an extensive phishing website test base is
important for getting valid results for detector testing throughout the research. This
chapter introduces into the important aspects of such a pishing test set and reports the
process of a test set that has been built up during this thesis.
• 5.2 SecurityGuard Website Status Rollup: What technical properties of websites
are interesting for users and how can they be offered towards them within a user in-
tervention mechanism? Within this project we built a rating and reporting systems
that displayed technical data concerning the current website within a status bar in the
browser using user centered development and evaluation.
• 5.3 Community-based Rating Intervention: In real life people often ask others for
security and privacy advice even about Internet websites. Can such a concept be used
online and is it as attractive to users as they make use of it offline? Within this project
we built a user intervention method as a browser plugin and evaluated how such com-
munity values can effect the users’ security behavior.
• 5.4 Spell Checking to Detect Fraudulent Websites: URLs are an important indicator
for detecting phishing attacks as they cannot be as easily impersonated like the website
contents of a company. With proper knowledge users could easily find a lot of attacks
when investigating the URL. Because of this many phishers try to create URLs that
look similar to a trustworthy company URL. Can this behavior of the attackers be used
for detecting phishing attacks in an automated manner. In this subchapter we present
a detector and its evaluation that is based on this fact.
• 5.5 Data Type Based Security Dialogs: Security warnings are all around the com-
puter and the Internet browsers but when do critical security decisions happen? In
this subchapter we take the advantage of the fact that phishing only happens if critical
types of data (e.g. credit card numbers) are involved. This can be used for filtering
incoming attacks and allows to create a user intervention method that takes the user’s
context into account. The development of this user intervention method and an exten-
sive evaluation is presented within the respective subchapter.
• 5.6 Enhancing SSL Awareness in Web Browsers: Non-blocking indicators are usu-
ally said to remain unnoticed by the users. This has been proven for lock-icons and
other smaller security indicators. Within this project we want to test this again by using
a large area of the whole background of the browser user interface to report the SSL
status. We evaluate this concept by looking at whether our plugin is able to change the
user’s attitude towards websites in dependence of the notification shown.
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5.7 Diminishing Visual Brand Trust
The content area of the web browser is the most important place for users to 
assess the trustworthiness of a website although it is easily impersonated. In 
case of this project we looked at whether small website content changes lead 
to a stronger focus on other security indicators in the browser.
5.8 Visual Image Comparison For Phishing Detection
The visual similarity of impersonating websites towards their original websites 
makes users often trust into these faked websites. We built a detector for 
phishing websites using visual similarity and tested different image features as 
well as a user intervention method for this kind of detection.
5.6 Enhancing SSL Awareness in Web Browsers
Non-blocking indicators are usually said to remain unnoticed by the users. 
This has been proven for lock icons and other smaller security indicators. 
Within this project we test this again by using the whole background of the 
browser user interface to report the SSL status. 
5.5 Data Type Based Security Dialogs
In this subchapter we take the advantage of the fact that phishing only 
happens if critical types of data (e.g. credit card numbers) are involved. This 
can be used for ltering incoming attacks and allows to create a user interven-
tion method that takes the users’ context into account. 
5.3 Community-based Rating Intervention
In real life people often ask others for security and privacy advice even about 
Internet websites. Can such a concept be used online and is it more attractive 
to users as they make use of it ofine? Within this project we built a user 
intervention method as a browser plugin and evaluated possible effects.
5.4 Spell Checking to Detect Fraudulent Websites
URLs are an important indicator for detecting phishing attacks as they cannot 
be as easily impersonated. Can similar looking URLs be used to detect phish-
ing attacks automatically? In this chapter we present a detector and its evalu-
ation that is based on URL similarity.
5.2 SecurityGuard Website Status Rollup
What technical properties of websites are interesting for users and how can 
they be offered towards them within a user intervention mechanism? Within 
this project we built a rating and reporting systems that displayed technical 
data concerning the current website within a status bar in the browser.
5.1 Phishing Website Test Set
Having an extensive phishing website test base is important for getting valid 
results for detector testing throughout the research. This chapter introduces 
into the important aspects of such a pishing test set and reports the process 
of a test set that has been built up during this thesis. 
5.9 The User Study Web Browser
Using live original and phishing websites in user studies brings along a variety of 
problems in a study setup that needs to fulll certain parameters. Within this 
project we built a browser plugin that makes it possible to mimic arbitrary secu-
rity situations and nally tested whether those changes can be detect.
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Figure 4.3: Overview of all projects carried out throughout this thesis each showing
which research questions have been covered.
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• 5.7 Diminishing Visual Brand Trust: The content area of the web browser is the
most important place for users to assess the trustworthiness of a website. However, it
is also one of the regions that can be most easily modified by an attacker. Users often
report that they get suspicious towards email messages in case of incorrect spelling
for example or weird graphics. This is what we apply within this project. In case a
website content is changed to confuse the user viewing it, does this make her rely more
on other security indicators outside of the content area?
• 5.8 Visual Image Comparison For Phishing Detection and Reporting: The visual
similarity of impersonating websites towards their original websites makes users often
trust into these faked websites. This is the reason why attackers try to make their
phishing attempts look very similar to the original websites the users are used too.
But image similarity and comparison is a technically advanced field. This is why we
tried to build a detector that tries to detect phishing websites through visual similarity.
Within the project we tested different image features that can be used for comparison
and also developed and evaluated a user intervention method for this kind of detection.
• 5.9 The User Study Web Browser: In user studies focusing on phishing it is nearly
always necessary to confront the participants with phishing and original websites. Us-
ing real phishing websites brings along a variety of problems and even using the real
non-malicious websites can be hard in a study setup that needs to fulfill certain pa-
rameters. This is why experimenters usually rebuilt both kinds of websites for user
studies. A problem that arises here is to easily fake domain names and especially se-
curity indicators that are bound to network properties that cannot be easily influenced.
Within this project we built a browser plugin that makes it possible solve all these
problems and finally tested whether its changes can be detected by study participants
or not.
Chapter5
Nine Research Projects on
Phishing and Usability
To gather new findings and evaluate the connections between good phishing detection and
good user intervention to achieve a final perfect protection this long chapter contains nine
different research projects that all focus on different parts of the research questions. Each
subchapter will contain motivation for the respective project, and explanation of the general
concept involved and the evaluation and results gathered within this project. In the end of
each chapter the findings that can be applied towards each of the tackled research questions
are summarized.
Throughout this chapter I will always use “we” as the grammatical person in describing
all work whether it was carried out by me alone or with the help of other researchers or
students. Where applicable I will give credit to all persons involved at the beginning of
each subchapter. Whenever German has been used as a language in user studies or surveys I
will rephrase the answers and questions to the closest English equivalent without separately
stating that German was the original language.
Within the subchapters I will not state any hypothesis that we had while the projects were
carried out but still describe our study methodology, dependent and independent variables
and results towards the central topics of each chapters. As the stated hypotheses were in
many cases obvious and are easily deductible from the given independent variables we did
not feel the need to include them. Another reason why we will not report the hypotheses is
that many interesting research findings in our projects have been made aside from the general
hypotheses that had been formulated.
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5.1 Phishing Website Test Set
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Within this subchapter we present a project in which adequate
website tests for phishing research were identified. We describe
the process of building up a phishing test set, available for test-
ing in other projects of this thesis and as a comparable basis for
other researchers. In the following subsections we will first give
an introduction on how a phishing test set should look like reason-
ing about which parameters are important for a test set to cover
important phishing aspects a detector should be tested for. After-
wards we describe the collection sources and collection procedure we used for our test set.
To suit all requirements defined for our test set a separate manual post processing phase we
needed that was performed on the collected data. With the complete test set it was possible
to retrieve accumulated findings from it and report about the possible application areas of
the test set. The subchapter concludes with the research results this project contributes to the
overall research findings.
5.1.1 What Should a Phishing Test Set Look Like?
The evaluation of heuristic detectors for any property is usually done by determining the
qualitative performance of a given detector in terms of false positives, false negatives and
their “true” counterparts (see section 1.4). In case of phishing, true positives are the phishing
websites successfully detected; false negatives are situations whenever the detector failed to
detect a phishing website. To cover these two detector measurements in an evaluation the test
set must contain phishing websites. True negatives and false positives are the counterparts
referring to non-phishing – or original – websites. To test these properties of a detector
non-phishing websites must be part of the test set. Without the coverage of both aspects
a detector that would simply accuse every website of being phishing would have a perfect
detection rate for phishing websites. The inability of classifying original websites as well
would go unnoticed. Summing this up it is of utmost importance that a test set for phishing
websites needs to cover both phishing and non-phishing websites to some degree.
Another important point that can optionally be taken into account is the matching between
phishing and non-phishing websites. “Matching” in this case means that for each phishing
website that impersonates another website the original website is also part of the test set.
A test set that contains a number of arbitrary phishing and non-phishing websites that have
nothing in common might be bad for some kinds of detectors. As most phishers try to
impersonate existing websites it should be made sure that detectors can detect the difference
between the true original website and the phishing website. Having such a kind of test set it
gets even possible to verify whether the detector is able to find the correct original “parent”
website to a given phishing website. To be able to test this, a linkage between each phishing
website and their original counterpart is desirable.
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For the evaluation of some of the detectors in this thesis we collected test data according to
the previously named characteristics. The collected test set was not only usable for testing
but made it also possible to gather some findings about the current state-of-the art of phishing
attacks and the current phishing landscape. Before describing the collected parameters in
more detail in section 5.1.2 we will start by describing the overall collection procedure. In
the end our test set was made publicly available for download to other researchers1.
5.1.2 Collection Phase
The collection phase of the phishing test set consisted of three separate steps. In a first step
possible sources of phishing and non-phishing websites had to be identified before setting up
the parameters of the collection process. Afterwards the main collection procedure – using
our own crawling software described in section 5.1.2 – gathered data from the sources and
collected all the different parameters for each website.
Collection Sources
The largest public and up-to-date source for existing phishing attacks is phishtank.com2, a
website dedicated to the collection of possible phishing attacks which are then manually
verified by a community. A list of the verified phishing URLs can be publicly downloaded
containing the URLs of the websites together with some other metadata: a unique Phish-
Tank id, the online status, the time of submission and the time of verification. Additionally
some domain specific properties fetched by PhishTank like the IP-address of the server are
reported. A “target” parameter is denoted to contain the targeted brand of the attack but in
most cases this parameter field only contains the string “Other”. Other parameters like the
HTML code of the website or screenshots are not available although phishtank.com seems
to collect them as they display a very low quality screenshot with a watermark on the detail
pages for every phishing attack.
phishtank.com collects vast amounts of phishing URLs. In January 2013 for example they
identified 25,021 valid phishes from a number of 37,811 submissions of potential phishing
URLs [234]. The median time for the manual verification in this month was 3 hours and 31
minutes.
As an initial basis for our scans we collected 10,030 phishtank.com URLs that were reported
to be still online. They had been submitted to phishtank.com around the 20th march of 2012.
We stored all URLs and metadata available from phistank.com in a local database for further
processing.
Regarding the non-phishing websites we used alexa.com, a website of a company dedicated
to the collection of global website analytics [9]. These global website traffic estimates and
1 http://www.medien.ifi.lmu.de/team/max.maurer/files/phishload/
2 www.phishtank.com
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other metrics are calculated through data that is collected from toolbar users. The company
states that they have “millions of worldwide internet users”.
Alexa offers a list of the top 1,000,000 websites for free download. As most of the phish-
ing attacks that impersonate a specific company assume that the recipient of the attack is a
customer of the respective brand phishers choose popular websites. We chose to include the
1,000 most popular URLs of this list into our index for non-phishing websites. The list only
contained a numbered index followed by the URL of the website server – no other metadata.
Using the first 1,000 websites of the list still did not guarantee that we would have covered
the original website to every phishing attack. Because of this we added missing original
websites in the final classification phase and recollected their data.
Collection Parameters
Before starting with the actual collection phase for the websites the parameters that should
be captured during collection had to be defined. So far we had only stored the phishing and
non-phishing URLs in our database together with the little meta information that we had
from our sources.
For our collection procedure we then wanted to gather or compute the following additional
information:
• URL hash: As URLs can be long a MD5-hashed version of each URL was computed
to make it possible to quickly make sure that a URL was unique in our database.
• Final URL: When visiting the URLs from the list it is necessary to follow existing
redirects until the browser reaches the actual website that would be displayed in a
user’s web browser. This URL may be different from the URL that was used to start
the request.
• URL/Final URL basedomain: We also extracted the basedomains from the start and
the final URL and stored them separately.
• Status Code: For every request that was made, the HTTP status code3 was noted.
This made it possible to quickly find websites that were offline or stopped working by
just examining their HTTP status code. Nevertheless these checks are not perfectly
reliable. A warning message of a webhoster saying that a web space was closed may
for example be served with a status code of 200 (OK) and the other way round a
phishing site could conceal itself as being the error page for a 404 (Not found) status
code.
3 HTTP status codes are numeric return values for a HTTP request that express the success or failure of a
request to a HTTP server. The most important status codes for example are: 200 “OK”, 404 “Not found”,
500 “Internal Server Error”, 301 “Moved Permanently” [88, 132].
5.1 Phishing Website Test Set 87
• HTML Content: The returned HTML source code was also stored but only the very
first level. This means that no images, stylesheets or other referenced data was down-
loaded and we also did not follow framesets or iframe4 references that would load
other websites as subwebsites of the current website.
• Load Time: Depending on the server connection with the respective web server the
times for retrieving the website and its information varied. Hence the time from be-
ginning the HTTP request until the website was completely loaded was also measured
and stored.
• Scanning Timestamp: The point in time of completing the loading of the URL and
additional information was stored for each website to store a record when the respec-
tive data was exactly fetched.
• Screenshots: Besides the HTML contents of the requested website we also acquired
three different types of screenshots: 1) a browser screenshot of the web browser win-
dow together with the URL bar and all other information; 2) a cropped screenshot
showing only the visible contents of the website and 3) a full page screenshot captur-
ing the whole contents of the loaded website no matter how long the website was. Type
3 hence included all elements that would only be visible by scrolling down within the
active window.
Collection Procedure
The data collection was performed in an automatic manner using two different techniques
within a Java software. To fetch the website contents a HTTP request was executed and the
return values were stored. For capturing screenshots it was necessary to load the website
including all stylesheet and image information and then render it as it would have been done
by a standard webbrowser. For this task we used an off-the-shelf Firefox browser that was
remotely controlled by the Selenium web browser automation framework. Selenium is used
to automate any kind of browser interaction (usually for web application testing purposes)5.
With the Selenium WebDriver project6 it is possible to remotely carry out browser actions a
user would perform from the foundations of a programming language.
We used a standard office computer (multi-core Windows 7) for collecting the data of the
different websites. For security reasons of the host system some of the scans have been done
within a virtual machine hosting Windows XP.
4 The frameset and iframe-Tags of HTML allow to embed other websites within one existing website. A
frameset can be used to compile a website consisting of several websites by splitting the screen whereas an
iframe allows the placement of an external website in a separate container [289].
5 http://docs.seleniumhq.org
6 http://docs.seleniumhq.org/projects/webdriver/
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5.1.3 Post Processing
After fetching all additional data of the website a manual post processing phase was needed
to complete the test set. On the one hand this was needed due to the requirement that for each
phishing website the linkage to the respective original website should be determined. On the
other hand this was necessary because not every visit to a phishing website necessarily led
to the HTML code and a screenshot of phishing website. Although the data collected from
phishtank.com stated that all phishing URLs were still online a lot of the requested websites
were already taken offline or replaced by error pages. A reason for this is the high fluctuation
that phishing websites have. The timeframe between acquiring online URLs and the moment
that they were actually scanned by our framework could in many cases be so large that the
phishing website already went offline again. This shows another reason why a working “of-
fline” phishing test set is so important for testing detectors. With a consistent non-changing
test set it can be guaranteed that multiple test runs with the same detector would lead to the
same result. Testing against live phishing websites would make it impossible to produce
constant and comparable results.
Website Classification
The analysis of the retrieved websites showed that there is quite a variety of cases that can
be observed. A classification of these is given in table 5.1.
In case real phishing websites have been captured, one has to distinguish between phishing
websites that mimic one single parent website (state 3) – the ones that we were actually
looking for – but there are also phishing websites that use multiple brand logos or no brand
logo at all to fetch arbitrary email credentials (state 2).
All other states relate to websites that did not load an online phishing attack. A large number
of those are websites that simply did not load because they were already offline (state 6), but
other cases like coding errors (state 8) or even educational anti-phishing explanations that
have been put up on server of the former phish (state 11) were present. The assignment of
those states to the websites has been done during the website linkage phase explained below.
Website Linkage
Linking phishing websites to their respective original websites has to be done manually as
no perfect detection methodology for such a case exists – this is the reason why the test set is
needed at all. To process the 10,030 captured phishing websites we hence wrote a small web
user interface that was used to assign each website to its respective parent. Using a three step
process each of the phishing websites was classified to the respective state and if necessary
was assigned the respective original website.
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1 Disabled6By6Hoster: This0website0has0been0disabled0by0the0hoster0or0it0redirects0to0a0
site0of0the0hoster0that0is0clearly0no0phishing0website0Ie"g"0Ethis0domain0is0emptyEP"
2 Phishonly: The0website0is0a0phishing0website0that0tries0to0steal0user data0but0it0has0no0
real0parent"0This0can0be0a0website0just0asking0for0an0arbitrary0emailSaddress0and0
password0or0websites0that0use0multiple0logos0and0hence0cannot0be0assigned0to0one0
specific0parent"
3 Phishing6Website:6A real0phishing0website0with0a0parent0that0has0been0assigned"0The0
parent0of0the0phishing0website0can0be0found0in0the0parent0field0of0this0entry"
4 removed
5 Still6LoadingFNo6content: It0seems0that0this0website0has0been0captured0while0still0
loading0or0at0least0it0does0not0yet0contain0any0meaningful0content"0Mostly0those0are0
completely0white0websites"
6 Dead6Link: Although0the0inital0website0could0load0Ibecause0the0statusCode0showed0
LUUP0no0proper0website0was0loaded0in0the0end"0Either0the0browser0did0not0reach0any0
page0at0all0or0the0page0reached0could0be0distinguished0as0a04U40or0similar0error0page"0
This0could0have0been0because0of0a0metaSreloadStag0pointing0to0an0illegal0location"
7 Original6Back: The0original0Website0seems0to0be0back0online"0A0server0was0hacked0and0
the0phishing0website0was0placed0on0this0usually0nonSfraudulent0domain"0But0now0the0
original0website0is0back0and0has0been0captured0instead0of0the0existing0phish"
8 Weird6ContentFWeird6Language: The0content0of0the0site0is0not0the0original0contentx0
neither0deadx0nor0a0phishing0attack"0In0this0category0there0are0also0pages0that0are0
written0in0foreign0languages0and0hence0their0status0could0not0be0confidently0
determined"
9 Coding6Error: A0script0error0occurred"0Some0part0of0the0website0code0was0executed0
but0threw0an0error"0Mostly0the0website0just0shows0some0PHPSWarnings0and0no0real0
content"0
10 No6Image:6The0capturing0engine0did0not0capture0a0proper0image0for0this website"0This0
error0occurred0for0some0websites0that0produced0an0error0when0rendering0on0the0
screenshot0canvas0of0Firefox"0It0is0possible0that0another0screenshot0type0may0still0
contain0website0content"
11 Domainparking: The0website0shows0a0series0of0links0and0is0disabled0or0parked"0Some0
hosters0show0a0list0of0promotional0links0on0a0deadx0disabled0or0parked0domain"
12 Educational6Website: The0website0is0down0and has0been0redirected0to0an0educational0
phishing0site"0The0website0is0not0anymore0a0real0attack0instead0it0shows0learning0
material0for0people0that0would0have0been0falling0for0that0attack"
13 Malware download: The0website0contains0a0link0that0will0most0certainly0download0a0
malware0software"0Since0the0websites0have0only0been0verified0through0a0visual0channel0
it0was0not0possible0to0validate0or0check0what0would0have0been0downloaded"
14 Original6Not6Found: Downloading the0original0failed0after0it0was0added"0Hence0no0good0
comparison0will0be0possible"0Another0possibility0is0that0it0was0not0possible0to0find0the0
exact0URL0of0an0original"
Table 5.1: List and description of the different states that have been assigned to the
phishing websites fetched for the phishing website test set.
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Original Websites and Brands
Although one might think that it is enough to only assign one parent website to each phishing
website this concept is problematic. For example, each original website may have numer-
ous domains that are to a certain extent all very similar (e.g. google.com, google.co.uk,
google.de). If a Google phishing website is not classified as being a fake of google.com and
a detector would match it to google.co.uk this could be interpreted as an incorrect match.
However, in a real life situation there is a meta-level to this problem: multiple original web-
sites can belong to the same brand. Detecting that a phishing website impersonates any of
those brand websites would already be a valuable detection result. To make it possible to
detect this, we introduced the concept of brands into our data model creating a brand for
each original website and assigning other original website to the same brand were needed.
If a detector would now detect a phishing website of google.com as being a phishing web-
site of google.co.uk one could still see that both original websites belong to the brand of
“Google” and hence the detection result would still be okay.
5.1.4 The Final Test Set
For the final test set that we made public we chose to keep all test data. For some researchers
the remaining states might also be valuable in some cases. If not they could easily query
the subset of attacks of state 2 and possibly state 3. After adding the new original websites
where necessary in the classification phase, our final database had a total of 11,182 URLs
of which 10,030 were phishing URLs and 1,152 were original website URLs. Each website
has a database record similar to the example record in table 5.2.
5.1.5 Findings from of the Test Set Data
After the classification phase was finished the test set itself was a valuable source for inter-
esting findings.
Concerning the original URLs we assigned those to 1,097 unique brands. Most brands so
far only consisted of one single URL but for 20 brands two or more URLs were assigned.
Google being the number one brand with 69 URLs, followed by eBay with six different
URLs, the TAM Airline with 4 different URLs and Microsoft, the Pirate Bay and Orkut with
3 different URLs. Some Brazilian services had a high frequency of phishing attacks in our
test set (see below) explaining the TAM Airline turning up in this list.
Looking at the classification of the 10,030 phishing URLs, real phishing websites were still
the largest part with 3,603 (43%) correctly downloaded phishing attacks that we could assign
to an original website parent. Still a total of nearly 60% of our downloaded websites did
not turn out as being working online attacks and belonged to other categories. 21% of
the websites were already disabled by the hosting company and 15% of the URLs were
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id 3447
alexarank
isPhish 1
parent 5643
brand 11
parentCount 0
url http2,,rasignsMcoMza,https,SLL,verifizierung,BzZB,privatkunden,verificationMphp'fJZ
urlHash c9f23db9fd9ea2b32bf260207b2bd5
urlBasedomain rasignsMcoMza
finalUrl http2,,rasignsMcoMza,https,SLL,verifizierung,BzZB,privatkunden,verificationMphp'fJZ
finalUrlBasedomain rasignsMcoMza
name
scanned 1,330,610,556,757
rescan 0
statusCode 200
htmlContent
LqOO!TYPYahtmlaPU?LH!au|,,Wb!,,OTOaXXTMLaZMzaStrict,,YNu
uhttp2,,wwwMwbMorg,TR,xhtmlZ,OTO,xhtmlZ|strictMdtduj
LhtmlaxmlnsJuhttp2,,wwwMwbMorg,Zööö,xhtmluj
Lheadj
aLmetaahttp|equivJu!ontent|TypeuacontentJutext,html0acharsetJUTP|äua,j
aLtitlej
a 4artenverifikationa|aMaster!ardainaOeutschland
aL,titlej
aLmetaanameJukeywordsuacontentJuMaster!ardaOeutschlandka4reditkartennutzungka
4reditkartenzahlungka4reditkarteaonlineka4reditkarten|Zinssatzka4reditkarten|4onsolidierungka
4reditkartennummerka?argeldbezugkaVerlustaundaOiebstahlua,j
aLmetaanameJudescriptionuacontentJuYrfahrenaSiekawieaSiearichtigamitaHhreraMaster!ardaumgehena
undabequemaundasicherazuraTätigungavonaZahlungenanutzenakönnenMua,j
aLmetaahttp|equivJuYxpiresuacontentJuZBabZkBzBzuj
aLmetaahttp|equivJuLast|ModifieduacontentJuNunaBzkaBzZZuj
aLscriptatypeJutext,javascriptuj
a varaglb?aseURLaJaUhttp2,,wwwMmastercardMcom,de,privatkunden,service,service_umgangMhtmlU0
aL,scriptj
aLscriptatypeJutext,javascriptua
srcJuhttp2,,wwwMmastercardMcom,common,js,cms_lib_USMjsujL,scriptja
LscriptatypeJutext,javascriptuasrcJuhttp2,,wwwMmastercardMcom,de,js,jquery|
ZMBMSMminMjsujL,scriptja
LlinkahrefJuhttp2,,wwwMmastercardMcom,common,css,styleMcssuarelJustylesheetuatypeJutext,cssua
,j
aLlinkahrefJuhttp2,,wwwMmastercardMcom,common,css,customMcssuarelJustylesheetuatypeJutext,cssua
,j
aLlinkahrefJuhttp2,,wwwMmastercardMcom,de,css,imageMcssuarelJustylesheetuatypeJutext,cssua,j
aLlinkahrefJuhttp2,,wwwMmastercardMcom,common,css,printMcssuarelJustylesheetuatypeJutext,cssua
mediaJuprintua,j
loadTime 10484
phishtank_id 1344139
phishtank_detailurl http2,,wwwMphishtankMcom,phish_detailMphp'phish_idJZbVVZbö
phishtank_submissiontime 1326841548
phishtank_verified 1
phishtank_verifiedtime 1326843346
phishtank_isonline 1
phishtank_targetname Mastercard
state 3
duplicatedFrom 9148
Table 5.2: An example record of one phishing website from our test set database. Be-
sides this information the three linked website screenshots were stored in a different
database table with links to the parent website.
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ID Count CategoryOName
3 3603 PhishingOWebsite
1 1743 DisabledOByOHoster
6 1294 DeadOLink
2 348 Phishonly
7 299 OriginalOBack
11 280 Domainparking
9 212 CodingOError
8 178 WeirdOContent/WeirdOlanguage
5 163 StillOLoading/NoOcontent
12 121 EducationalOWebsite
14 107 OriginalONotOFound
13 22 MalwareOdownload
10 19 NoOImage
43%
21%
15%
4%
4%
3%
3% 2% 2%2%1% 0% 0%
Figure 5.1: Distribution of the different phishing website states over the 10,030 phish-
ing URLs that have been scanned.
completely dead. One of the most interesting findings of this list is the rather high number
of “Phishonly” attacks. About 4% of all the phishing URLs did not target a specific brand but
instead simply asked for arbitrary credentials or used multiple company logos. Compared to
the 3,603 other phishing attacks found this is even 8,8% of all online phishing attacks. This
clearly shows that no matter how successful such attacks are they are used by some phishers
and need to be regarded as possible threats as well. For a detailed list of all states please
refer to figure 5.1.
As reported above we had a list of 1,152 non-phishing URLs that were reduced to 1,097
unique brands. But how many brands of those have been phished and which ones are the
most attacked ones? When measuring this data we did not only include all websites of state 3
(“Phishing Website”) but also the phishing websites of state 14 (“Original Not Found”):
although we were not able to find the original website that had been faked for some of the
attacks it was still possible to assign a unique brand to those attacks. In total, we found at
least one attack for 208 brands out of the 1,097 original brands (28%) that we had in our
database. The top 13 of those brands – mentioned in figure 5.2 – already cover 78% of all
the attacks that were analyzed. By far the brand that was most present in our test set was
PayPal with 36% of all attacks accounting for phishes relating to them. PayPal is followed by
the online community platform Habbo (9%), the social network Orkut (6%) and the auction
platform eBay (5%).
Looking at this one can clearly see a huge gap between PayPal being the most phished brand
and the other brands in the list. In fact there is another explanation for that besides the fact
that PayPal is by far mostly attacked. Laura Oppenheimer from OpenDNS [224] reports that
PayPal actively pushes phishing attacks reported to them to PhishTank (our data source) and
so far seems to be only company doing that. This may account for the skewed data showing a
lot more phishing attempts to PayPal than to any other brand. In fact it is hard to assume how
many PayPal phishes would have been reported without the help of the company itself but
the number would most certainly be lower than it actually is. Applying this to the rest of the
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Count Brand Name
1316 Paypal
335 Habbo
233 Orkut
197 eBay
190 TAMdAirlines
120 Santander
88 CielodLottery
88 AOL
79 Tibia
70 Battle.net
57 Mastercard
56 Visa
52 RuneScape
829
3710 Total
36% 
9% 
6% 
5% 5% 
3% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 2% 
22% 
195dotherdbrands
Figure 5.2: The top 13 of the 208 brands phished in total and the number of occurrences
in the test set. We included all websites of state 3 and 14.
data would hence mean that a lot of actual attacks are missed and not reported to PhishTank
at all. Assuming that PayPal would have the same number of reported phishing attempts
as the second most prominent brand in our dataset (355 found phishing websites instead of
1316) this would mean that only 27% of all phishing attacks of a brand are actually reported
to PhishTank and that the actual phishing numbers are more than three times higher than
actually assumed. As interesting as those calculations are, they are also highly speculative
as the real number of PayPal reports that would occur without their own reporting cannot be
determined and if it was even possible this would necessarily mean that the difference is the
same for all other brands.
When using a test set such as the one presented here for evaluation of phishing detectors,
another property of phishing attacks is highly important: the distribution of attacks across
the set. The order of attacks in our test set corresponds to the the time of reporting of an
attack. As phishers usually not only launch one single attack for a brand but spread it over
a larger number of URLs, the timeframe – and thus the number of different attacks – has
to be carefully selected. Even for high frequency attacks like PayPal this problem persists.
As one can see in figure 5.3, the position of PayPal attacks throughout the test set varies
(see chart 5.3a). Parts (b) and (c) of the figure show a subset with the first 100 and 500
PayPal phishing attacks of our test set. Although the average percentage in all three cases is
approximately 35% this is clearly not the case for all every portion of the test set. 100 attacks
from the offset of attack 1,000 have only 27% phishing attacks (see 5.3d). Looking at (a)
again, one can see that there would be even less attacks in the area from 1,200 to 1,800 and
a lot more attacks at around 2,900. In practice this means that phishing tests with real life
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Figure 5.3: Grouping effects that occur in smaller sized phishing test sets. This figure
looks at PayPal phishing attacks and their distribution throughout different portions of
our phishing test set (ordered by the time of addition to our database). a) PayPal attack
distribution among all 3,710 attacks; b) PayPal distribution among first 100 attacks; c)
PayPal distribution among first 500 attacks; d) PayPal distribution among 100 attacks
starting from offset 1001. The distribution of the same attack variestion which may lead
to seemingly different attack percentages.
test sets should always contain a large number of tests as smaller numbers might be biased
by the current wave of attacks being launched by phishers.
Many of the phishing attacks try to closely mimic their parent website as close as possible,
but for varying reasons other not so perfectly looking ones do also exist. Figure 5.4 shows
eight different PayPal phishing website screenshots from our test set. Although many of
the screenshots look very close to one of the real PayPal phishing websites that existed at
that time (e.g. ID 1117 and 1179) others fail to look exactly the same. In some cases this
is due to technical problems or the inability of the phisher to produce a similarly looking
result (ID 3234). In other cases these can also be hosting limitations of the webspace chosen
by the phisher (ID 3413 and 3533; e.g. a blog hoster that allows only to place content in
a predefined layout). Some phishers deliberately create a different layout to place a web
form gathering data within this layout (ID 4624 and 2714). ID 7846 shows a very interesting
phishing attempt that tried to recreate the look and feel of the standard website but used a
completely different photo and claim taken from a modified stock photography image.
Some other interesting screenshot examples to look at are the 8.8% of phishing websites that
did not target a specific brand. Looking at the examples in figure 5.5 one can see that most
of them are used to gather email credentials (all except ID 1458). Since these credentials
usually contain the email provider within the username no specific brand setup is needed.
Some of them are done using online service that allow to setup online forms (e.g. Google
Docs7) (ID 1005). Others place a multitude of different brand logos aside a login form (ID
1275 and 7428). ID 1300 used the same technique but here additionally the brand colors of
7 http://docs.google.com
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1117 78461179
4624
353334133234
2714 IDs
Figure 5.4: Most attacks try to closely mimic the appearance of the parent website
but some also different to the original, either due technical limitations of the phisher or
because of content variations.
PayPal are used for the text contents (without displaying the PayPal logo anywhere). This
could be either to subconsciously place another brand cue for the user visiting the website or
perhaps the phisher only reused the styling information of another PayPal phishing attack he
launched earlier. We also observed some cases that tried to gather credit card data without
phishing one specific credit card operator. ID 1458 shows an example for a website using
the MasterCard and Visa logo at the same time.
5.1.6 Application of The Test Set
Having a large test set such as the one presented in this chapter should make it possible
to perform comparable tests among different detectors that make use of URL, HTML or
graphical properties. Most of the detectors that have been presented in the related work
chapter (see section 3.5) could hence be tested with this test set making performance results
comparable more easily.
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1005 13001275
74281458 IDs
Figure 5.5: Different screenshots for websites of the state “Phishonly” (2) that target
either no specific or a multitude of different brands.
The contained phishing and non-phishing websites make it possible to not only test the detec-
tion rate of phishing attacks but also look out for false positives and true negatives delivered
by a detector. Using the linkage with the corresponding brands researchers may also test
detectors that predict the similarity with an original counterpart of a phishing website.
To facilitate this we made the test set publicly available on our website for other researchers
to download. A MySQL dump of the different database tables can be downloaded as a
compressed archive to import it into own databases. The website as well as the archive also
contain explanations on the different database tables that are contained within the test set.
Although a standardized test set allows for better comparison of different detectors it also
has its limitations. As phishers and their methods evolve, a phishing test set should be as
up-to-date as possible to make sure that the detectors are not tested against already outdated
attack types. In this case comparability conflicts with up-to-date-ness and researchers should
make up their mind whether its better for them to have a comparable basis to other research
which they could easily reuse or an accurate test set that most probably will need to be
collected by themselves. A possible solution to suit both dimensions best would perhaps be
to offer a standardized way of collection phishing attacks at every moment (e.g. offering a
phishing collection software). Like this, researchers could collect up-to-date data that has
the same properties as data sets of older research. For comparability they could then do their
tests with the test set of previous research or if applicable retest the work of other researchers
with their own new test set. Perhaps the parameters that were used for the creation of this test
set and the database table structure could serve as such a standardization with some slight
extensions.
5.1 Phishing Website Test Set 97
Some detectors from related work used additional properties that were not captured within
our test set. Domain-based information (like the time of registration) are not part of our
test set, as well as only the main HTML corpus of the first page was stored in our database.
If information of additional images, style resources or other websites linked from the main
website were needed for the detection process they would need to be added to the test set as
well.
5.1.7 Research Results
Although the creation of this test set can be seen more or less as a basis for further research,
its definition and the collection already brought up some research findings which contribute
to the research questions covered within this thesis.
DD What is Phishing Detection?8
When building up a phishing test set the dimensions and the definition of phishing detection
play an important role. In terms of this chapter phishing detection or a phishing detector
could be defined as a piece of software that is able to classify website input correctly into
phishing and non-phishing attacks.
In other words, in each test of a phishing detector using a test set, the test set represents
the definition of phishing and how the world of phishing looks like towards the detector.
Looking at properties of our and other related work one can see phishing detection as a func-
tion mapping different technical details about websites to a binary classification problem of
whether a website is phishing or not. In the test set presented, some of these input properties
have been gathered (e.g. URL, HTML content, screenshots) and some have been omitted
(e.g. domain information, linked content).
f (attributes(website),context info) =
{
1 if is phishing
0 if is NOT phishing
attributes(website) =

URL
HTML content
screenshots
domain info
linked content
· · ·

Depending on the type of detector the returned result may be more than just a binary return
value. Additional output information like a probability score instead of a solely binary clas-
sification can make it easier to communicate the detection results to the user or use them for
further processing.
8 For each project subchapter the results concerning the different research questions can be recognized by the
respective shortcut icons from the research question overview.
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Another perspective on what phishing detection is, can be gathered through the analysis of
a phishing test set. What kind of data is phished? What types of businesses are attacked?
Using such observations does not only give an overview over what phishing is but also on
what phishing detection needs to be. The details provided in this chapter should already
provide an overview over the current state-of-the-art of the attacks.
DM How can Detectors Be Evaluated?
To evaluate detectors test inputs are essential to find out whether the detector works as in-
tended. Feeding those test items into the detector and comparing them to the desired results
yields the benchmark data that is used for rating the detector. Does the detector produce a
lot true positives and true negatives or are there a lot of false positives and false negatives?
Again the test set is vital to make sure that all general and corner cases of possible phishing
attacks are covered.
As mentioned in section 5.1.6 such a test set could either be standardized for better compa-
rability of the detection results of different research approaches or should be up-to-date to
cover the recent phishing landscape. For the best evaluation possible both should hold true.
A test set as it has been presented in this chapter can be seen as a first step towards such a
goal. It does not only provide a public testing basis that can be reused by other researchers
but also provides standardized structure of possible input variables to detectors. Reusing this
model would make it possible to use different test sets of different time spans as inputs to
different detectors to provide the best comparability between detectors.
5.2 SecurityGuard Website Status Rollup
This chapter is based on the work that was part of the diploma thesis “Enhancing Web Browser
Privacy and Security Awareness” by the student Dominik Andreansky [13].
Definition
Measurement
Enhancement
Reason
HCI
Phishing
Detection
User
Intervention
IE
IM
DD
DM
DH IH
ID
IR
DE
DR
The goal of the project that is described in this subchapter was
to create a web browser status indicator that would be similar to
other status indicators (e.g. security toolbars) that have been pre-
viously proposed and deployed but that mitigates the downsides
of such approaches that have been shown in related work so far
(section 3): first of all most users usually overlook non-blocking
status indicators simply because security is not the primary goal of
their actions. Within the developed extension we try to counteract
this using a large customizable browser sidebar that provides continuous feedback on many
different parameters and, for maximum visibility, by coloring the whole browser depending
on the overall security. A second problematic property of such status indicators is that users
are often unable to understand the information that is conveyed by the indicator and hence
are unable to take the correct decision. Here it can help to offer security content relevant to
the user that is presented in a way it is easily understood.
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Figure 5.6: Screenshot of the passive
warning used by Egelman et al. [78].
Neutral-Information toolbar
SSL-Verification toolbar
System-Decision toolbar
Figure 5.7: Three different types of tool-
bars used in the study by Wu et al. [324].
We developed a Firefox extension (called “SecurityGuard”) that displays diverse security re-
lated information on the user’s visit to websites within several information areas in a browser
sidebar. Each information block contributed to an overall score that finally set a general
security recommendation. The extension was designed with a user centered development
approach using an online survey and a paper prototyping phase. We finally evaluated the
plugin in field study by recording usage patterns from 24 plugin users.
5.2.1 Yet Another Status Toolbar?
When looking at the related work in terms of computer security warnings in the browser
(see section 3.3.2) researchers found that non-blocking indicators and especially security
toolbars don’t seem to work. Egelman et al. [78] found that in case of passive browser warn-
ings the users did not have more success in evading security problems than a control group
(without any warning). Only 30% of the participants read the warning at all, because some
accidentally dismissed it during typing on the keyboard. The passive warning they tested
(see figure 5.6) was a non-blocking popup-dialog. The only permanent visible component of
this indicator was a small text on the right side of the URL bar. Wu et al. [324] tested several
browser toolbars with similarly small indicators. They distinguished between a “neutral in-
formation toolbar” (only showing more information about the domain), a “SSL verification
toolbar” (showing additional information about the SSL protection) and a “system decision
toolbar” (using a traffic light metaphor to propose how secure the website is) (see figure 5.7
for the three toolbars). In their tests the highest number of participants fell for attacks when
using the neutral information toolbar (45%) whilst 33% still fell for attacks using the system
decision toolbar. The explanation given by the authors is that the participants also failed to
look at the toolbars in many cases and solely relied on the content area of the browser for
making their judgments.
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Looking at all these facts, one has to ask why one should bother creating another non-
blocking information tool for user intervention. We saw four reasons why more research
in this area might be promising: 1) looking at the previously described research one can eas-
ily see that the systems tested where more or less at the minimum of the range of possibilities
that could be tested. Regarding the passive warning of the Internet Explorer it is clear that
such small indicators will be overlooked by the user (as previous research already proved
that the lock icon was never looked at). In case of the toolbars the design of these toolbars
was very rudimentary and perhaps did not stand out enough of the rest of the browser’s user
interface. 2) Besides the problems that research sees with toolbars they are still used as a
widespread instrument of companies for customer information and customer security. Rand
Fishkin [90] compiled a list of 14 different popular browser toolbars. 3) Blocking security
messages have the advantage that they cannot be overlooked but that comes with another
problem: if the user actively wants to disregard them (e.g. because they are erroneous) this
can get very time consuming. The untrusted SSL certificate warnings of Firefox are an in-
teresting example as they often need to be circumvented to reach self-signed SSL secured
websites. 4) Another advantage of a permanently visible indicator is that it is not only able
to provide feedback in case of errors, instead it can also be used to constantly reinforce the
user positively on standard websites.
For our “toolbar” presented in this subchapter we chose to do some radical changes com-
pared to the toolbars tested so far. We tried not only to enlarge the area of toolbar feedback
within the browser to a maximum but also raised the amount of reported information. In
the end, we included website identity information, blacklist information, server location
and domain information, password and visit information, and gave an overall summary and
recommendation that led to complete browser design changes (see figure 5.8 for example
screenshots). Before explaining the different components in more detail we will start off
with the user centered design process of the toolbar that we took.
5.2.2 Designing the Extension
Related work and other prior research already showed possible directions where another web
browser extension should go or rather where it should not go. This already gave us a broad
idea of what a new toolbar-like extension could look like. To gather more details about
user expectations towards such a tool we first conducted an online survey. Afterwards we
wanted to gain user interface design insights doing some paper prototyping sessions, before
we arrived at the final design of the “SecurityGuard” browser extension.
Online Survey
To gather insights about user expectations towards such a toolbar we designed a 32 ques-
tion online survey. Besides some demographic questions, we asked people to describe and
explain existing warning dialogs; about their knowledge on SSL certificates and phishing
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Figure 5.8: Four screenshots of the look and feel of different states of the SecurityGuard
extension. a) Revisiting an extended validation protected SSL website (paypal.com); b)
Revisiting a standard SSL secured website (amazon.com sign-in); c) visiting an unse-
cured previously unvisited website (lab website); d) visiting a self-signed SSL protected
website for the first time.
and about their feelings about certain design criteria for security dialogs (colors, icons). Fi-
nally we asked several questions about their behavior when seeing such warnings and about
preferred wording of security related messages.
The questionnaire was promoted online and received 49 complete responses within 14 days.
In average the participants’ age ranged from 17 to 58 years (31 years in average). 24 partici-
pants were female. 22% stated to have “excellent” or “good” online security knowledge.
Only a small fraction of people were able to correctly explain the contents of the pre-
sented warning examples. Some even thought the screenshots we had included were fake.
47% stated to know what SSL certificates are, whilst only 31% were actually able to explain
them correctly. The term phishing was correctly explained by all 73% that stated to know
what the term means. 12% of our participants actually used an anti-phishing tool.
Looking at colors and iconography that was preferred by the users the standard color expec-
tations of a western culture were met. Green was selected most (43%) as a metaphor for
security and red (43%) as one for insecurity (see figure 5.9). The participants were allowed
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Figure 5.9: Left: Ratings for colors perceived as “secure” by the participants. Right:
Ratings for colors perceived as “insecure”. It was possible to select multiple colors.
to select more than one color. In terms of iconography the current icons of the existing Fire-
fox and Internet Explorer web browser were rated superior to the the classic lock icon. A
smiley icon performed worst.
Only 37% of the survey respondents stated they would not read browser warning messages
because they are too long or technically phrased. In case a warning would ask them to leave
a website 67% of the participants stated they would do so.
As we planned to use a rather large amount of screen real estate for our extension we also
asked people how much screen space they would be willingly give up for a security plugin.
More than half of the people (53%) would only allow for up to 10% of the screen space to
be occupied by security indicators. 27% would sacrifice 15% of the screen space and 14%
even 20% of their screen space.
Paper Prototyping
With the results of this first survey study we created a first draft of our plugin concept and
decided that it should be implemented as a browser sidebar that is divided into different
information modules.
To get a more detailed feedback for our concept we decided to build some paper prototypes
to collect first user feedback. We built a few simple mockups for a range of possible modules
that could be used in the later plugin (see figure 5.10) and used three different states for each
module (green for secure, red for insecure and yellow for suspicious or missing information).
We presented them together with mockup browser chromes to nine participants in single
interview sessions and explained the concept of the plugin and of the different modules to
them. Participants were asked to play around with the concept and arrange the modules
as they liked. We also provided different browser contents (warnings and real content) as
puzzle pieces to build a whole browser mockup.
The feedback from the participants was diverse. The participants preferred different levels of
information details. One participant was only interested in a security summary and wanted
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Figure 5.10: Example modules used for the paper protoyping study.
Figure 5.11: Two example pictures of the paper prototype browsers that had been com-
piled by the participants. One using the scenario of paypal.com as a website and one
using the scenario of a simple IP-address.
to access detailed data on request. Another participant was interested to see the blacklist and
SSL certificate status. During the interview we asked our users to build browser configu-
rations for three different URLs (the www.paypal.com URL, an IP address and a arbitrary
university subdomain “something.lmu.de”). The participants made up their own scenario of
what the URL could mean and configured the paper prototype accordingly. The scenario
also influenced the choice of modules. Figure 5.10 shows two example paper prototypes that
have been compiled by participants of the study.
We also discussed some general design decisions with the participants. Participants had no
clear preference of whether such a sidebar should be docked to the right or the left of the
screen. Some wanted the sidebar to be always present, whereas another participant wanted
it to fade in with each new page load and to fade out as soon as interaction within the
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content area was started. Another participant wanted to have different module configurations
depending on the summarized state of all modules.
Final Extension Design
Accumulating all findings from related work, our online survey and the paper prototyping in-
terviews we ended up with a final design concept for our SecurityGuard extension consisting
of four general browser elements:
• SecurityGuard Sidebar: The major component of our extension is the browser side-
bar containing the different information modules. The whole sidebar and each module
could be collapsed and reopened to support each configuration the user wanted. The
standard configuration was to show all possible modules to the user. Depending on
the module some of the following module states are possible: a green state symboliz-
ing that the partial result of the security assessment of this module is good; a yellow
state that indicates some problems or missing information; a red state indicating secu-
rity problems within that module and a gray state indicating that this module does not
have a security judgment. The sidebar consisted of the following five modules:
• Website Identity Information: This module shows the current state of the SSL
certificate, consisting of the website the certificate was issued for, the name of
the company and the issuer, the certificate status (whether it was verified) and
finally a connection status indicating whether the connection is encrypted. Using
a button with the caption “more information” the user can open up the browser’s
security information dialog for even more information.
• Blacklist Information: This module contains only a single information indicator
telling the user whether the website appears on a blacklist index.
• Server Location and Domain Information: This module collects several pieces
of information of the server and the domain the user is connected to. First of all
the geo-location of the server’s IP address is retrieved and a flag, a map and
a textual representation of the location of the server is given. Besides this the
person or company that has registered the domain name is displayed.
• Password and Visit Information: This module displays the number of times
the user has visited the website and whether the user has stored a password in the
browser’s password manager for this domain.
• Information Summary: Finally the information summary module gives a short
summary over the most important states of the other modules and displays an
overall security rating that is calculated by the extension.
• SecurityGuard Toolbar: The security guard toolbar consists of five different buttons
each one belonging to one of the modules in the sidebar. It can be used to quickly
switch modules in the sidebar on and off. We introduced this possibility as some users
5.2 SecurityGuard Website Status Rollup 105
wanted to modify the information display when necessary. It is not necessary to have
this toolbar enabled to make use of the SecurityGuard extension.
• SecurityGuard Location Bar: The SecurityGuard extension also enhances the dis-
play of the location bar. Next to the browsers own SSL status indicator a flag showing
the country where the domain’s server is situated is introduced. This indicator is iden-
tical to the one in the server location module. In addition to that the style of the URL
display is also different to the usual appearance in web browsers. The URL is format-
ted in a color, matching the global security rating of the website (as identified by our
plugin). The basedomain-part of the URL is formatted differently to the subdomains
and the scheme of the URL (e.g. “http” or “‘https”). Each folder of the path of the
URL is separated using small icons (as known from breadcrumb navigation9 in web-
sites). All this highlighting and separation should make the different parts of the URL
easier to understand for the user to make it easier to recognize URLs that impersonate
another domain somewhere in the subdomains or the path for example.
• SecurityGuard Personas: Finally the browser’s persona is also changed to resemble
the color of the security decision of the plugin. This helps to change the complete
appearance of the browser without using more screen real estate. Besides using this
idea within this extension for the first time, we conducted a follow-up project (see
subchapter 5.6) to examine the possibilities of this kind of user intervention more
closely.
Figure 5.12 shows a labeled example screenshot of the final browser extension. A figure
showing different states of the module for different example websites can be found in fig-
ure 5.8.
5.2.3 Implementation
The SecurityGuard extension has been implemented as a Firefox plugin using the standard
hooks and methods of the Firefox API10. When the browser is started the plugin registers
two hooks to browser events to start the validation of the current page. One is fired with
every new page load that happens, the other one is fired whenever the active tab of the
browser window is changed (because the userinterface components of the browser need to
be updated then).
Whenever the security information needs to be refreshed, different functions are called that
update the information of each module separately. As some modules have to reload infor-
mation from outside sources the overall security information is updated after all information
is fetched.
9 Breadcrumb navigation uses the idea of Hansel and Gretel of having a trail of breadcrumbs to find their way
back in websites [160]. A path of a URL can also be seen as a trace of sublevels back to the top folder.
10https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/
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Figure 5.12: The different parts of the SecurityGuard browser extension.
The SSL status information can be read directly from browser objects identifying the dif-
ferent SSL status and information about the SSL certificate. The blacklist information is
received using an API call to the Google Safebrowsing API. The server location is received
from another free API that allows to resolve geographical details for IP addresses11. The
flags are displayed using flag graphics we bundled with the extension whereas the map
representation was loaded dynamically as a query to Google Maps12 returning a static im-
age. The domain owner is retrieved from another API that can be used to receive WHOIS-
information13. The number of visits to the current website and the number of stored pass-
words again could be extracted from standard calls to the Firefox API.
5.2.4 User Study
To evaluate our extension we chose to conduct a small field study. We added some logging
functionality to the plugin and made the plugin publicly available on a website together with
installation instructions in German and English. The main purpose of our study was to find
out how the users would make use of the different modules and the configuration options
they had at hand. The initial online survey suggests that people are not willing to have a
big portion of their screen occupied by a security related information plugin. We wanted to
check whether this would be true for the our plugin in the field.
11http://www.ipinfodb.com
12http://maps.google.com
13http://www.kahtava.com
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Methodology
We asked the participants of our field study to download and install the plugin and use it for
a period of two weeks. The log data was not submitted to our server but instead we stored it
locally on the participants computers and asked them to send the information back to us after
the study period. We also did a small exit interview with them, followed by an additional
online survey.
We recruited 24 participants excluding people that had previously participated in our paper
prototyping study to prevent biasing. During the collection phase we were mostly interested
in the kind of interactions the participants did with the browser extension. Hence every
interaction with the plugin was stored within the log files noting the respective element, the
action, a timestamp, and the user interface component from where the action was triggered.
We did not store any privacy related data like website URLs, but recorded more general
data like start and end of a browsing session and each time a sidebar module was opened or
collapsed.
Results
The average age of the 24 participants of our field study was 31 years with 75% of the
participants being male. The participants were recruited using posts on a social network
platform.
In total we analyzed 680 different webbrowsing sessions (in average 28 per participant in 24
days). Looking at the log files we saw that 21 of our 24 participants (88%) collapsed or hid
the sidebar at some point during the field study whilst only three had it open for the complete
duration of the field study. Of the 21 people that collapsed the sidebar only six (25%) kept it
closed at all times. The 15 remaining participants opened some single modules or the whole
sidebar whenever desired. In total, we monitored 310 openings and closings of either single
modules or the complete sidebar. In contrast to what we expected, the toolbar buttons were
hardly ever used, instead the users collapsed the sidebar entries using the section headers
within the sidebar.
Looking at the numbers how often the sidebar or single modules have been opened or col-
lapsed, the whole sidebar was most often opened (89 times by 18 participants). Looking at
the single modules the number of open interactions are only close behind. The map module
was opened 69 times by 12 participants, the blacklist module was opened 65 times by 13
participants, the website identity module 52 times by 15 participants and the password mod-
ule 46 times by 10 participants. Most interestingly we found only 28 open interactions for
our summary module. This could be because of the fact that the overall security assessment
was also shown using the browser persona and other indicators but it could also mean that
the module was less often collapsed.
We didn’t expect that the map module was requested this often. In our paper prototyping
study it was hardly used and hence we also excluded the contained data from the overall
security value calculation.
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Asking the participants in the interviews when and how they used the SecurityGuard exten-
sion, 79% stated that they had a look at the modules whenever they did financial transactions
online, or when the persona (67%) or one of the modules (50%) turned to another color than
green or gray. 13% were also sometimes just curious about the contents of the modules.
Besides demographic data the final questionnaire contained mostly Likert scale questions
belonging to three different categories. We used five point Likert scales ranging from “1 -
strongly disagree” to “5 - strongly agree”. We had 22 different questions of which we will
only report on the most important ones of all three categories (see figure 5.13).
The first category of questions dealt with the experienced usability of SecurityGuard. All
but one participant found that the extension was easy to use and easy to learn and nearly
all of our participants were overall satisfied with the extension. In terms of understanding
the extension again high ratings where achieved whilst the overall layout was rated worst
with one person disagreeing and one person being neutral about the fact that the layout
was easy to comprehend. We think that the wealth of different information options that is
offered by the plugin might be a reason for this. The information of the single modules
was well understood by all participants. Asking whether participants understood the color
coding they reported to understand all coding equally well. We thought that the fact that
different colored modules then are summed up to an overall recommendation might possibly
confuse our users. The last set of questions asked the people about their experienced security
when using the plugin. Again the participants thought that security helps them to find online
risks and that it helps them understand security concepts better. Looking at the median rating
values, so far all questions had a median rating of 5. The question about the understanding of
security concepts was the first one that had, despite a high average, a median value of 4. We
think this is reasonable as although our extension gives insights to a lot of different security
related parameters we did not focus on the specific explanation of the different security
concepts. As a last question we asked the participants whether they would continue using
our extension after the field trial. Seventeen agreed with that while four people disagreed
and three other people answered neutrally. These numbers fit well with the six participants
that had not done any major interactions with the sidebar during the study phase.
5.2.5 Discussion and Limitations
Within this project we used a user centered development approach – including online surveys
and paper prototyping – to build a browser extension providing security related details to the
user. Looking at our results it seems that at least for some of our test users and modules
we were able to get the users to seek advice in the information provided by our tool. This
is in slight contrast to what related work reports, that such non-blocking warning interfaces
fail to catch the users’ attention. In some cases the users even looked at the results out of
pure curiosity without any security related questions in mind. Such an approach to security
information display could make the topic of security much more attractive than it is today. If
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Figure 5.13: The answers of participants to the Likert questions for the SecurityGuard
field study. We asked questions about the usability and understanding of SecurityGuard,
as well as security-related questions.
users familiarize themselves with security related topics in other contexts it could help them
to better understand security problems.
Looking at our development process the results from the pre-studies in many cases predicted
the final outcomes in our field study. However, the insights where pre-study and field study
did not match seemed to be the most interesting. Although the server location and infor-
mation did not matter much to the participants of the pre-study, the field study candidates
looked a lot at this data. In practice malicious websites can be hosted on any server in any
country, but the sole fact of people starting to reason about the technical properties of their
actions is a step in the right direction. The form of presentation also might be a major point
that made this security module more interesting than the others. A country-flag and a lo-
cation on a map is something a user can easily identify with. Do I know that place? What
are my feelings about this area? Does it make any sense that this company hosts their data
there? These are all questions that could arise when looking at such a representation.
Besides the positive qualitative and quantitative resonance that we had when analyzing our
log data, still 25% of the participants nearly completely neglected the sidebar as a core com-
ponent of our plugin. Haven’t they been interested in security at all or was the overall rating
displayed by the persona already enough for their judgment? Looking at the qualitative an-
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swers most of them seemed to be happy with the extension. In future studies it would be
important to take extra care of those participants to find out exactly what their reasons were.
Collecting data on the individual module usage of our participants on the one hand gave a
very good insight on how our plugin was used. On the other hand, we did not evaluate in how
far our concept really would protect users that visit malicious websites. In case of this project
we wanted to collect knowledge about which types of information are interesting towards the
user and how she can be reached. We think that a field study evaluation was suited very well
to achieve this goal. A measurement of how often a user falls for malicious websites usually
needs to be done within a lab study. In an upcoming project (see subchapter 5.5) we tried
to solve these problems by performing an extra lab study to find out about how participants
would perform when being exposed to malicious websites and collected anonymous website
visit data throughout our field study. This made it possible to get more insights about the
actual browsing behavior of the participants without affecting their privacy.
Another limitation of this project was that we did not do any evaluation of our scoring sys-
tem. We hence have no results about the correctness of the recommendations given by our
plugin. Without those quantitative values on detection a comparison to other existing ap-
proaches is close to impossible. Looking at the interview comments and the quantitative
and qualitative results of our study it at least seemed like we were able to influence the
security perception of the users using our plugin. The sole action of opening a module to
check its contents already shows that we were able to raise the interest towards security and
hence influence the security perception in some way. As the persona concept has been very
well accepted within this project we will focus on this specific aspect more in the project
in subchapter 5.6 to see whether we can influence the users’ security perception using such
methods.
5.2.6 Research Results
This project focused mainly on the user centered development of a new kind of user in-
tervention system. Within this project we didn’t focus on the quality of the detector but
were instead interested to find out which kind of information in which kind of representation
would be interesting for a user. In the course of this project we kept this detector mechanism
to the minimum necessary to have enough data for our desired outputs. This shows that
working on new ways of user intervention nearly always introduces some findings related to
the detection of attacks.
DD What is Phishing Detection?
The usual way of the definition of phishing detection as it is presented within this thesis
includes a measurement of how well a given detector performs in detecting phishing attacks
and other websites. In case of this project we had a lot of different modules that each pro-
duced a recommendation that was then finally summarized by an overall module. This raises
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the question what level of transparency should be applied to such detection results. Is it bet-
ter to hide everything but the final detection result from the user and try to automate the
decision process or does a variety of possible information eventually have some advantages?
Each participant in the evaluation steps throughout this study had different ideas of what
information he or she would want to see. This means that in case a user is able to make use
of different detection stages he should perhaps be incorporated into the detection process.
DH How can HCI be Used to Build Detectors?
It seems that for a proper protection of the user against malicious websites a lot of individual
factors have to come together. It is not only about how well the technical aspects lead to a
good phishing detection, it is also about whether the user can understand the problem and
data that is finally reported and whether she is interested in it. In other words a detector
development process already needs to have knowledge about the users of the final system.
In case of this project the user centered design approach first told us what the users would
like to know to judge the security of a website and how they would like to see it represented.
We then built a minimum detector to fulfill what we identified that would be necessary for
the desired user intervention mechanism. This way of reversing the development process
of a phishing detector may help to come up with new ideas that will most likely be better
understood by the final user.
DM How can Detectors Be Evaluated?
We did not perform an actual measurement of the quality of our simple detector by check-
ing its results against malicious and non-malicious websites. Although such an evaluation
should usually be performed to find out details about the technical benchmarks of the detec-
tor the evaluation of the user intervention system can also yield findings that serve as a basic
detector benchmark. Detectors with a low detection quality will always lead to inaccurate
user intervention that will sooner or later be detected by the users. Besides this, even in
the final evaluation of a user intervention method interesting findings for the detector can be
generated. In our case we did not use the data of the map module for our detection result as
it seemed not to be important neither from the technical nor from the user intervention side.
Finding that this module was the most frequently used one shows that people relied on the
data and it should be incorporated by the detection process if possible.
IH How can HCI be Used to Enhance User Intervention Mechanisms?
Using the methodologies of software development in a user oriented way can help to design
user intervention mechanisms that are much better understood and accepted. Especially in
the security area where security is not the primary goal of the users actions it is important to
think about what kind of intervention will reach the user best. Using a user centered design
process can create user intervention mechanisms that guarantee that their contents are of
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some interest to the users leading to more interactions and on the long run hopefully turning
the user’s focus more to security.
IM How can User Intervention be Measured?
In the course of this project we did not measure the quality of our user intervention method
by measuring how well people would be protected from malicious websites, instead we
measured details about the plugin interaction and used a lot of qualitative values. These
qualitative measurements throughout the course of the design can be very valuable to en-
hance specific parts of the user intervention as well as the detection. It should always be
used within the development process of new user intervention methods. In case one wants to
have measurements that allow better comparison of user intervention methods a qualitative
measurement is needed.
IE How to Enhance User Intervention Quality?
Related work showed that small notifications outside of the user’s primary focus are not
noticed by the users and we saw within this project that occupying too much screen space
is also unacceptable for most users. Yet, other users – perhaps mostly security experts –
might be annoyed by blocking dialogs that appear to warn them about a potential thread. We
showed that users do use and interact with non-blocking user intervention mechanisms in
some way, showing that to at least some extent non-blocking warnings seem to work, too.
Even when looking at the toolbar study of Wu et al. [324] one can see that the system decision
toolbar performed better than the neutral information toolbar and hence had some effect.
The optimal solution seems to be somewhere between both approaches (perhaps somewhat
closer to the blocking dialog side). In our project in subchapter 5.5 we tried to create a semi-
blocking dialog to merge the positive aspects of both approaches. Besides this our field study
enabled us to reason about what properties of our user intervention mechanism were most
important to the users. Although this is no final proof for the success of a concept it can be
used to enhance a user intervention method before finally testing it with a broader user base
in the field or measuring the protection strength within the lab.
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5.3 Community-based Rating Intervention
This chapter is based on the work that was part of the bachelor thesis “Community-Based Security
and Privacy Ratings for Internet Websites” by the student Simon Wicha [297]. Some parts of the
project also led to a publication at 6th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS) by
Maurer titled “Community-Based Security and Privacy Protection During Web Browsing” [181].
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Toolbar-like user intervention methods (as discussed in the pre-
vious chapter) are not the only user intervention method that is
in practical use on the Internet. Services like the WOT-plugin
(Web of Trust)14 [323] offer website ratings to the users allowing
each user to contribute to. Although neither the toolbars nor the
community-based rating services are standard functions of today’s
browsers, WOT reports to have more than 80 million downloads.
Although this general concept is in practical use, the topic of
community-based recommendations for security purposes has been little discussed in the
research community yet. Within this project we wanted to have a look at how such a user
intervention method is actually able to influence the participants’ opinion and behavior. To
measure this we implemented our own prototype for community-based website ratings with
a security and a privacy rating. We then measured how warnings within such a plugin would
affect the user’s opinion on different websites.
5.3.1 The Real World Example: Web Of Trust
Before diving into the work done within our project it might be valuable to have a look
at how a commercial browser intervention mechanism actually looks today. In this case we
want to give a short introduction into the Web of Trust (WOT) platform to be able to compare
it against our own prototype later on. While describing the current state of the WOT system
– as of 2013 – here, our plugin has been developed in mid 2010 when Web of Trust already
existed but was still a lot less popular.
WOT allows a community to rate websites in four different dimensions: trustworthiness,
vendor reliability, privacy and child safety. Whether or not a website denotes a security
problem does not have a direct mapping in the WOT scheme. It is expressed by the sum of
different values instead.
After having installed the WOT plugin in the browser, it provides different status indicators
to the user indicating the community-ratings for websites (see figure 5.14). For the current
website that the user is visiting, a small status indicator is added to the browser next to the
URL bar that opens a popup with detailed information once it is clicked. In case the average
rating of a website is below a certain threshold a blocking warning message appears over the
website (5.14c). For each website an online scorecard can also be accessed without having
14http://www.mywot.com/
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the plugin installed (5.14d) and the plugin also adds the WOT indicators to links on other
websites to show their status prior to an actual visit. For each rating a popularity indicator
shows how many people voted for the given website to indicate how reliable the community
result is.
5.3.2 Community-Based Security Research
For our research we are mostly interested in possibilities to protect users from malicious
websites and hence a security judgment is most important for a plugin developed by us.
Besides such a rating we also introduced a secondary privacy rating for our research.
In case of this project we wanted to use the concept of community-based ratings and a user
intervention method based on this to achieve two research goals. First off, we wanted to see
whether people are actually able to correctly assess those values for different websites. What
is the users’ definition of security and privacy and how would they rate different websites?
On the reverse we were interested whether the ratings given by other people are actually
able to influence the opinion of another user towards the website and whether a warning
regarding security or privacy that has its foundations in the ratings of other people would be
able to influence the decision making process of another user.
5.3.3 Building the Prototype
For building our own conceptual version of a community-based rating system we needed to
develop a user interface representation in the users’ browser that would be used to set and
show given ratings and warnings (in case of low ratings). Besides this the plugin needed a
backend server that can be used to collect and store website ratings and deliver them to other
browsers as necessary.
The User Interface
Due to time restrictions we did not do any user centered design process for the user interface
used within this project. After several design iterations within the team we arrived at the
final designs used in our study that can bee seen in figure 5.15.
In case of average or good security and privacy ratings the only indicator that is visible to
the user is a small icon together with the numeric ratings in the lower right corner of the
status bar of the browser. Besides the textual ratings a small icon indicates the overall status
over both ratings. Clicking on this indicator opens a popup that displays the average ratings
more detailed and provides options for setting or changing the own ratings for this website.
To rate the security we used five lock icons which can be clicked by the user like the well-
known star ratings. To rate privacy we used an icon symbolizing a spy. Besides prompting
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Figure 5.14: The user intervention components of the Web of Trust extension (a com-
mercial plugin) [322] a) different rating states and the rating icon; b) website indicator
and scorecard-popout; c) website alert dialog appearing as a blocking dialog in case of
a low rating; d) online scorecard website for each domain; e) integration of web of trust
indicators with links on other websites.
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Figure 5.15: Different examples for dialogs displayed by the community-based rating
extension: a) Example for a website rated with a high privacy and a high security rat-
ing; b) example for a website rated with a high security but different privacy rating;
c) example for a phishing website with very low ratings.
the user for rating the website the dialog contains the URL of the website that the vote will
be recorded for and a possibility to open the login screen of our extension.
We had two cases when our plugin did not stay quiet but instead opened a dialog by itself.
In case a website had no rating at all we opened the dialog with an additional text explaining
that no ratings for this website had been made yet and that the user should please provide
new ratings. In case of very low ratings of the website we opened a red warning popup and
warned about the low security or privacy rating. The popup did not block interaction with
the loaded website but stayed open until it was dismissed. Both kinds of dialogs could be
closed using a red cross on the upper right corner of the dialog and did not reappear until the
website was loaded again.
Server Side Implementation
On the server side we implemented a few very simple PHP-scripts to build the backend
functions that were needed. Using a simple API the web browser extension was able to query
ratings for existing websites, could log users in to start a new session (managed by a cookie)
and submit own ratings for a user. Whenever a new rating was submitted or updated in the
database the new average privacy and security rating was computed and stored. Storing the
average values together with URLs allowed us to serve queries for current average ratings
faster. Using another query the plugin was able to query the values the user had previously
set for a given URL. This was needed to display those values when revisiting a site that
was rated earlier. Visiting the backend server as a website new users had the possibility to
register accounts by providing a new username and password.
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5.3.4 User Study Evaluation
As explained in the beginning our main goal of this project was to determine how well users
are able to judge websites in terms of security and privacy and whether such a community-
based rating system would be able to alter their judgments or behavior in any way.
Methodology
We did a laboratory experiment that consisted of three parts. In an opening questionnaire
we collected demographic information about the participants. Afterwards the participants
had to visit different websites and rate the security and privacy. We concluded the study
by debriefing our participants with the details of our browser extension and asked several
questions about the plugin concept in general using an exit survey.
We had three independent variables, two as a within-subject factor and one as a between-
subject factor and were hence doing a mixed design. Half of our participants had to visit the
given websites without having our plugin installed, whereas the other half used a browser
that had our plugin installed. As a between-subjects factor the participants had to visit five
different websites belonging to different categories. Where applicable we tried to use a well
known website and a less known website for each category. For the plugin users we had
previously configured all websites to have privacy and security ratings attached to them de-
pending on the context of the website. Table 5.3 shows the different URLs and the assigned
ratings for the plugin group. For two categories it was impossible to have a well known web-
site which is why we ended up with a total number of eight websites. We used the alexa.com
ratings to find well known and less known websites.
Looking at the categories we used examples for all combinations of high and low privacy and
security ratings. As a last category we introduced an error into our given ratings by rating a
phishing website with the best security and privacy ratings. We did this to see whether this
error would influence the participants behavior.
We counter-balanced the eight different websites that people saw using a Latin-square de-
sign. In case of the plugin group we did not introduce our plugin in any way and told the
participants of both groups the same story that they would have to judge websites in terms of
different factors. When the participants had seen the websites they had to fill in a short ques-
tionnaire asking for each website, whether the participants knew the website and whether
they had an account with that website. Afterwards we asked six Likert-scale questions to
find out more about their security and privacy assessment. Answers to all question should
be selected on 5-point scale ranging from ‘1-low’ to ‘5-high’. The first questions simply
asked them to rate the security of the website, followed by a question asking whether the
user thought that the website was working correctly and another one that asked whether the
website reacts as expected. The next three questions asked for a privacy assessment, whether
the website tries to get to know details about the user and whether that could lead to misuse
in the future.
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#S #P well known less known
google.com/buzz hdrcom.com
ASsocialSbloggingSandSnetworkingStoolS
discontinuedSatStheSendSofS2011.
ASmalwareSwebsite.
[n/a] telenor.com.pk
ASpakistanianStelecommunicationsS
company.
facebook.de nurstudenten.de
ASlargeSinternationalSsocialSnetwork. ASgermanSstudentSsocialSnetwork.
amazon.de planet-sports.de
ASwell-knownSonlineSshoppingSwebsite. AnSonlineSretailerSforSclothing.
5.0 5.0 [n/a] [HSBCSPhishing]
#S =SsecuritySrating #P = privacy rating
W
e
b
si
te
s
5.0 5.0
5.0 1.0
1.0 5.0
1.0 1.0
Table 5.3: The different known and unkown websites that were used for the user study.
In some cases a well known website did not exist, reducing the total number of websites
that were tested to eight.
Results
We had 12 participants in our study with an average age of 23 years (range 20 to 28). All
participants were male. Most of the participants stated to be rather cautious when using the
Internet whilst two people acknowledged to be incautious.
The complete table of all average ratings given by our participants can be found in table 5.4.
Looking at the table the first thing one can see is that our classification of known and un-
known websites did work reasonably well. Besides “planet-sports.de” all websites were
unknown to the participants. And even in this case the website was known to less people
than its well known counterpart “amazon.de”. It also seems that our participant samples
were similar because the numbers of people that knew the different websites in the plugin
and control group are always close to each other.
The most important results to look at are the average answers of our participants to the
security ratings and the privacy ratings depending on whether the plugin was installed or
not. In table 5.4 these results are highlighted in blue. Using our plugin, a high security or
privacy rating of the plugin should possibly raise the respective number in the plugin group.
A low number should lower the respective number in the plugin group condition. The second
effect should work better, as low scores trigger a warning message, whereas high scores were
only displayed in the small indicator in the status bar.
In case of website a) and f) (security 1.0; privacy 1.0) the participants using the plugin indeed
rated the security very low. For website a) it was rated 0.6 points lower and for website f)
both groups already had the lowest possible rating. Privacy was also rated lower than in
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WellBKnownBWebsites
Plugin Control C1P Plugin Control C1P Plugin Control C1P Plugin Control C1P Plugin Control C1P
DoByouBknowBthisBwebsite? 3 1 -2 5 6 1 6 6 0
DoByouBhaveBanBaccountB
withBthisBwebsite?
0 0 0 4 5 0 5 5 0
HowBwouldByouBrateBtheB
securityBofBthisBwebsite?
3.2 (0.7) 3.8 (0.9) 0.6 2.3 (0.9) 2.8 (0.7) 0.5 4.3 (0.5) 4.5 (0.8) 0.2
DoByouBthinkBtheBwebsiteB
worksBokay?
4.3 (0.7) 4.5 (0.5) 0.2 4.0 (1.4) 3.7 (0.7) -0.3 4.8 (0.4) 4.8 (0.4) 0.0
DoesBtheBwebsiteBbehaveBasB
youBwouldBexpect?
4.5 (0.5) 4.0 (0.0) -0.5 3.7 (0.7) 3.7 (0.9) 0.0 4.8 (0.4) 4.8 (0.4) 0.0
HowBwouldByouBrateBtheB
privacyBofBthisBwebsite?
2.3 (0.5) 2.8 (1.2) 0.5 1.3 (0.5) 1.5 (0.8) 0.2 4.2 (0.7) 3.7 (1.1) -0.5
DoesBtheBwebsiteBtryBtoBgetB
toBknowBaBlotBofBthingsBaboutB
4.0 (0.6) 3.3 (1.7) -0.7 4.3 (1.5) 4.5 (0.8) 0.2 2.8 (0.7) 4.0 (1.2) 1.2
DoByouBthinkBthisBcouldBleadB
toBmisuseBinBtheBfuture?
3.8 (0.7) 2.7 (1.5) -1.1 4.3 (1.1) 3.7 (1.6) -0.6 3.0 (0.8) 2.0 (0.8) -1.0
LessBKnownBWebsites
Plugin Control C1P Plugin Control C1P Plugin Control C1P Plugin Control C1P Plugin Control C1P
DoByouBknowBthisBwebsite? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 1 1 1 0
DoByouBhaveBanBaccountB
withBthisBwebsite?
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0
HowBwouldByouBrateBtheB
securityBofBthisBwebsite?
1.0 (0.0) 1.0 (0.0) 0.0 2.5 (0.8) 2.3 (0.9) -0.2 2.5 (1.0) 3.3 (1.2) 0.8 3.8 (0.7) 3.7 (0.5) -0.1 4.2 (1.5) 4.2 (1.1) 0.0
DoByouBthinkBtheBwebsiteB
worksBokay?
2.5 (1.6) 1.7 (0.7) -0.8 3.5 (1.3) 3.5 (1.3) 0.0 4.0 (1.4) 4.3 (0.7) 0.3 4.5 (0.5) 4.3 (0.5) -0.2 4.2 (0.4) 4.3 (1.1) 0.1
DoesBtheBwebsiteBbehaveBasB
youBwouldBexpect?
1.7 (0.7) 2.3 (1.1) 0.6 3.5 (1.4) 3.5 (0.8) 0.0 4.0 (0.8) 4.2 (0.7) 0.2 4.0 (0.8) 4.5 (0.5) 0.5 3.7 (0.7) 4.0 (1.0) 0.3
HowBwouldByouBrateBtheB
privacyBofBthisBwebsite?
1.3 (0.7) 1.5 (0.8) 0.2 3.2 (1.2) 2.8 (1.2) -0.4 2.0 (0.6) 3.2 (0.7) 1.2 3.7 (0.7) 3.2 (1.3) -0.5 3.7 (1.2) 4.5 (0.8) 0.8
DoesBtheBwebsiteBtryBtoBgetB
toBknowBaBlotBofBthingsBaboutB
3.8 (0.7) 2.7 (1.5) -1.1 2.8 (0.9) 2.8 (1.3) 0.0 4.0 (1.0) 3.8 (1.1) -0.2 2.7 (0.5) 3.5 (1.3) 0.8 2.7 (1.2) 3.3 (1.7) 0.6
DoByouBthinkBthisBcouldBleadB
toBmisuseBinBtheBfuture?
4.5 (0.8) 4.3 (0.9) -0.2 3.2 (1.1) 3.2 (1.3) 0.0 3.8 (0.7) 3.5 (0.5) -0.3 2.3 (0.9) 3.5 (1.0) 1.2 2.3 (1.2) 1.5 (0.5) -0.8
]S:B5.0B]P:B5.0
telenor.pt.pk
]S:B1.0B]P:B1.0 ]S:B1.0B]P:B5.0 ]S:B5.0B]P:B1.0 ]S:B5.0B]P:B5.0
hdrcom.com
google.com/buzz facebook.de amazon.de
planet1sports.de [HSBCBPhishing]nurstudenten.de
a
f g
c
h
d
i j
Table 5.4: The answers to the questions of the user-study for the eight different web-
sites. Concerning the first two questions the number of people agreeing with the ques-
tion was given in other cases the average Likert-scale values and their standard devia-
tions (in parenthesis) are given. The column “C-P” contains the difference between the
control and the plugin-condition.
the control group. This may indicate that our warning message did its job in influencing
the peoples’ ratings. In case of website g) (security 1.0; privacy 5.0) the privacy rating was
indeed higher but the security rating was also 0.2 points higher. In case of this website
the warning did not seem to have the expected effect. Looking at the websites with a high
security (5.0) and low privacy rating (1.0) – websites c) and h) – the privacy ratings of the
plugin group were again lower than the ones of the control group. In case of the high security
rating the plugin group participants were not influenced in that direction. The appearing
privacy warning screen seemed to have had an influence while the positive score displayed
alone seemed to have not. In the very positive case (security 5.0; privacy 5.0) three of the four
values – websites d) and i) – were higher in the plugin group without any popup appearing.
Concerning the last website j) the phishing site was positively rated by both groups. The
high security rating that we applied in case of the plugin group had no effect. The privacy
was even rated less than in the control group.
Looking at the control group separately one can see how participants would have judged the
websites without being influenced. These values show a tendency towards the values that
we had previously assigned to the websites. It appears that the less known websites have
somewhat lower and somewhat more distributed results. Known brands seem to have higher
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ratings. However, there are exceptions. “facebook.de” was rated lower than the completely
unknown “nurstudenten.de”. Looking at the respective WebOfTrust scores of these websites
today facebooks privacy rating is at 66 of 100 whereas “amazon.de” has 93 of 100.
Besides these values our participants also made valuable qualitative comments about the
concept. They wanted to see more reasoning for bad ratings which could be easily achieved
in a community system by using comments. In case of app stores (like the Android Play
Store15) this seems to work fine. An overall app rating is always displayed together with
comments of the users. Another important comment of the participants was that the termi-
nology of such a plugin should be made more clear, especially if there are multiple types of
ratings for one website.
5.3.5 Discussions and Limitations
Looking at the overall results of our study we achieved little to no effect with our given
approach. Perhaps the largest effects where the ones when our security and privacy warning
were triggered and actively opened a popup. The indicator alone displaying the ratings had
no outstanding effect. Since the data can only provide rough trends and are not statistically
reliable we omitted a statistical analysis of the data. Nevertheless these results seem to
correlate with given findings in other projects and the related work. A small passive indicator
is not properly noticed by users. A popup or even a blocking warning work much better.
A major problem of the user study was definitely the small number of participants that we
had. With six people for each group (plugin/control) only a single deviating rating can
change the average rating a lot. In similar future studies the number of participants would
need to be higher. In contrast to a lab study this study could perhaps also be conducted as an
online study (see the project in subchapter 5.8 for an example).
Looking at our test conditions we only tested a phishing website with incorrect high scores
but not a single one that would have triggered a warning message. We used a malware
website for this condition instead. However, these websites can also be identified by the
visual look and hence we could not see the potential advantage of our appearing warning.
For our four major conditions we had also taken very extreme security and privacy ratings
– min and max values. In a real world setting such ratings would usually not appear. That
means that any effect that we would have discovered within this project would be even
smaller in a real world setting.
Despite the methodological shortcomings of this evaluation we were still able to see trends of
previously already proved results about user intervention and where able to collect valuable
qualitative feedback towards a general concept of using community-based ratings for web
security.
15http://play.google.com
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5.3.6 Research Results
Within this subchapter we looked at how people would react to a user intervention mech-
anism that displays results collected from a community. Although we were not able to
measure outstanding changes in the user rating of websites compared to a control group, we
received other interesting findings regarding such user intervention mechanisms.
IH How can HCI be Used to Enhance User Intervention Mechanisms?
Although recommender systems – for example in online shops – are usually not judged of
being a usability or human-computer interaction measure we tried this approach here to make
security user intervention mechanisms more usable. When looking at real world computer
security problems and how they are used, it is often other – more experienced – people that
are asked for advice – usually relatives or close friends. In this context the concept seems to
work well, so why not adapt it to the computer to have less experienced people make use of
such recommendations, too.
Evaluating such an approach we found two problems: the indicators used where not correctly
noticed and perhaps not correctly understood. Other users also missed an important property
of inter-personal recommendations within our user interface: personalized comments. Who
is the one giving me that recommendation? Can I trust the ratings of a stranger more than the
visual look and feel of this website? In an approach focusing on inter-personal relationship
these relationships should become clear also by looking at the user interface. The higher the
level of importance of the decision is, the more reasonable a rating will need to be.
IM How can User Intervention be Measured?
In case of this project we evaluated the user intervention mechanism by collecting Likert-
scale answers to different questions regarding websites that we showed the participants. In
case of performing such an evaluation it is important to have a control group that uses either
an unmodified browser or another user intervention method. This makes it possible to mea-
sure the relative performance between both systems. Without such a frame of reference the
Likert values are hard to interpret and as these studies are usually conducted within a lab en-
vironment the values can’t be taken as real world results. The choice between an unmodified
browser and a browser using another user intervention concept has to be made depending
on which kind of result wants to be achieved. In general, proving a concept superior to the
current browser market will always be a first step before comparing a concept against other
ones. To elaborate further on this evaluation technique we did a similar evaluation within
the project described in subchapter 5.6.
IE How to Enhance User Intervention Quality?
In case of this project we were only able to measure small to no effects with our concept.
This may be mostly because of the user interface design. As already shown by other related
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work it seemed that our small indicator showing the average security and privacy scores in
the status bar was not noticed enough. The popups seemed to have some influence on the
users but they did not contain enough understandable reasons for the negative judgment. In
case non-blocking indicators are used they need to be more invasive than small indicator
icons in some corner of the browser. In case of project 5.5 we placed our positive and
negative feedback within the content area and in case of project 5.6 we used the whole
browser chrome as an indicator and evaluated this using the same evaluation technique as
within this project. Within this projects we achieved much stronger results.
IR When Should Intervention be Performed to Which Extent?
This project again showed that in confirmed critical situations a very distinct kind of warning
has to be presented to the user – usually a blocking warning. But as errors and other detection
problems exist these kind of warnings should be used with extreme care. A question that
reappears throughout this thesis is to which extent this rule can be loosened towards non-
blocking warnings messages without losing the intervention effect. Small indicators that
are aside of the users current primary task are not working but using smaller indicators to
reinforce positive situations might also be valuable for several reasons: The user can feel
more secure on websites that do not denote a threat and possibly learn to notice the absence
of the positive indicators.
5.4 Spell Checking to Detect Fraudulent Websites
This chapter is based on the work that was part of the bachelor thesis “Bulding a Toolkit for Aggrega-
tion and Analyzation of Malicious Web Content with Focus on URL Checking” by the student Lukas
Höfer [129]. Some parts of the project also led to a publication at the 4th International Symposium
on Cyberspace Safety and Security (CSS2012) by Maurer and Höfer titled “Sophisticated Phishers
Make More Spelling Mistakes: Using URL Similarity Against Phishing” [186].
Definition
Measurement
Enhancement
Reason
HCI
Phishing
Detection
User
Intervention
DD
DM
DE
DH
IE
ID
IM
IRDR
IH
So far this thesis discussed new ideas how phishing attacks could
be detected, that were derived from user interviews and the users’
ideas of security information (section 5.2) and a user intervention
method that was derived from social processes for mutual assis-
tance in improving security as it is performed in the real world
(section 5.3). In this chapter we use a third approach for coming
up with a new phishing detector. We developed a detection mech-
anism that makes use of a particular property of phishing websites
that is crafted by phishers with a certain purpose – in case of this chapter: the URL. Many
phishers try to create URLs that look convincing to the average user and hence contain the
brand name of the website somewhere within the URL. In other cases they register slightly
misspelled domain names that look convincing. Within this project we built a detector that
tries to detect those phishing URLs looking for brand names in the URL and for possible
typos that can be found using a spell checking mechanism. We also add the quality of a
5.4 Spell Checking to Detect Fraudulent Websites 123
phishing website as parameter to our later analysis to see whether the phenomenon is depen-
dent on this factor.
We start this chapter by looking at the different parts of a URL more closely and by explain-
ing our algorithms for extraction and analysis of certain parts of the URL. Afterwards we
talk about a test set of different URLs and how we ran our algorithms against these. The
quality assessment of a sub-sample of our test set is described next before we finally report
our results concerning the detection rate and the impact of quality before finally discussing
the project findings and its limitations.
5.4.1 Detecting Phishing URLs
Creating a perfect copy of the content area of an original website is an easy thing to do for
a phisher. For any website the HTML code and images are all downloaded to the computer
of every user of a website and the same code usually can be simply uploaded to another web
server to resemble the same website. In contrast to this phishers cannot reuse the exact same
domain name as the original website (unless they would have access to DNS servers) and
hence have to pick other domains for hosting their attack. The URL of a phishing website
thus can be used as one of the best indicators to spot attacks. To create URLs that look at
first sight, as if they are connected to the original website, phishers have come up with a
variety of different phishing attacks. Among others Krammer et al. [154] compiled a list of
such attacks. One of the most sophisticated examples might be the homograph attack [103].
The homograph attack is special case of a character substitution attack that uses different
looking letters for domain names. “paypaI.com” might be easily misread as “paypal.com”
(on a computer screen) as it is written with a capital ‘i’. The homograph attack itself uses
internationalized domain names (IDN) to register domains that look even more close. Some
letters from the russian alphabet look exactly the same as their Latin counterparts (russian
‘à’16; latin ‘a’17). Domain names registered containing the russian version of the letter hence
can’t nearly be told apart. Please refer to section 2.3.3 for more URL attacks.
A possible algorithm to find words with nearly identical spelling, is the Levenshtein dis-
tance [116] that calculates the number of insertions, deletions and substitutions that are
needed to get from one word to another. For our approach we state that unknown domain
names that have a close distance to well known domains denote a possible security threat.
However, this can’t be applied to a complete URL. So a first questions to solve was which
parts of the URL can be used for such checks.
URL Parts and Phishing Examples
A website URL consists of several parts starting with the scheme, followed by the subdo-
mains, the domain name and finally the path section (see figure 5.16). The original URL
16 http://www.pàypal.com (Homograph Attack)
17 http://www.paypal.com (Original)
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Subdomain
rem. 1+Public Suffix¹
.
/
http://paypall.example.com.br/sub/folder/trust.me.ru/natwest.html
Scheme
http
://
paypall.example.com.br sub/folder/trust.me.ru/natwest.html
paypall example com br
paypall example.com.br
Basename
me.ru
Pathdomain
¹http://publicsuffix.org/list/
Path
Figure 5.16: Extraction process used to extract relevant URL portions from a URL.
specification [28] contains even more parts like a username and a password for example that
haven’t been used within our concept because they are very seldom used within phishing
URLs. To be able to run a meaningful spell checking query we created an algorithm that
extracted the following four types of information from a given URL (see figure 5.16 for the
extraction procedure and table 5.5 for four example URLs):
• Basename: The basename of a domain is the part of the domain that has to be officially
registered with a Network Information Center (NIC) that manages the respective top-
level domain. The basename consists of the top-level prefix and the first part before
that top-level domain (TLD). In many cases the top-level domain is only one label
(e.g. ‘.com’, ‘.de’) but there are NICs that split their own top-level domain again into
several so called public suffixes (e.g. ‘.co.uk’). In such a case the basename has to
include the next label of the domain name as well. To be able to properly compute
basenames for URLs, a list of the public suffixes is available online18. For a phishing
attempt the original base domains cannot be used as they are registered by the original
companies. This part of the domain is the one where spelling mistakes are most often
used.
• Subdomains: The rest of domain labels preceeding the basedomain are the subdo-
mains of the URL. Once a phisher owns a domain he can use arbitrary subdomain
names. Hence using “us.battle.net” as subdomains for any other domain might fool
18http://publicsuffix.org/
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Type Sample-URL
Basename: http://www.warldofworcarft.com
AttackersR pickedR aR domainR withR someR typos.R FwarldofworcarftFR mightR beR easilyR misreadR asR
FworldofwarcraftF.R
Subdomain: http://us.battle.net.loginaccountbattle.net/login/en/login.html
AR misleadingR subdomainR isR preceedingR theR realR domainR thatR hostsR theR attack.R Fus.battle.netFR usuallyR
alreadyR isR theR fullR domainR name.R InR thisR caseR itR justR servesR asR arbitraryR subdomainsR toR theR realR domainR
Floginaccountbattle.netF.R
Path-domain: http://piasel.altervista.org/www.paypal.com/new/paypal/intl/update/
TheR domainR isR createdR asR aR folderR onR theR upmostR levelR ofR theR server.R TheR attackR claimsR toR beR
Fwww.paypal.comFRwhichRisRputRnextRtoRtheRrealRdomainRnameRFaltervista.orgF.R
Brand Name: http://www.radiotelemiracle.com/includes/Archive/NATWEST/index.html
InRthisRcaseRnoRfullRdomainRnameRisRincludedRbutRonlyRtheRbrandRnameRisRpartRofRtheRURLsRpathRargument.R
ForRthisRworkRweRusedRaRsimpleRlistRofR21Rbrands.R
Table 5.5: Four example URLs showing the different types of terms that we extracted
from the URLs (based on [186]).
some people in thinking that the actual domain name might be “battle.net” (see ta-
ble 5.5).
• Path-domain: Some other phishers include a faked or original domain name within
the path section of a URL. As a path label is usually nothing more than a folder on the
respective webspace this kind of attack can even be used if the phisher has no access
to the subdomains of a domain (e.g. in case they are using a free web hoster or a IP-
adress instead of a domain). We named occurences of domain names within the path
portion of the URL “path-domains”.
• Brand name: Besides adding complete domain names to subdomains or the path
portion many phishers also just place the brand name somewhere to make the URL
look more convincing. Such brand names can be easily found without the use of a
spell checking algorithm by just searching the URL for the brand name given a list of
the attacked brand names exist and that they are distinct enough to be separated from
other text.
Extracting URL Parts and Detecting Phishing
The extraction algorithm for the four terms used in our concept was straight forward, as
depicted in figure 5.16. We first reduced the whole URL to the scheme, the domain and the
path part. After splitting the domain part at each dot it is possible to extract the base domain
by finding a valid public suffix at the end of the domain and adding one more preceeding
label to it. In case any labels remain, these labels form the subdomains. To find path-domains
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53.com Chase Microsoft ANZ Citibank Paypal
AOL eBay USBank Banamex E-Gold Visa
Bankofamerica Google Warcraft Barclays HSBC Westpac
battle.net Lloyds Yahoo
Table 5.6: List of the 21 brand names we used when searching for brand names within
a URL. We used brand names that are phished most often (based on [186]).
we applied the basedomain finding algorithm again to the path portion of the URL. To find
any brand names we used a list of 21 brand names that are phished most often (see table 5.6)
and did a string search for those brand names within the whole URL. We only used such a
small number of brand names to see the general effect. In practice, a larger list would be
needed.
After having extracted the different terms from the URL, the last important step was to find
out whether any of the extracted paths closely resembles a well known domain name. If
we had used the Levenshtein distance by ourselves we would have needed a vast number of
valid domain names to compare against whilst additionally knowing their importance. Only
having those two components it gets possible to compute a similarity score and set a certain
threshold that would denote a critical similarity.
We chose not to build such a system by ourselves and instead used the capabilities of a
modern search engine that uses exactly such a principle to correct misspellings of their users
when entering search terms. So instead of building our own distance measurement tool we
submitted the extracted terms one by one to a search engine and checked whether the search
engine did return a spell checking result.
5.4.2 Detector Evaluation
To evaluate our detector we wanted to use a large number of different real world phishing
URLs to find out how many of the URLs would trigger any spell checking results. As a
second research question we wanted to find out whether the perceived quality of a phishing
attack correlates with the number of attacks that can be found using such a system. We
assumed that phishers that are able to create very similar looking attacks will also spend
more effort to make their URLs look similar.
Methodology
We started our evaluation by gathering a test set of 8,730 phishing URLs from phish-
tank.com. We applied our extraction algorithm to each of the URLs and then submitted
queries to a major search engine and checked whether it returned a spell checking result. As
brand names did not include any misspellings we just treated the sole existence of a brand
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Extractor
http://paypall.example.com/my.path.ru/paypal.html
URL
Basename
example.com
Subdomains
paypall
Pathdomain
path.ru
Search Engine 
Spell Checker
example.com
no result
paypall
Result "paypal"
path.ru
no result
Brand Checker
http://paypall.examp...
found: Paypal
0
1
0
1
2
Figure 5.17: Evaluation methodology used to test the domains of our test set. Spell
checking and brand name search results were stored for later analysis.
name term as a hit and did not submit those to the search engine. Figure 5.17 shows a di-
agram of the evaluation methodology. We implemented a Firefox extension to do all the
downloading and testing of websites right from the browser.
Quality Assessment
For our second evaluation we used a reduced test set of 566 phishing URLs. These URLs
should be rated by experts concerning their visual quality. For those ratings we needed
additional information. For each of the 566 phishing URLs we rendered a screenshot of the
phishing website and stored it. Afterwards we assigned each of the phishing websites to
its original parent website and created screenshots of those 127 resulting parent websites.
The whole process is somewhat similar to the process of building the test set presented in
subchapter 5.1 but as the large test set was not yet completely ready when this project was
carried out we needed to build our own smaller set.
The rating of the websites was performed by three expert Internet users (one IT consultant,
one informatics student and one media informatics student). They saw each of the 566
phishing websites in random order next to its original counterpart and used the keyboard
keys to judge the quality of the attack from 1-“very easy to recognize the phishing” to 5-
“very hard to recognized the phishing” (see figure 5.10 for an example). The experts saw
only the browser contents of the websites and did not see any other information (like the
URL for example). We did this to avoid biasing of the experts by other factors as we only
wanted their assessment of the visual quality of the phish. We did not instruct the experts
what factors they should exactly look for and did not define what “very easy to recognize the
phishing” would exactly mean.
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Figure 5.18: Screenshot of the tool the experts used to evaluate the quality of the phish-
ing websites.
False Positives and True Negatives
Using the 127 original websites that we had gathered for the quality assessment we could
finally also do checks with our algorithm for false positives and true negatives to see whether
our detector would bring up a large number of false alarms.
5.4.3 Results
This project produced two different kinds of results, the first group being the detector results
for the different terms. We had three different test sets: the whole test set of all 8,730 URLs,
the subset used for the quality assessment and finally the set of the 127 original URLs.
Afterwards we take a look at how the subset of 566 websites has been rated by the experts
and whether the detector results are different for different quality levels.
Detector Results
Table 5.7 shows an overview over the detection results that we achieved with our different
extracted terms. Looking at the large result set of 8,730 URLs we had 265 URLs included
that used IP-addresses instead of domain names. When calculating the results for domain
name based terms, we excluded these domains. For the submitted basedomains the search
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Results
N=8730 %* N=566 % N=127 %
Basename Spelling Results 961 11.4 41 7.2 0 0.0
Subdomain Spelling Results 2119 25.0 144 25.4 0 0.0
Pathdomains Extracted 1522 17.4 43 7.6 22 17.3
Pathdomain Spelling Results 232 2.7 3 0.5 0 0.0
Brand Name Hits 2021 23.2 63 11.1 31 24.4
Non-PhishingRated AttacksAll Attacks
*Where8applicable8IP-Address-Domains8where8excluded8for8basename8
and8subdomain8percentages.8In8those8cases8N8=88465.
Table 5.7: Results for the number of matches for the four different extracted terms
(basename, subdomains, path-domain and brand) using three different test sets (full
URL set, quality subset and original website set) (based on [186]).
engine returned spelling results for 11.4% of the submitted URLs. When submitting the
subdomains we had 25% search engine hits. Looking at the path-domains we were able to
extract at least one path domain from 17.4% of the URLs although only 2.7% finally led to
a spell checking result. We found at least one of our 21 brand names in 23.2% of all URLs
that we tested. In case of path-domains and subdomains the phishers had the possibility of
including original domain names that would usually not trigger the spell checker – please
see section 5.4.4 for details.
Performing the same checks with our subset of websites we achieved similar results es-
pecially for the spell checking of the subdomains (25.4%). Basename (7.2%), path-
domain (0.5%) and brand results (11.1%) were a little lower. In general the larger test set
should yield more accurate results than the smaller one did.
Our non-phishing test set confirms that our indicators seem to work pretty well. Base-
name, subdomains and path-domains did not trigger a single spell checking result (0.0%). In
31 cases we found a brand name within the URLs which is perfectly natural as our original
URLs certainly contain their own brand names.
Another interesting property of our results is found by combining the different detection
methods. The heatmaps in figure 5.19 give an overview over which URL triggered which
of the different detection types – each horizontal bar represents one URL of the test set.
Looking at the results of the basename, subdomain and path-domain spell checker as well
as the brand name detector together 4,552 URLs would have triggered at least one of these
features. This means that we achieve a total coverage of 52.1%.
The 52.1% total coverage can be segmented into 43.7% URLs triggering only one detector,
8.0% that triggered two detectors and 0.5% that triggered three different detectors at once.
No website triggered all four detectors at the same time.
130 5 Nine Research Projects on Phishing and Usability
Quality
N=226 % N=149 % N=112 % N=79 %
Basename2Spelling2Results 17 7.5 16 10.7 12 10.7 16 20.3
Subdomain2Spelling2Results 83 36.7 26 17.4 22 19.6 11 13.9
Pathdomains2Extracted 9 4.0 11 7.4 13 11.6 10 12.7
Pathdomain2Spelling2Results 0 0.0 1 0.7 2 1.8 0 0.0
Brand2Name2Hits 18 8.0 16 10.7 16 14.3 13 16.5
very2bad2[1;2] bad2]2;3] good2]3;4] very2good2]4;5]
Table 5.8: The classification results for the subset of the quality test websites clustered
by four different quality dimensions (based on [186]) .
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Figure 5.19: Generated heatmaps that show for all 8,730 URLs where which kind
of detector or extractor has retrieved a result. The last two rows shows the accumu-
lated heatmaps, with and without taking the extracted path-domains into account (based
on [186]).
Quality Results
For each phishing website of the subset of our URLs three experts had rated the phishing
quality from 1 to 5. For each website we calculated the average rating and then classified
each website into one of four quality categories: very bad (average from 1 to 2 inclusive);
bad (2 excl. to 3 incl.); good (3 excl. to 4 incl.); very good (4 excl. to 5 incl.). With this
classification most websites were rated very bad (226), 149 fell into the category “bad”;
112 were “good” and 79 websites were classified as being “very good”.
Table 5.8 shows the results of our detector split by the different quality categories. Looking
at the percentages one can see that the number of basename spelling results increases from
7.5% to 20.3% with increasing quality. The number of found brand names and the number
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of extracted path-domains also grows with increasing quality. The only thing that decreases
with increasing quality is the number of subdomain spelling results (from 36% to 14%). This
is interesting as we saw that this detection rate was the only one being constant between our
subset and the whole set of the URLs.
5.4.4 Discussion and Limitations
With this simple URL-based detector we were able to show that a lot of phishing attacks can
be detected using our approach when accumulating the different detector values. However,
a detection rate of 52.1% is still not enough to have this detector act alone. We would hence
recommend to combine the detector with other already existing detection means to further
enhance the detection mechanism.
An option to raise the number of detected websites would be to include all URLs that contain
a path-domain into the list of suspicious domains. That would have raised the overall detec-
tion rate from 52.1% to 54.7% (see figure 5.19). However, this approach would also have a
downside: within our non-malicious website test set path-domains have been extracted for
17.3% of the URLs which would hence lead to a lot of false positives.
We think that the detection rate of such a detector could be vastly enhanced. In our approach
we only looked at spell checking results for the subdomains and the path-domains. Since the
phishers are free to use anything they want within these terms the spellchecker did not nec-
essarily notice the attacks – in case the spelling was correct. We are confident that checking
those terms against a whitelist of correctly spelled original domains could find another huge
portion of phishing attacks.
When performing the spell checking we just noted whether a correct spelling was suggested
or not but did not verify whether the spelling suggestion was really related to the phishing
attack or whether it appeared because of a different reason. Our cross check using 127 origi-
nal domain names shows to some extent that the system does not generate false positives but
further testing with a larger sample of original websites would be definitely needed before
deploying the concept.
Our quality analysis clearly shows that phishing websites with better quality are a lot easier
detected by our approach than websites with bad quality. We argue that when developing
a detector, this property should be kept in mind during the whole development process and
when possible it should also be tested for, when evaluating the detector.
We also think that the high number of poorly rated website can hence account for the lower
detection rates of our subset. When selecting the 566 websites for our subset, it seems that
we randomly picked more websites with bad quality then we had in the rest of the subset.
This would explain why the detection rates of the subset went down by some percentage
points.
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Deploying our concept as it was used for the evaluation purposes would create a vast amount
of web traffic to search engines to validate the spell checking results. For a field deployment
it would be necessary to set up a dedicated service to perform the checks on the different
URL parts that would work in a more optimized way.
5.4.5 Research Results
Within this project we built a detector based on observations of technical properties phishers
try to tweak to make their attacks more convincing towards the users. In this case we could
develop the general detector without turning directly to the end user. This is also the reason
why we did not create nor evaluate any user intervention methods for this detection method.
DD What is Phishing Detection?
Within this project we introduced “phishing quality” as a factor that we used to measure
our phishing detection. This shows that beyond the classic definition of how many websites
a detector can correctly classify, there are more dimensions of a phishing attack that could
be taken into account and that yield different quality results of a detector. Is each detection
of a phishing website worth the same? In our case we were able to show that high quality
websites are detected better. Another way of measuring detector performance could also be
the amount of money or data that would have been stolen with the detected attacks – although
this data is hardly available. This would lead to a different kind of definition of phishing
detection. In summary we think, that the number of detected attacks is a reasonable measure
for phishing detection whilst other measurements should be performed where possible.
DH How can HCI be Used to Build Detectors?
As phishing is a social engineering attack it is not only the researchers that can monitor the
users and their security behavior online. In fact the phishers somehow use “usability flaws”
to construct and enhance their attacks. Taking this into account one can also learn from them
about possibilities where to get hold of their attacks. In case of this project, we observed the
tactic that phishers try to make their URLs look convincing. On the one hand this makes the
attacks more believable for the user but on the other hand it can be used to track down the
attacks using a detector. In those cases the HCI research is more or less done by the attackers
and we as researchers only have to pick up their results.
DM How can Detectors Be Evaluated?
Besides the classic evaluation strategy of counting the numbers of true and false positives
which we also applied within this project, the evaluation of quality as parameter of phishing
websites is what was new about the evaluation methodology of this project. Although a tight
definition of the quality of a phishing website is hard to come up with, we chose to have that
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implicitly defined by our experts that were asked to rate the websites. By showing them only
the rendered content of the website we somehow already defined the quality ratings as being
about visual similarity. Extending the evaluation properties to more fine grained domains
can help to get better insights where the detector needs to be enhanced. The large manual
workload that came with this type of evaluation can be reduced in case a standardized test
set with quality assignments is reused.
DE What Kind of Detection Works Best?
The URL as a textual feature seems to have a medium to high potential to build phishing
detectors that use these as inputs. A huge pro argument for using URLs as a detector param-
eter is that they are relatively small pieces of data that can be easily and quickly handled and
it is also possible to process large quantities quickly. The downside of any approaches that
are based on the URL is that – as other researchers already noted – they are usually not in
the focus of the user. That would mean that phishers can change their URL tactics once a
URL-based detector is launched to avoid getting detected. The possibility of generating ever
new URLs – in the worst case one for each email – is already a huge problem for blacklist
based approaches that also work with the URLs. Perhaps a similar problem could arise for
other URL-based detectors.
5.4.6 Possible User Intervention for the Approach
Although other researchers showed that domain highlighting in general does not help people
to identify phishing attacks [166] we still think that having such a detector to do a first line
of detection it would be possible to also create a user intervention interface to present the
detection results to the user.
Knowing which term of the URL seems to be problematic would make it possible to attract
the users’ attention to that specific term and one could even offer an alternative writing or an
alternative URL that the user should perhaps choose instead of visiting the malicious URL.
5.5 Data Type Based Security Dialogs
This chapter is based on the work that was part of the bachelor thesis “Keyword Based Security
Awareness Warnings for Websites” by the student Florian Müller [201] and the bachelor thesis “En-
hancing Datatype Based Security Notifications For Websites” by Sylvia Kempe [150]. Some parts
of the project also led to a publication at the 29th international conference on Human factors in
computing systems (CHI2011) by Maurer, De Luca and Hussmann titled “Data Type Based Security
Alert Dialogs” [182]. A second publication concerning a different part of the project was published
at the 7th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS2011) by Maurer, De Luca and Kempe
titled “Using Data Type Based Security Alert Dialogs to Raise Online Security Awareness” [183].
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a b c
Figure 5.20: Screenshots of the different states of the intervention method on real web-
sites: a) password warning (expanded), b) whitelist match on future visits; c) password
warning on phishing website (based on [183]).
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Reasoning when to display which kind of user intervention has
been discussed in the previous chapters and is also a major re-
search question within this thesis. As a security researcher one
tends to try to get users as secure as possible without thinking of
all the numerous people that will possibly get handicapped by the
resulting additions to the workflow during their daily work rou-
tines. When tackling this from an HCI perspective one has to
think of both sides and has to notice that a general anger of the
users towards security measures will never aid in better security behavior.
In this chapter we want to introduce a way between non-blocking indicators and annoying
blocking dialogs (e.g. figure 4.1). We call them “semi-blocking dialogs”. We based this
project on the assumption that not every data that is entered on a website is so critical that
it might get stolen (although the warning in figure 4.1 suggested that). In fact we assume
that only certain kinds of entered data (e.g. credit card data, login data) is what needs to
stay protected. A phisher that gets hold of a search term a user submitted to a search engine
will usually not be very happy. Using those specific “data types” – as we will call them
throughout this subchapter – it is possible to postpone security checks and more importantly
security intervention to the moment when critical data is involved. Using this concept we
were able to create a user intervention mechanism that appears in the context of critical data
right in the user’s focus (see figure 5.20).
Within this chapter we will first describe the general concept of our dialogs in more detail
before moving on to a first prototype and its lab evaluation that we did. As a follow up to this
first prototype we refined the warning design using a focus group and tested it again in a field
and a second lab study. For more details about this project please compare the publications
associated with this chapter [182, 183].
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5.5.1 User Intervention Concept
To fully explain the user intervention concept of this project we will first start explaining
the behavior towards the user with a practical example before turning to the three main
contributions made by this new kind of user intervention method: Taking the users’ situation
into account; using semi-blocking dialogs; in-context dialog appearance.
The User Perspective: Alice Does Online Shopping
Alice is about to do online shopping on a new shopping website that she has been invited
to by a good friend Bob. She visits the website, composes her order and moves on to the
checkout phase. When she is about to enter her credit card data, a warning dialog appears
surrounding the input field of her credit card number (see figure 5.20). At first she didn’t
even notice it, as she was still looking at her keyboard while entering the credit card digits.
Now that she looks up to the screen again she sees a warning telling her that she has never
entered credit card data on that website before. The warning also contains information about
the fact that the data she just enters won’t be protected from eavesdropping and that the
website is poorly rated by other people. That sounds weird and she calls her friend Bob that
was supposed to have invited her. Bob has never heard of such an email but tells her that he
caught a computer virus a few days ago. Luckily Alice did not enter and submit all her data
on that fraudulent website.
A few days later Alice decides to buy something at the well known online retailer she knows
for years. As she opens the website and starts entering her password the password field turns
green. “At least here everything is fine” shes says and enjoys the rest of her online shopping.
The General Concept
Within our concept we introduce two different kinds of user feedback the choice of which
is dependent on the type of data a user enters into a form field. Whenever our system de-
tects that the user enters such a critical type of data into a form field we check whether
this website’s domain is contained in the user’s personal whitelist – whether it has been ac-
knowledged before. So far our prototype checks for three different kinds of data: credit
card numbers, passwords and bank transaction numbers (one time passwords used for bank
transactions in Europe). In case the website has been previously acknowledged by the user
the respective form field is highlighted with a green border indicating that the plugin spotted
the input of critical data but acknowledges it. In any other case a user intervention window
opens up that displays details about the current website and the type of data that was recog-
nized. While the warning is open the user can still continue typing text into the respective
form field but the access to other form fields and the form submission is blocked. The user
can now acknowledge this website and add it to the personal whitelist or alternatively cancel
the input and leave the website.
Compared to the previously presented concept this concept does not involve a detector that
tries to detect phishing sites by looking at different technical properties. A technical detec-
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tion is needed to find the different data types but besides checking the whitelist no website
is judged as being phishing or not (see section 5.5.9).
Overall this general user intervention concept introduces three new user intervention prop-
erties.
Situation Specific Warnings
Warning concepts that have been presented so far all rely on technical properties to assess a
certain risk level before displaying an actual warning. In this project we use context infor-
mation of the action that the user is about to perform. In our case we use the type of data that
the user is about to loose to be able to know when the user is entering a critical context state
that needs additional security attention. Any appearing critical data type hence raises the
security importance. This approach could be coupled with a detector which is just left out in
our project here. Other situation information could be used to lower the security importance
(e.g. if the user does not have an account with a brand that appears on a phishing site).
Reducing the number of warnings based on the situations has the major advantage that it
can avoid habituation towards a warning message. Another advantage of using the user’s
situation before displaying a warning is that the user intervention methods now can incorpo-
rate that situation to explain to the user why the warning appeared. In our case the warning
clearly states that the user is about to enter a credit card number for example.
Semi-Blocking Dialog
Related Work and the last subchapters showed that it is extremely hard to gather the user’s
attention with non-blocking warnings. When we started developing this concept we origi-
nally thought of a blocking warning message (that immediately blocks access to that website
as soon as a data type is detected). In practice this has the problem that it interrupts the user’s
course of interaction so heavily that it might confuse the user – especially if the warning has
appeared in error. We experienced this when the blocking warning appeared while people
were typing, they kept typing without noticing the warning. Most of their password input was
then lost due to the changing window focus and in case the warning appeared at an original
website they had to retype their password. This is why we came up with the semi-blocking
dialog. It appears and blocks the interaction with most of the existing website but leaves the
interaction with the current form field possible. This way, the user can continue typing and
can then verify the warning message when her focus switches back to the computer.
In-Context Appearance
A third novelty that we added to our concept here, was to have the warning messages appear
in-context to the user’s current focus. In case of input fields this is easy to determine as
the users’ focus usually is where they are currently typing. This in-context appearance has
advantages in several dimensions.
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Figure 5.21: The three different data type based warnings used with the first prototype
(based on [183] and staged for printing).
Location: Using the user’s input text field as the assumed visual focus area of the user makes
it possible to make the warning appear right in the user’s view. Even if she looks away from
the screen when the dialog appears she will look back to the input field when done typing.
Timing: Making the warning dialog appear together with the user’s most critical action –
right in the moment when critical data is entered – could greatly help the user to understand
why the warning has just appeared. It couples the dangerous action and the warning more
closely than other user intervention procedures do.
Preserve Context: Our semi-blocking warning appears at the user’s focus and hence can
also be more moderate in size and have a reduced amount of alertness than other non-
blocking or blocking warnings do. Most of today’s browser warnings fill at least the whole
content area of the browser. This makes it harder for the user to understand what the current
warning is about. In case of our warning it is integrated right at the user’s focus and the rest
of the previous interaction area is still visible preserving the cognitive context that the user
currently is in.
5.5.2 The First Prototype
Both prototypes that we developed throughout this project were created for the Mozilla Fire-
fox browser. A screenshot of the design of this first indicator can be found in figure 5.22. We
designed the dialog to contain the type of data as the most prominent information. Each data
type is represented by a different icon and is additionally labeled with a text using a large
font. An info section in the lower part of the dialog shows additional information by repeat-
ing the domain of the website that the user currently visits and by displaying the encryption
status. Using a button labeled “Trust this!” the user can add this website to her whitelist or
close the dialog using a small “X” in the upper right corner.
5.5.3 Detecting the Data Types
As mentioned earlier we implemented detection for three different types of data which each
needed slightly different algorithm for the detection (see figure 5.21 for dialog examples):
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File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
Google
Ready
https://www.amazon.de/checkout
SHIPPINGMLMPAYMENT
Continue
(You can review this order before it's final.)
Credit or Debit Cards
Enter your card information:
Card number Name on card Expiration date
01 2011
How would you like to pay?
Add your card
Domain: amazon.com
Your information will be encrypted.
Figure 5.22: User interface of the first data
type based warning after the user has en-
tered a credit card number on an unknown
website [182]. [staged for printing pur-
poses]
Figure 5.23: Final user interface for the
data type based user intervention method
that was used for the second user stud-
ies [183]. [staged for printing purposes]
• Passwords: As password fields are a special kind of input field in a HTML website
we just look for those being of the type “password” and trigger our warning whenever
the first character was entered in such a field.
• Credit Card Numbers: Most credit card numbers can be easily verified using the
LUHN algorithm [283]. The algorithm is a special sum over all digits of the credit
card. Starting from the end every second digit is doubled before adding it to the sum
and in case the multiplication result is greater or equal to 10 the number 9 is subtracted
again. If the sum of all digits ends on zero the LUHN algorithm has verified the code.
For “2758” the sum would hence be 8+(5 ∗ 2− 9)+ 7+(2 ∗ 2) = 20 which would
be a valid LUHN code. Since this cannot be a credit card number by itself we also
introduced a length check.
• TAN-Numbers: TANs are short one time passwords used for bank transactions in
Europe. They are usually 4 to 6 characters long and mostly consist of digits only.
This definition clashes with a lot of other input types (e.g. postal codes). To avoid
getting warning messages appearing in error we included a HTML-search algorithm
that looks for matching keywords in the HTML-DOM-Tree vicinity of the input field.
In this first implementation this algorithm can be easily fooled by an attacker in case
he replaces the textual labels using images.
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Type URL Phishing-Attack
CC www.bol.de Cousin+Domain
CC www.amazon.de Cousin+Domain
PW www.web.de IP-Address+Attack
PW lokalisten.de IP-Address+Attack
TAN www.bankingportal.sparkasse-emh.de Cousin+Domain+++Content
TAN www.meine-deutsche-bank.de Cousin+Domain+++Content
Table 5.9: The 12 websites used for the
preliminary lab study. In case of the phish-
ing websites we used the given attack to
derive a phishing website URL from the
original URL (based on [183]).
Type URL Phishing-URL
CC1 www.neckermann-reisen.de www.nerckermann-reisen.de
CC2 www.wwf.de www.wwff.de
PW1 www.ebay.de www.ebuy.de
PW2 www.paypal.com www.paypal.webupdate.com
Table 5.10: The websites used for the sec-
ond lab study (based on [183]).
5.5.4 Lab Evaluation
To test the preliminary design of our user intervention method we performed a lab study to
find out how many participants could be protected from phishing using our plugin compared
to a standard browser.
Methodology
We used a mixed-model design for that lab-study having the use of the plugin (with plu-
gin/without plugin) as a between-groups independent variable. As one within-subjects factor
we wanted to use the three different data types that our plugin was able to detect and as a
second within-subject factor we wanted to see how people would behave on original and on
malicious websites. Therefore we needed six websites that we could show each participant.
To be able to balance the study we hence needed a total of twelve websites (six original and
six malicious) (see table 5.9).
For our study we developed a scenario that we called “Grandma is Ill” to guide the user
through our study tasks. In case of security lab studies it is usually impossible to have the
participants use their own data and instead, role playing is often used to have the participants
carry out the tasks as if they were someone else. This is often criticized as the participants
may not take the tasks of the user study seriously. In our approach the user presumes per-
forming tasks for his own grandmother and hence isn’t really role playing but just carrying
out tasks for another person using their security details. I compare different scenario possi-
bilities and the advantages of this approach in more detail in section 7.2.1.
Using the scenario we sent the participants to six different websites – three malicious (phish-
ing) and three original ones – and measured the number of malicious websites that they
would refuse (true positives) and the number of original websites that they would actually
use (true negatives). Our dependent variable hence was the “correctness” of their decisions.
For none of the websites we had our participants use an actual online website instead we
diverted all the traffic back to the local computer using the windows “hosts” [304] file and
served identically looking copies of the websites from there. It was impossible for the par-
ticipants to notice that the traffic did not come from the Internet and the URLs they saw all
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looked like the original ones. Please see the project in subchapter 5.9 for more technical
information and the best way to conduct such a study.
Looking at the websites in table 5.9 again we used shopping websites for the credit card
condition, banking websites for the TAN condition and a social community and a webmail
service for the password condition. For each condition we presented the user with a short
text explaining why he had to visit the website for his grandmother and what she wanted
the participant to do there. Grandma had all links bookmarked for the participants in her
browser and they also received her “secret notebook” that contained her passwords, TANs
and credit card information.
We balanced our different conditions using a 6x6 Latin square which was used twice whilst
inverting the phishing websites in the second set. These twelve different sequences were
then used for both between-subject groups (with plugin/without plugin).
We instructed our participants to “think aloud” during the study and did not mention security
until the final debriefing. In case a participant had concerns about entering information
on a website we told them that they are allowed to skip tasks if they fear any negative
consequences for their grandma. After all six tasks the participants were debriefed and
had to fill out an exit survey containing also qualitative questions about our concept.
Results
As already mentioned we had 24 participants in our study most of them being students as
they were recruited around campus. Each participant was randomly assigned to the between-
subjects groups as long as space was available. In the plugin group the participants were on
average 24 years old (three being female) whilst in the control group we had an average age
of 23 years and three female participants.
Looking at our quantitative results our subjects using the plugin refused to enter data on 20
of the 36 appearing phishing websites (55%) whilst in the control group only five phishing
websites were detected (13.9%). Analyzing the results statistically using a two-way mixed
ANOVA – see section 7.2 for more information about statistical tests – showed a significant
main effect for our between-subjects factor (F1,22 = 11.83p < .05). The within-subjects
factor “data type” (credit card, password, TAN) was not significant (F2,44 = 0.77, p > .05)
but we had an interaction effect of the two independent variables (F2,44 = 6.27, p = 0.004).
Plugin combined with the data types for credit card and password did not show significant
changes in recognition but the differences between the TAN and password recognition was
significant (F1,22 = 6.50, p < .05). The reason for this most probably is that both groups
found four phishing websites in the TAN condition whereas our plugin seemed to have a lot
more impact for the other two data types.
The participants of the plugin group generated two false positives by refusing to enter data
on original websites whereas no false positives appeared within the control group (without
the plugin).
5.5 Data Type Based Security Dialogs 141
In the qualitative survey part of the study we explained the concept to all our participants
and they rated the helpfulness of the plugin on a Likert scale from 1-‘not helpful at all’ to
5-‘very helpful’ positively with a median of 4. They liked the opportunity to think again
before submitting critical data but many people felt that the warning screens that popped up
on every site were annoying. This was actually a problem of the study setup as we tested
six websites and a warning appeared for each one of them. In practice warnings would show
up more seldom (see the upcoming field study). Some users also complained about the user
interface of the warning which is why we chose to redesign it in a second iteration.
5.5.5 The Second Prototype
After testing our first prototype in the lab study we had identified several design flaws. The
most importants one being that we had a very big “Trust this!” button compared to the small
“X” that somehow suggested to the user to choose the unsafe option as a standard. This
should not be done in security dialogs. As a second implication the wording of our dialog
was still very technical using terms like “encryption”. To solve these issues we wanted to
redesign the dialog based on the findings of a focus group with five participants (mostly
students with an HCI background).
Before the focus group we created a few new design iterations by ourselves but kept them
hidden from the participants until the end of the focus group (see figure 5.24 f through h).
Within three phases we wanted to examine how a well working dialog needs to look like.
In the first phase we explained the concept of data type based warnings to them but without
showing any warning imagery. Afterwards we orally discussed different design properties
(e.g. colors, graphics, headlines) with the participants. In the second phase we had the par-
ticipants craft their own dialogs with pencil and paper. We also provided additional material
to each participant – like an assortment of graphics and icons or various colored background
drops. In the last phase we discussed the drafts with the participants and also showed them
the drafts we had previously created. We asked them to vote for the ones they liked best and
to explain why they chose the respective design. Figure 5.24 shows the dialog drafts created
by the participants and the ones created by us. Talking about all final drafts the participants
did not want a “X” style button to close the dialog as well as they wanted that the URL of
the website that is visited is most prominent in the dialog. They also proposed an area with
more security information that could be considered when necessary. Looking at the drafts in
figure 5.24 they liked several drafts very much (b and f).
We not only incorporated several of the enhancements found through the focus group but
also added some more technical security to the plugin. In case form fields were filled by
the autocomplete machanism of the browser our plugin was so far not yet triggered. We
corrected this for the second version. The final dialog design can be found in figure 5.23.
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Figure 5.24: Design drafts for the second prototype created by the participants during
the focus group (a through e) and beforehand (f through h) (based on [183]).
5.5.6 Field Evaluation
To evaluate the enhanced plugin prototype we conducted a field study having participants
use the plugin at home. We did this to collect information about the real world plugin usage
(by quantitative and qualitative means). For the quantitative evaluation we logged certain
pieces of usage information and for the qualitative evaluation we sent an online post study
questionnaire to our participants.
Our participants could download the plugin from a public download website that we had set
up. After installing the plugin it asked for the users’ email address to be able to send them
the post study questionnaire.
For our data collection process we wanted to find out how the plugin integrated in the users’
daily web usage. Therefore we needed to log their online browsing behavior to some extent.
Logging the actually visited websites would have denoted a privacy issue towards the partic-
ipants. As a solution we hashed the visited domains before transmitting them to our server.
This allowed us to recognize whenever a website was visited a second time or was reused
between participants but we were not able to reverse the process to find out which URL was
actually visited. Besides the visit data we also collected data whenever a plugin warning
appeared or the user interacted with the warning dialog. Besides our anonymization process
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Figure 5.25: Percentage of new websites and and appearing warning dialogs throughout
the seven days of usage [183].
we did not link the collected data in any way to personal data of the participants. Instead we
only stored an anonymized participant id.
14 participants from 22 to 68 years (avg. 40 years) used our plugin for a period of more then
seven days. For all participants we only used data entries from the point of first usage upto
exactly seven days later. The average Internet experience of our participants – rated from
1-“not at all experienced” to 5-“very experienced” was 4.2 (SD 0.97).
Using the collected web usage data we were able to find out, which percentage of the web-
sites the users visited each day had never been visited before. Using this data together with
the number of appearing dialogs we also could evaluate for which percentage of the websites
a warning dialog appeared. Figure 5.25 shows these percentages. Within the first 24 hours
naturally all websites had not been visited before. Afterwards the number of new websites
drops quickly to an average level of about 50% and stayed like this for the forthcoming days.
In contrast to that the number of appearing warning dialogs of our plugin shows a continuous
downward trend after the first day.
We actually assumed that both measurements would continue to decrease over time, but it
seems like our users kept visiting a certain amount of new websites each day. However, the
number of dialogs that appeared still decreased more and more to a minimum of 4.5% on
the last day of our experiment. This shows that although users visit a lot of new websites
every day the number of new websites that involve critical data seems to drop proving that
our concept even without a detector would work out after a certain amount of training time.
In total, 229 dialogs appeared to our participants asking them for their decision about that
website. 112 times that website was added the user’s whitelist and 32 times we logged an
actual dismissing of the dialog. As we were missing logging data for the remaining 85 cases
this means that the users must have navigated away from the website without taking any
decision at all. In 522 cases a website visit created a hit on the user’s whitelist and hence
a positively highlighted input field appeared. Concerning the 229 dialogs that appeared the
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“more information” section of the dialogs was only unfolded 11 times – by only 4 users.
This is highly problematic as it contains important information about security details of the
website (please refer to the discussion section).
From the post study questionnaire we drew other interesting findings. None of the partici-
pants reported to have fallen for a phishing attack. They rated their phishing knowledge with
3.1 on a Likert scale from 1-“I don’t know anything about it” to 5-“I know it very well” but
stated to care a lot for the online security (average 4.4). The general concept of the plugin
received an average score of 4.3 and usage was rated with 3.9 in average. Again this lower
score might be due to the fact that users reported that in several cases the plugin detected a
wrong data type. Although still a lot of warnings opened up in our field trial, the participants
experienced that the number of warnings got less. On a Likert scale from 1-“the warnings
did not get less” to 5-“the warnings got less quickly” they answered with a median score
of 4.5. The coloring of the input fields and the positively enhanced green indicator around
input fields was especially liked by the participants.
5.5.7 Second Lab Evaluation
Besides the field study we also performed a second lab study with the second prototype that
was very similar to the first user study. In this second study we limited the amount of data
types tested to password and credit card number (excluding bank transaction numbers) (see
table 5.10). We had 16 participants with an age ranging from 19 to 51 (average 28) – four
were female. We ensured that no one had taken part in any of the previous studies. To
balance the expert level of the users in our two groups we tried to assess the users’ security
knowledge before starting the actual study without actually asking for security knowledge
to avoid priming. We hence asked them to rate the “understanding of Internet technologies”
from 1-“no knowledge” to 5-“very good knowledge”. People with an answer of 4 or 5 were
considered as experts and equally split among the conditions. In the end we had one more
‘non-expert’ in the plugin condition than in the control condition.
In the second lab study both groups discovered more phishing websites than in our prelimi-
nary study. The plugin group found 12 of the 16 phishing attacks (75%) compared to 44%
in the control group. Although this looks like a huge difference we found no statistical dif-
ference in this study (F1,14 = 2.01; p = .187) – mixed ANOVA on the variable plugin usage
(yes/no). In the plugin group we had one false positive. The fact that we found no statistical
significance in this study might be due to the fact that all but three participants had been
classified as experts and hence the plugin was less useful to them than to a higher amount
of non-experts in the first lab study. After the security related part of the study we asked the
people more directly for the phishing knowledge and found that our plugin group had only a
median of 3 whilst the control group had a median of 4. This could also be a reason why we
did not see any statistical difference in the second lab study.
Besides this, nearly nobody opened the “more information” box and the participants hence
mostly did not see information about the encryption state of the connection for example.
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5.5.8 Discussion and Limitations
Within this chapter we described an example of user intervention mechanism that uses no
real detector and instead limits the number of false positives by the means looking only at
cases that involve critical types of data. When starting to use such a concept a user would
at first get a large number of warnings for websites that are actually no threat at all. As we
showed in our field study this number would constantly drop as the user continues to make
use of the method. In addition to that the users start to learn that they get positive feedback
on websites they revisit and where they reuse critical data. We think that this could generate
a certain learning effect for the users to understand that they should look our for possible
threats whenever being on a previously unvisisted website that involves critical data. The
number of false positives of our plugin that appear could be greatly reduced by using a
prepopulated whitelist that would contain known trustworthy Internet parties. In such a case
the user would not have to add each of his standard websites manually. On the one hand this
could reduce the habituation towards our dialog and keep the user sensitive for appearing
warning messages. On the other hand this could reduce the learning effect that we try to
introduce using our plugin that once a website was confirmed the user will get the positive
feedback because of his prior confirmation.
There are also possible technical attacks towards our concept that we did not mention earlier.
In our current implementation we inject our warning window into the source code of the
actual website. Attackers knowing this could mess around with the injected warning to
automatically close it using their own code or by placing elements on top of our appearing
dialog. If such a concept would be deployed as a real tool it would be necessary to place the
warnings in a safe environment were they could not be modified or hidden by code included
in the website.
Another possible issue is that although we block form submission whilst our warning dialog
appears, the attacker could transmit the form input data in the background whilst the form
is being filled in by the user. As a first line of defense we already use a copy of the input
field in our warning dialogs. Like this input listeners to the original input field would cease
to work as long as our dialog is open. In case the attacker would transmit every key press on
the website he would still be able to capture the inputs into our warnings. Again, a trusted
environment for our warnings would be the key to solve this issue.
Concerning our second design we introduced one major issue by hiding the important infor-
mation about the encryption status of the website within a “more information” section. As
we noticed most users did not unfold this section an could hence not see this information.
In the first prototype this information was visible at the first glance. As an important les-
son for future warning designs it is important to make such information visible immediately.
Only information that is really not necessary to judge the security properties should be made
accessible in a second step.
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5.5.9 Research Results
Within this project we presented a research approach that introduced several new parameters
to user intervention methods. A semi-blocking dialog that appears smoothly during user
interaction but still blocks further interaction of the user towards the website. As a second
novelty we present the dialog only in cases were critical data is involved and are hence
able to reduce the amount of warnings to a minimum. This data type based property also
enables us to know where the user’s current focus is and we can hence introduce the warning
message right at the point where the user currently interacts conveying a rational reason for
the appearance of the intervention.
DD What is Phishing Detection?
Within this project we did not have a real detector component that processed the websites
the user visits to find malicious ones by itself. Instead we limited the number of critical
websites by the means of context. In our case the context of the type of input information
that is involved in the online transaction. This can be seen as means of reducing the overall
input space but is not a real detector as this system does not perform differently on malicious
and original websites and hence does no real “detection” by itself.
DH How can HCI be Used to Build Detectors?
Using the users’ context for filtering out inputs towards a possible detector can be seen as
incorporating HCI into the detection building process. In our cases we used the reduced num-
ber of websites that we filtered using the context directly for our user intervention method.
In other cases an additional detector could be used before or after the filtering process.
DR What Detection Overhead and Thresholds are Reasonable?
Within our field study, our participants saw a large number of 229 warning dialogs that
appeared within the week. On the first day of our field study a warning appeared for 22.4%
of all domains that the user visited – about one warning on every fifth website. After one
week this number had been reduced to 4.5% of all the domains that were visited on that day.
Our participants had not reported that any of those websites denoted a security threat and
hence these numbers can be seen as false positives of our approach. A detector with such
a false positive rate would be far from perfect. However, in case of this project we had the
secondary goal of raising the users’ sensitivity towards their private data and of making them
think of were to submit this data. Together with the 229 warning we produced 552 whitelist
events that were thought of encouraging people of using a website. Summing this up, in case
we are able to positively reinforce the users’ security behavior in a large number of cases it
can also be okay to confront him with problems in the same domain as this can help to raise
his overall security interest and knowledge.
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IH How can HCI be Used to Enhance User Intervention Mechanisms?
Within this project we made use of HCI principles in a lot of different ways. The very
basic concept looks at the users’ behavior on the Internet and at the kind of actions a user
performs online that are really security critical – in this case handling sensitive data. We then
developed our concept around certain properties that would make the warning appear more
sensible towards the user (see research question “IE” for more). Using a multi step approach
with lab and field studies we further enhanced the warning design to fit the user needs best.
IM How can User Intervention be Measured?
In case of this work we did both possible types of measurements for user intervention meth-
ods. A lab study study to quantitatively assess the users’ performance in detecting phishing
websites was done twice to see how our user intervention methods would outperform a con-
trol condition in dangerous situations and in between a field study that was used to find out
more about how people would actually use the user intervention method in their daily life
and to see how our concept would evolve during a period of longer usage.
In case of the lab studies we found that the types of users that participate in such a study
can make huge differences in the study outcome. In our second study the number of expert
users was higher than in our first study which seemed to result in the fact that our control
group did perform so well that our plugin did not make a significant difference anymore.
This makes it even more important to try to counterbalance the number of security experts in
such a study or even reduce it. However, this needs to be accomplished without priming the
users for security. We asked them for their knowledge of “Internet technologies” in general
but found out in the post questionnaire that this was different from their actual knowledge
about phishing.
IE How to Enhance User Intervention Quality?
As explained in the beginning of this section we used findings from HCI to introduce sev-
eral new parameters to user intervention methods in case of this work. Our “semi-blocking
dialog” is a dialog that appears in context of the user’s current action and is dependent of
the critical data that is involved. Introducing such properties can not only be used to reduce
the number of warnings but also to make sure that the warning is noticed and to raise the
users willingness to pay attention. Bartsch et al. [23] did follow up work and confirm that
the context can lead to a higher understanding of the risks.
IR When Should Intervention be Performed to Which Extent?
For this project this research question is closely coupled to the question about detector rea-
soning (DR). By using our context based filtering and our other new approaches for the user
intervention design we were able to raise the attention to our warnings by using means that
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were reasonable and understandable for our participants. As discussed in the discussion sec-
tion of this chapter an approach like the one presented here lies between the advantages of
repeated exposure for learning purposes and the problem of warning habituation.
5.6 Enhancing SSL Awareness in Web Browsers
This chapter is based on the work that was part of the bachelor thesis “Enhancing SSL Awareness
in Web Browsers” by the student Tobias Stockinger [279]. Some parts of the project also led to a
publication at the 13th IFIP TC 13 International Conference (INTERACT2011) by Maurer, De Luca
and Stockinger titled “Shining Chrome: Using Web Browser Personas to Enhance SSL Certificate
Visualization‘” [184].
Definition
Measurement
Enhancement
Reason
HCI
Phishing
Detection
User
Intervention
IE
IM
IR
IH
DH
DM
DH
ID
DE
DR
The fact that non-blocking warning messages seem to be over-
looked by the participants has been often discussed within this
thesis so far. For projects that have been previously presented and
which used small non-blocking indicators we were able to observe
a similar effect (see subchapter 5.3) but blocking user intervention
methods can also lead to habituation and resentment of the users.
In the last chapter we showed our idea of semi-blocking dialogs
that are somewhere in-between both worlds, but within this chap-
ter we want to take a closer look at whether it is really impossible to achieve any effects
with non-blocking indicators. We look at a concept to change the whole browser interface
to denote certain security states and measured whether this can have any effect on the users’
assessment of security towards websites. In the SecurityGuard project in subchapter 5.2 we
already used a similar approach of coloring the browser, based on our overall ranking but
we did not specifically focus on this feedback. Besides that we also tested a redesigned set
of the certificate warnings that appear in the browser to see whether we could generate more
valid user decisions.
5.6.1 The Concept of SSLPersonas
Modern browsers, like the Mozilla Firefox browser for example, allow their users to choose
skins that change the look and feel of the browser in certain areas. In the Firefox browser
a lightweight skin that does only change the background images and not all UI elements is
called “Persona”. These Personas can be selected online and immediately be “worn” by the
browser. Hence, switching between Personas can be accomplished fast (see figure 5.26a for
the standard Firefox Persona).
A major advantage of these Personas is that they occupy a large amount of screen estate
– and are hence well visible to the user – without using up additional space. The background
area of the browser user interface so far is not used for any information display. This is
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Figure 5.26: A Firefox web browser “wearing” a standard Persona skin (a) and our own
Personas for the different states: b) Warning (partially unencrypted content) c) Standard
SSL certificate d) Extended Validation SSL certificate (based on [184]).
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why we wanted to use these Personas as means to visualize the current encryption state of a
website the user is currently visiting.
Other indicators like the lock icon or even the colored indicator in front of the URL bar
are usually overlooked by the users as confirmed by related work. The effect of “change
blindness” [267] most certainly is part of the explanation for this issue found in many ex-
periments. Rensink et al. [245] found that especially in marginal interest areas of an image,
large changes may go completely unnoticed by the viewer for a long period of time. In-
creasing the size and kind of the visual change using Personas we want to counteract the
effect.
Besides using an unencrypted connection there are three possible states an encrypted con-
nection can have. In case a website is SSL protected but some of the website content is
loaded using unencrypted connections this is stated as being problematic, as content that
is transmitted over those channels may be subject to eavesdropping. In case a connection
is properly encrypted, two types of SSL certificates exist. Standard SSL certificates that
are issued by certificate authorities and extended validation SSL certificates that require an
additional validation of the company to include company details within the certificate.
For those three cases we designed three different kinds of Personas that can be seen in
figure 5.26. A warning Persona colored the browser yellowish with an additional warning
sign containing an exclamation mark in the background. The Persona for standard SSL
was colored blueish containing a huge lock icon and the extended validation certificate was
colored greenish containing two lock icons and an additional certification icon. The basic
color scheme used by us is identical to the colors used by the Firefox browser itself for the
different states.
5.6.2 Redesigning SSL Warning Messages
In all of the above cases the certificate used could be verified by the browser and the website
would be displayed. However, a few other cases of encrypted websites exist were the certifi-
cate cannot be verified by the certificate authority and the browser hence displays a warning
before letting a user access this website. These warnings usually appear if a certificate has
not been signed by a certificate authority known by the browser (self-signed certificate) or
if the “common name” – the stored domain name – of a certificate does not match with the
actual URL the certificate is applied to.
In both cases Firefox displays a warning screen before giving the user access to the respective
website. As a lot of university or company specific websites use self-signed certificates to
save the money needed for certification, many users simply learned how to skip the warning
message although they do not understand its contents.
For both of the aforementioned cases we redesigned the warning messages and tried to make
them more usable. On the one hand we included a huge preview image of the respective
website to make each warning look more unique and to give the user a preview of what the
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Figure 5.27: Our redesigned SSL warning messages containing thumbnails: a) Mis-
matched common name (domain) of the certificate, b) self-signed certificate error (based
on [184]).
site that she wants to access would look like. These preview images were loaded from an
online service without really loading the website. In addition we recreated the wording and
different options of the warning dialogs to highlight important terms and make them more
understandable. A “further information” link was provided to users for even more details on
the problem. When designing those warnings we stuck to a number of previously published
recommendations by other researchers (e.g. [78] and results found in previous projects).
We took special care of avoiding technical terms and lengthy messages whilst providing
clear choices and preventing habituation. Figure 5.27 shows the two redesigned warnings in
action.
5.6.3 Lab Evaluation
For the lab evaluation of our concept we wanted to find out whether the Personas displayed
by our plugin would be able to influence the users’ opinion for a specific website towards
more positive or more negative ratings.
Methodology
In a mixed-model design design we assigned 24 participants to between-subjects groups
using our plugin or using a standard browser (12 participants in each condition) and let them
browse 14 different websites of seven different categories. After viewing each website we
asked the participants to rate security and trustworthiness – our dependent variables – of the
given website. Up to the end of the study we did not give any explanations about the plugin
or the meaning of the different Personas.
The 14 different websites came from two other within-subjects variables that we had. On the
one hand we used websites from seven different categories to test all aspects of our plugin:
1) websites having a proper extended validation certificate; 2) websites using a standard
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# Type Known Websites Unkown Website
1 EV Certificate www.paypal.com www.ebanking.hsbc.com.hk
2 SSL Certificate www.googlemail.com online.alandsbanken.fi
3 Mixed Content www.one.de/shop/index.php www.instantssl.com
4 No SSL www.openmmx.de www.schatzkiste-bad-windsheim.de/login.php
5 Phishing (No SSL) [ebay phishing site] [hsbc phishing website]
6 Warning
domain mismatch amazon.de browser.garage.maemmo.org
7 Warning
untrusted issuer webmail.ifi.lmu.de www.buha.info
Table 5.11: List of the 14 URLs used for the SSLPersona lab study. For each of the
seven categories of websites we had one known and unknown website per category.
SSL certificate; 3) websites that had mixed content within the encrypted website; 4) genuine
websites that did not use SSL; 5) phishing websites that did not use SSL and; finally two
conditions that triggered the display of our new warning dialogs. Firstly the mismatched
domain warning (6) and secondly the unknown issuer (self-signed) warning (7). Using the
Alexa ratings of different websites we used one well-known and one less-known website
for each of our conditions thus ending up with two within-subject variables and 14 different
tasks per user (see table 5.11 for a complete list of URLs).
We showed the 14 websites in random order to our participants to avoid ordering effects.
After viewing each of the websites the participants had to answer a set of questions. For the
websites regarding the Personas (1-5) we asked four questions about them knowing the web-
site in general, a trustworthiness rating from−2-“this website seems suspicious” to +2-“this
website seems trustworthy”, a security confidence rating from−2-“I cannot see whether this
site is secure” to +2-“there are enough indicators that this site is secure/insecure” and an
assessment about the willingness to login to that website.
Concerning the warning messages we asked 5 different questions on Likert scales from −2
to +2 covering the following areas: understanding of the warning message content; ease of
understanding the warning message content; did they read the entire text; perceived length
of the text and an assessment of the severity of the warning.
Results
The age of our 12 participants in the control group (standard browser with no plugin) ranged
from 14 to 45 years (average 27) with 8 male participants. In the plugin group we had an
average age of 23 years (14 to 30) and 7 male participants. Our participants used the Internet
on average for several hours each day and 20 of the 24 participants did online banking.
We first look at how well our classification of known and unknown websites had worked. In
case of the conditions 1,2 and 5 our classification was correct but for the other two conditions
the selected well known websites were actually not known very well. However, the unknown
websites were truly unknown for all our conditions and as the overall results of both levels
were very similar we will only report the findings from the seven unknown websites here.
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Table 5.12: The rating results (medians, means and standard deviation) for the seven
unknown websites in the five conditions belonging to the Personas. A star indicates for
each condition and question whether our plugin had the intended influence or not [184].
We found a slight tendency that our plugin had a larger effect on people if the website was
unknown.
Looking at the average answers of our participants towards the three remaining questions
in the different conditions one can see from table 5.12 that the plugin influenced the users’
behavior as intended for most of the conditions – especially for the Persona based conditions
1 to 3. In case of the conditions 1 and 2 we expected that the positive indicators in our plugin
group would raise the users trustworthiness towards the website, their willingness to login
and their perceived ability to determine security. This was the case for all the answers in this
category. In case of the partially not encrypted website we expected that trustworthiness and
the willingness to login would go down (which they did) but that the ability to determine
security would still be rated higher – this was also the case.
In case of our non-SSL secured websites (conditions 4 and 5) our plugin did not play any
direct role, as it did not display a Persona for any user group. What we wanted to look at for
these two conditions were carryover or learning effects from our plugin. A missing feedback
of our plugin finally should result in an increased suspiciousness of the users. In fact we were
not able to observe such an effect within this lab study. Due to the short duration of our study,
familiarization with our plugin could not happen. Besides, showing the websites in random
order to our participants proved to be a methodological flaw here because it meant that some
participants of the plugin group saw those conditions without ever having been exposed to
the Personas yet.
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Figure 5.28: Decisions taken by the partic-
ipants for the mismatched domain warning
(condition 6) and the self-signed certificate
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Figure 5.29: Acceptance of the SSLPer-
sonas concept and the newly designed
warnings throughout the participants
(based on [184]).
In case of our redesigned warning messages the behavior of our plugin-group participants
was much more rational than the behavior in the control group. In case of the mismatched
domain warning it will usually be best to visit the website that the certificate was originally
intended for. For the unknown websites this was done by two people in the control group and
five people in the plugin group. In case of the known websites the effect was even stronger
(see figure 5.28). Condition 7 was dedicated towards self-signed SSL certificates (untrusted
issuer) and people could only leave the site or set up an exception. As we only had genuine
websites in our study that used self-signed certificates it was okay to set up an exception
which was done more often by our plugin users. Comparing those results statistically using
a repeated-measures ANOVA the differences for the between-subjects variable “plugin” are
highly significant (F1,22 = 16, p = .001).
In the end we debriefed all our participants and explained them what the study was about
and how our plugin worked. We showed all participants of both groups side-by-side images
of our concept and wanted them to vote for a preferred version in terms of the Personas
that they saw and concerning the new warning messages. A majority of both groups voted
in favor of our Persona (75%) and warning (71%) concept whilst the participants that had
actually experienced the plugin were even more satisfied (see figure 5.29 for details).
5.6.4 Field Evaluation
In August 2010 we published the developed plugin and deployed it on the official addon web-
site of the Firefox browser. It was downloaded several thousand times and security related
blogs and podcasts featured it (e.g. [106, 209]). By March 2011, when the corresponding
paper was written we had more than 15,000 downloads.
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Methodology
We wanted to use this real world user base to find out about the qualitative performance of
our plugin and compiled a questionnaire that was available in German and English (the lan-
guages our plugin was most often used in). Besides demographic questions the survey con-
tained several questions from the “IBM Post-Study System Usability Questionnaire” [161]
using a 5-point instead of the original 7-point Likert scale and finally some questions about
the plugin usage and security knowledge of the participants. We included a popup with an
invitation to the survey within the next update of our plugin.
Results
Within a period of two weeks 169 users of our plugin had filled in our questionnaire. The
age of our users ranged from 9 to 70 years (41 years in average) and 9.5% of the participants
were female. They used the Internet in average 30 hours (SD 23.1) per week and 28% stated
to have expert computer skills. 9% stated that they had been attacked by a phishing attack
before but only one single participant was successfully attacked.
Since we had no technical means of measuring how long the plugin had been installed on the
users’ computers we asked the participants in the questionnaire. 15% used it less than one
month, 40% 1-2 months, 30% 3-5 months and 15% more than five month. Between those
groups we did not see any real differences in their answers besides that it seemed that the
number of experts was higher in the group of long-term users. We think that it could be that
the plugin had firstly been discovered by more experienced users and that the novice users
started to adopt it later.
We asked some questions about the existing Firefox SSL indicators (in front of the URL)
and only 82% stated that they had seen this indicator before. Interestingly, only 11% were
able to give a correct explanation. 50% at least stated that they had clicked the area before.
Concerning our plugin we wanted to see whether the users understood the different Per-
sonas. 62% stated that they knew the difference between our green and blue Persona but
only 21% were able to give a correct textual answer. Another 21% mentioned the “strength
of encryption” in any way which is completely wrong as both certificates can be used with
the exact same encryption methods and key lengths. This shows that although many users
had classified themselves as being experts they were not able to correctly explain the SSL
related concepts. 38% of the users stated that SSLPersonas had changed the way they use
the Internet. Concerning the IBM Usability questionnaire the users’ answers were mostly
positive (see figure 5.30).
5.6.5 Discussion, Limitations and Future Enhancements
Within this project we presented a user intervention mechanism targeting SSL warning di-
alogs and SSL visualization within the browser. As the SSL status can only identify whether
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Figure 5.30: The users’ answers concerning the SSLPersonas nine usability question-
naire questions (based on [184]).
the connection itself is protected from eavesdropping it is not guaranteed that the party sitting
at the other end of the connection is not a malicious one. Phishers might as well use SSL
encryption for their phishing websites although they usually do not – as these certificates
cost money and they have to acquire the signed certificates somehow.
With our concept of SSL personas we showed in our lab study that we are able to influence
the users way of thinking about encrypted websites in a positive way. As some of the partic-
ipants of our field study confirmed it may change the way one uses the Internet. Whether or
not our plugin leads to any long term effects on websites that are not SSL encrypted could
not be shown within our lab study and was also not part of the field study.
Using the questionnaire of the field study we found out that a lot of users (long term and
short term) classify themselves as expert users. This seems interesting as our plugin is
mostly intended for novice users. We suppose that a huge problem for novice users is to
find such enhancements like plugins by themselves. They either do not actively look for
browser extensions like ours and if so, they are perhaps unable to install those. We hence
recommend that novice security features should be shipped as standard features of a software
and for experts the possibility of disabling such features should exist.
Another issue that was often mentioned when discussing our field study was the fact that the
high rating of our participants might simply arise from the fact that they are long term users
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of our plugin and would not use it, in case they did not like it. Nevertheless we think the
way of evaluating software by deploying it into the real world and collect feedback from real
users might be much better than artificially force a few participants to use a piece of software.
Biasing may occur in both ways as participants might try to please the experimenters with
their ratings and an active user base for any software can already be seen as some kind of
quality metric. In the research domain around mobile devices such evaluation methods are
already done by researchers like Henze et al. [122] for example.
When evaluating the questionnaire data from our plugin we looked closer into the fact that
the same amount of users that correctly explained the difference between our green and
blue Persona stated that the green Persona would denote stronger encryption. We found that
within our green Persona image we used two lock icons compared to one lock icon within
the blue Persona. This might have misleaded the users into thinking of a stronger encryption.
In a later version of our plugin we replaced the second lock icon with the icon of a green
man to denote the certified identity.
Looking at the new warning designs that we proposed we managed to get significantly more
people into choosing correct decisions within such a dialog. We attribute this to our design
types that showed clear choices with less text than the original warnings and created more
individual looking dialogs using formatting and imagery.
5.6.6 Research Results
As this project provided only SSL security indicators of different ways we had absolute no
kind of detection process involved. But although our Persona feedback components were
passive and non-blocking we were able to prove that these non-blocking indicators can have
some influence on the user’s opinion towards a website.
IH How can HCI be Used to Enhance User Intervention Mechanisms?
Non-blocking security indicators are mostly overlooked as the users focus when visiting
a website is skewed towards the website content and security is never a primary goal. This
means that a non-blocking security indicator has to fight for attention, but screen real estate is
precious to the user and nobody wants to have 30 percent of his screen reserved for security
feedback (see the project in subchapter 5.2). Using the Persona concept we were able to
use a relatively large portion of the screen for security feedback without having to reserve
additional screen real estate. The research about “change blindness” seems to be important
related work when it comes to non-blocking indicators. Besides the property of more space
other properties might also be used to achieve a higher amount of attention. these measures
are always coupled with the research questions around “reasoning” as too much of an alarm
for any tiny security issue, will set up the users sooner or later.
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Concerning our newly designed warning messages the guidelines that have been proposed by
other researchers combined with our own findings so far provide a good basis for designing
warning messages that might finally lead to more correct decisions.
IM How can User Intervention be Measured?
As in the project in subchapter 5.3 it is not always necessary or possible to measure the
achieved correctness of user behavior. In case of SSL certificates it would make no practical
sense of testing how users would behave on SSL secured phishing websites as they hardly
exist. Instead of measuring achieved correctness, an encrypted website should make a user
more confident in using it and this can be measured by self reporting as it was used within
this project. Using such a method, a baseline to compare against is very important, as the
measured values depend to a large extent on the website contents and other factors. Only the
difference in both measurements (with plugin/without plugin) can yield valuable insights.
For our warning messages we were again able to evaluate the user behavior to see whether
it would lead users to more correct decisions.
IE How to Enhance User Intervention Quality?
First of all this chapter showed that non-blocking indicators are not per se useless for con-
veying warning information. It is possible to providing indicators that are noticed by the
user although security is not the user’s primary by getting various properties right. Overall
a certain visibility or notability can only be achieved for indicators having a certain size and
stand out against the rest of the user interface. We used large background graphics of an ap-
plication in this case. When designing such elements the details that are communicated by
the imagery and content have to be reviewed. In our case using two lock icons in one image
whilst using only one lock icon in another graphic most probably made the users think of
one type of certificate denoting a stronger encryption than the other.
IR When Should Intervention be Performed to Which Extent?
Reasoning about the amount of user intervention is especially important within this project as
the intervention does appear in many situations and mostly in non-critical instead of critical
ones. As we saw in the previous chapter such positive reinforcement denotes another possi-
bility of helping the user with security. In contrast to messages that only warn about threats
positive security reinforcements can have the effect of creating a positive attitude of the user
towards security principles and may even lead to some kind of learning effects. However,
positive indicators that are not reporting any kind of threat are generally expendable and
hence should never be too flashy. This is why the concept of a non-blocking indicator, as it
was used within this project, is a very good example for such a user intervention method.
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5.7 Diminishing Visual Brand Trust
This chapter is based on the work that was part of the bachelor thesis “Diminishing Visual Brand
Trust on Websites for better Security Assessment” by the student Cornelia Reithmeier [244].
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So far we saw in the previous subchapters that it is possible to
influence the users’ security opinion towards a website to some
degree even when using non-blocking indicators. However, the
part of a website that still catches the largest amount of attention is
the content area of the browser. From the point of view of usable
security this is at the heart of the problem because users are blinded
by the look of the content that can be so easily impersonated by an
attacker. Within this subchapter we want to present a project in
which we tried to have a look at whether it would be possible to get that strong content focus
of a user lowered by making the content appear less trustworthy. We built a browser plugin
that exchanged logo images of a website and replaced them by images of other websites or
modified the text appearance of a website. After some initial research we conducted a focus
group to find out what others thought about our concept before finally developing a plugin
that took care of the content changes. Finally, we conducted a user study to see whether our
modifications would help to change the users’ security behavior.
5.7.1 The Concept of Destroying Content Trust
When browsing the Internet the users’ primary focus is never on security and most of the
time the user is focused on the visual content area of a web browser where the actual website
is displayed. Due to this, mobile browsers for example are completely hiding the browser
interface whenever possible. For the concept of this project we asked ourselves how we
could make users more aware of the other indicators in the surrounding browser chrome.
On the one hand this can be achieved by the flashiness of the placed indicators around the
content (see subchapter 5.6) or by blocking the access to the chrome content (cf. related
work or the project in subchapter 5.5). But is there a way to make users focus other security
indicating elements by breaking the users’ trust into the content area to some extent?
Using existing related work and some own research we compiled a list of elements within
a browser that can be seen as generating trust for the users’ actions [?, 95, 275]. We use
the term “trust” instead of security within this subchapter because the users’ motivation to
continuously carry out actions on a website is more than just security. The different aspects
of the user interface all add to the fact that users keep executing their online transactions. If
they would not “trust” the sum of the whole interface they would suspend those actions. The
following list of items hence adds to this trustful user experience in some way:
• Website Design: Although a very broad term, the design of the whole website a user
is visiting, is what defines the brand of a website and helps the users to recognize
known companies they are usually doing business with.
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• Website Logo: As a subelement of the design, the logo of a company is the most
unique part for brand recognition. A big problem about logos in the digital world is the
ease with which a logo can be copied. Even in the physical world the fashion business
and other industries have to fight against logo misuse although faking a logo physically
is much harder then just copying an image file from one server to another. Logos as a
key element of impersonation have been subject to other research specifically looking
for logo impersonation [254].
• URL: The URL of a website really tells the users which Internet server they are cur-
rently communicating with. Compared to a logo in the content area it is much harder
to fake this information.
• Encryption Status/SSL: This tells the user something about how the data between
both communicating parties of a web server connection is handled and whether it is
protected from eavesdropping.
• Certification Seals: Coming from the physical world it has often been practice that
some governmental or private companies are used to certify others and their services.
In Germany a famous example is the “TÜV” [285] (short for technical surveillance
association) that has the duty of checking every car every two years for its ability to
participate in road traffic. But these kinds of certifications are not limited to the offline
world. The TÜV and other companies also certify online retailers and these are then
allowed to place a respective seal on their website. As with the logos such imagery is
easily copied.
• Links: Linking to other websites or to websites within the own website makes a web-
site appear connected with other parties of the web. Hence, they allow the user to
assess the relationship of the current website to other websites to some extent. It is
important to note that these certification seals and their images have nothing to do
with encryption certificates.
• Third Party Logos: Logos of other companies may also generate trust. If one com-
pany does business with another company there must be some trustful relationship
between those.
• Personalization: Most Internet companies state that the users should look for per-
sonalization within email or other communication they receive to validate the other
company. Often attackers are only in possession of the email address of a user and
would not be able to generate personalized content.
• Security Instruction: Security instructions on a website that tell the user for example
how she is able to verify that she is communicating with the right party may be helpful
to some extent but they can also backfire [136].
Taking these items into account we made a first list of website properties that could be altered
to hopefully change the users reliance from content related indicators to other ones that are
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more reliable from a security point of view. Such a concept would be very invasive towards
the users’ web browsing actions which is why we postponed a decision whether or not the
concept would be suitable for a deployed browser solution to after our focus group (see
section 5.7.2). Nevertheless a general investigation of a possible change in user behavior
would also be interesting.
• Replacing Logos: Logos on a website could be replaced by other logos or could be
left out.
• Replacing Images: The same is true for other imagery of the website. Despite that
other pictures or image-based design elements might be less known than a logo, a
replacement with other images could still change the look of a website.
• Changing Image Color: Changing the image color especially of a logo or a photo
would distort the natural look of an image without completely replacing it. A problem
here some companies really use their logo in multi-colored versions.
• Changing Website Color or Style: Besides images a website contains other style el-
ements like the layout, layout elements or text colors. All these attributes of a website
can be easily changed to end up with a totally different looking design.
• Changing the Position of Interface Elements: Each website uses a certain kind of
navigational structure or other kinds of UI elements. An example for distorting the
user interface in this way would be to move a menu bar from the left of the website to
the right.
5.7.2 Focus Group
After we had identified possible properties of modifications we wanted to discuss the whole
concept within a focus group. Our goal was to find out more about what properties of
websites make a website trustworthy and how those would be ranked by our participants. As
a last part of the focus group we wanted to gather insights about how others think about our
modification and study ideas.
We had six participants joining our focus group (one female) with an average age of 23 years.
Four of our participants were studying informatics or media informatics.
Motivation
We didn’t mention the exact topic of our focus group beforehand and instead told the par-
ticipants that the focus group would be about “visualization of websites”. We did this to
make our participants in a first phase more aware of the actual problem of people focusing
more on the content of websites instead of the security indicators. In the beginning of the
focus group we showed the participants 10 different screenshots of websites projected to the
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# 0URL0(without0path)0 Brand0 Phishing
1 http:88www1youtube1com Youtube no
2 http:88cgi2Qbay1de1xt1cx eBay yes
3 https:88www1amazon1de amazon no
4 http:88facebookpowered1t351me facebook yes
5 http:88www1accountQ61com WorldOfWarcraft yes
6 https:88login1portal1uniQmuenchen1de UniversitykPortal no
7 http:88www1tvviter1com tiwtter yes
8 http:88www1ellerencontro1com HSBCkbank yes
9 http:88www1icq1com ICQ no
10 http:88skype11ns8Qwistee1fr Skype yes
Table 5.13: A list of the URLs belonging
to the screenshots that we showed at the
beginning of the focus group to motivate
towards the problem.
#  Original Domain Phishing Domain
1 paypal paypai
2 facebook fakebook
3 ebay epay
4 yahoo yaho
5 battle bottle
6 spiegel spigel
7 youtube youtabe
8 postbank postbanc
Table 5.14: A list of the eight different do-
mains used for the study and the phishing
domains that were used to replace the re-
spective domains depending on the task.
wall of the conference room that was used for the focus group. Six of those websites were
actual phishing websites which could easily be seen when for example looking at the URL.
We handed a list to each participant and asked them to fill in the name of each website and
special elements that attracted their attention when they saw the website. For looking at the
screenshots and noting their answers they only had fifteen seconds. The results of this first
motivational task were later on not considered for any analysis. Although a lot of the URLs
we had chosen were easily recognizable as being phishing none of our participants had noted
that they saw some phishing websites among the original ones. A whole list of the URLs
used can be found in table 5.13.
Indicator Trust and Phishing Experience
After having debriefed our participants and having explained the problem once again, we
started with our discussion phase. We presented the participants with the trust elements we
had identified earlier, written on cardboard and wanted them to discuss the elements and
finally sort them according to their importance. After a short discussion the participants had
identified the five most important elements and started to rank them. They agreed that some
elements are of nearly equal importance and hence ranked the logos and the overall design
of a website as most important followed by the URL and SSL/https indicators and as a third
level of importance they chose the certification seals.
Afterwards we asked them to tell us more about their personal experiences with phishing:
whether they noticed any attacks on themselves before and if so how they had detected those.
Two group members remembered that they had received phishing emails before but they said
that they had not fallen for the attacks.
Introducing our Concept
In the last stage of the focus group we gave a short introduction into the idea of our concept
and showed the participants some mockup images of how the modifications might look like.
Examples for those mockups can be found in figure 5.31. We asked them for their opinion
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Figure 5.31: Different mockup examples of modifications that were shown to the par-
ticipants of the focus group: a) Logo with changed colors; b) Changed color style of the
website; c) replaced logo image; d) switched menu location.
towards the concept and its possible changes and whether they had any concerns about the
idea.
The replaced logo was experienced most striking by the participants but they also had their
doubts about it. They mentioned the Google Search engine as an example where the logo
of the search engine is changed every few days for special occasions. Changing the color
scheme of a website was commented to be possibly hard to notice if the participants are
not extremely familiar with a website. Next, the participants expressed their doubts about
changing the page structure (e.g. the menu position). First of all users could explain this
away as being a formatting error and as a second reason this could sometimes be thought of
as being simply for another cultural group.
The most interesting finding from our focus group was a completely new kind idea of mod-
ification that came up during the discussion. One participant mentioned that erroneous en-
codings for special characters of the German language are always a warning sign for him
when he gets emails (e.g. an ‘ä’ just appears as ‘?’). Other spelling or grammar mistakes
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Logo ModificationText Modification
Figure 5.32: Example of the PayPal home page without modifications and after our
modifications (logo+text) have been applied.
where also mentioned to cause distrust. For our plugin the participants suggested to create
those errors on purpose by translating a piece of text to another language and back using
some automatic online translator tool. This should create similar looking errors.
Participants were also worried about the fact that our modifications could appear too often.
They proposed to include a whitelist within the plugin that would keep already known web-
sites free from modifications or that the modifications would only appear on websites where
one had to enter login credentials. In general the participants did not really like the idea of
having their websites modified during their daily browsing sessions as we had considered
it so far. This showed us that our plugin would not be really suitable as a tool that could
be deployed to end users but we at least wanted to use it to gain our research findings we
mentioned in the beginning of this subchapter.
5.7.3 The Final Plugin
Within our focus group we had identified that logo and text changes seemed to be the most
suitable ones. Figure 5.32 shows an example of the final algorithms applied to the standard
PayPal home page.
For the final plugin we decided to use logo replacement instead of logo recoloring. For that
the current logo of a website should be replaced by a randomly chosen logo of a different
brand. We discussed several possibilities of how to create the logo repository to choose from.
The solution would have been to extract the logos from other browsing sessions of the same
user to only swap the current logos with other logos that are known to the participant. A
problem with this approach was that it might lead to privacy issues disclosing the brands that
a user usually visits. Because of this issue we started with a fixed set of well known logos
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in the German language area. When replacing a logo we resized it in a way that the aspect
ratio of each logo was kept but placed it within the boundaries of the original logo.
The technical discovery of the logo images can get very hard as logos are not easily distin-
guishable from other images within a website. For our prototype we developed an algorithm
that searches the image source or “id” attribute within the HTML code for an occurrence
of the word “logo”. If no logo is found within the image text we then move on to anchor
elements and check their attributes and contents and afterwards we check other elements
and their attributes. On most standard websites this algorithm appears to be quite stable and
worked well enough for our testing. In a professional environment more advanced solutions
like the one presented by Jiao et al. [142] could be used.
For our text replacement we had problems of finding a free and fast online translating tool
that would offer an API to quickly do the translation requests that we needed. As it was
important that the text replacement would be visible at first sight of a website we could not
afford to wait for long lasting online translation. In addition for each website a lot of different
text areas exist that would each need to be translated twice (forward to another language and
then backward to the original language) which would cause a lot of server requests. We
chose to implement an own algorithm for error creation by interchanging single characters
within the words of a text. Using such a method the modified text can still be understood but
looks somehow weird to the user. The technical implementations of the textual modifications
were pretty simple and straight forward. For each word of each text area of a website we
randomly decide whether it should be changed. In case a word should be changed only
one random character of the word switches its place with the next following character. The
character case is preserved using the case of the original character position.
5.7.4 User Study Evaluation
With the so far developed prototype we now conducted a user study to find out whether the
modifications introduced would lead to more people investigating other security indicators
outside of the content area. To measure whether a participant looked at the different indi-
cators we used questionnaire data, a think-aloud protocol and an eye tracker to see where
exactly our participants looked at.
Methodology
We conducted our study as a within-subject design and used two independent variables. The
first variable “modification” had four different levels: no modification, logo change, text
change and text+logo change. Besides that we wanted to apply our concept on phishing and
non-phishing websites. This results in eight different conditions each user had to go through.
We balanced those conditions using an 8 by 8 Latin square .
Whenever we wanted to show a phishing website we used a simple browser modification
that will be explained in more detail in the project in subchapter 5.9 to make the original
166 5 Nine Research Projects on Phishing and Usability
website look like a phishing one. In case the original website was encrypted we modified
the security indicators to appear as if the website was not encrypted and besides this we
exchanged the URLs in the URL bar and the status bar of the browser with new domain
names. We selected a list of eight different original websites that were either among the
most phished websites on phishtank.com, or the most phished websites reported according
to the anti-virus company Avira [211]. For each of those websites we derived a possible
phishing URL by creating a similar sounding domain name that could have been registered
by a phisher. Table 5.14 contains a list of the eight used domains and the respective phishing
domains we used. For all our eight conditions we assigned the websites that should be used
randomly in such a way that each brand was used once throughout one user trial.
Using the eye tracker, think-aloud, the questionnaire and additional logging we collected dif-
ferent dependent variables from three different categories. Using the eye tracking recordings
we could see where the users looked at, during the website interaction. In case our eye track-
ing had possibly missed any interaction we also tried to make use of possible memorization
of security facts through the participants. For these we stored screenshots of the content of
the websites the user had visited throughout the study and showed them to participants again
after the first round of the study asking them several questions about the indicators. As a last
resort we also did some logging of the interaction the user carried out whilst going through
the tasks.
• Eye Contact With the URL: We used the eye tracking data to see whether or not a
user looked at the URL during the website visit.
• Eye Contact With the Security Indicators: Again using the eye tracking data we
looked at whether the participants eyes focused towards any security indicator within
the browser.
• Memory of URL: When reviewing all websites we asked the participants whether
they remembered the URL of the website they had been on, offering them four differ-
ent choices: the original URL, a phishing URL and finally the possibility to state that
they had no idea or to prose another domain name.
• Memory of HTTPS: This was nearly the same as the URL memorization questions
instead that we asked for the encryption state of the website.
• Time of Interaction: Throughout the user study we logged the interaction time with
each website to see whether that would change for our modified websites. We mea-
sured the time from the moment a website was loaded until it was dismissed again
going back to the user study’s overview screen.
As it was important to not prime our participants for security we hid the original purpose
of the study until a debriefing at the end of it. Instead we announced the user study as
being about the “visualization of websites”. To keep the users distracted whilst viewing the
eight different websites we also asked a couple of design questions that had to be answered
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Figure 5.33: Correctness of domain guesses by the participants in total and for the
different modification conditions. Participants were also allowed to state that they had
no idea or could propose a different domain instead of the given two possiblities.
after viewing each website. We also instructed people to think aloud about their website
interaction to see whether they would talk about the modifications towards the websites.
At the end of our study we debriefed the participants and asked them some questions about
the overall concept using a final survey.
Results
We had 16 participants attending our user study – average age 23, mostly students – and
hence repeated our Latin square balancing for the second half of the participants. 10 partici-
pants were male and none of the participants had taken part in a study about phishing before
– we asked for that after debriefing the participants. Nearly all of them were students of IT
programs. They stated to have a good average Internet knowledge: 4.4 (SD 0.7) on a 5-point
Likert scale. They used the Internet for 5.3 (SD: 1.9) hours per day on average.
The first important aspect to look at, is whether our participants had noticed the different
changes that we had introduced throughout our study. In general this worked out well.
Having our think-aloud protocols, the users’ questionnaire data and the eye tracking results
we combined those different sources and found out that about 81% of the participants had
noticed the logo changes and about 80% of the participants had noticed the text changes.
However, this means that our changes still were overlooked by about 20% of our participants.
We also had cases were the influence of the changed logo was so strong that the participant
believed to be on the website belonging to the brand of the replaced logo.
Looking at how well the participants remembered the URLs or whether they remembered
having seen a phishing website, the results suggest that our plugin did not help that people
had a better memorization of phishing attacks or the URLs. On average the participants
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Figure 5.34: Correctness of encryption guesses by the participants in total and for the
different modification conditions. Participants were also allowed to state that they had
no idea about the encryption state.
chose in 48% of the cases the correct domain name which is close to guessing. We offered
them the original and the phishing domain name to choose from but they were also allowed to
state that they had no idea or they could propose a different domain name. In the Logo+Text
but also in the condition without any modification 17 correct of 32 possible answers were
given (53%). This shows that none of our modifications enhanced the user’s URL retention
compared to the baseline (see figure 5.33 for details). When asking the participants at the
end of the study how much attention they had paid to the URLs they answered with 1.9
(SD 1.0) in average on a 5-point Likert scale (1-‘not at all’ to 5-‘very close’) confirming the
retention results.
The results regarding the retention of the encryption state are even worse (see figure 5.34)
and when being asked in the end how much attention the users had paid to security signs
they answered with an average of 1.5 (SD 0.5).
This could be also confirmed looking at the data we recorded using the eye-tracker. Fig-
ure 5.35 shows the number of websites for which a participant had look at least briefly
towards a given security indicator. We looked at different browser areas: the URL, the site
identity indicator combined with the https-scheme indicator, the browser tab and the history
return button. The fact that the participants’ eyes came across a given indicator does not
necessarily mean that they perceived and understood the indicator.
When finally asking our participants about the level of disturbance that was created through
the different modifications, the textual modifications were rated to be more disturbing than
the logo modifications (see figure 5.36). We also asked our participants about some of their
feelings they had when using the plugin. From figure 5.37 one can easily see that the plugin
confused and disturbed many of our participants while it made a lot less people think about
safety.
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Figure 5.36: Level of disturbance experienced by the participants for the different types
of changes.
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Figure 5.37: Different feelings of the participants towards the BrandTrustMinimizer
concept.
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5.7.5 Discussion and Limitations
Looking at our overall results our concept of getting the users focus away from the content
area did not work in any way. No matter which kind of measurement was taken into account
the users did not look more at other indicators. However, our modifications were noticed by
most of the users and understandably they did not like them very much.
When developing the concept we originally had thought of a button within the browser
chrome to acknowledge the changes of a website and revert them. Perhaps placing such
an element next to the security elements would help a little, as users that are disturbed by the
content changes could revert them when shifting their focus towards the security indicators.
Nevertheless we think that the results of this study show that lowering the trust the user set
into the content area is not really possible. The only effect that seems to be achieved is that
participants get confused and in some cases even thought they were at the website of the
replacement logo instead of the original website. These effects seem to be much stronger
than the shift of the users’ focus towards the security indicators. We hence conclude that
non-blocking security indicators need to attract attention by themselves and cannot rely that
the users would in any case give up their content-focused behavior.
5.7.6 Research Results
Within this project the main goal was to find out if the user intervention methods and hence
security indicators are taken into account by users more often if we try to reduce their trust
into the content area of the browser. Although we were not able to successfully prove this,
the project generated a lot of other interesting findings.
ID What is User Intervention?
User Intervention as the ability to protect people from dangerous security events – phishing
in the case of this thesis – was also to some extent the definition that we used as a basis
for this project. However, we did not use this as our main measurement metric. We did
ask people whether they remembered the URLs they had been on, which would have been
a necessary step in detecting the phishing attacks, but mainly looked out for the different
security indicators that users looked at. This is only a necessary but not sufficient criterion
for the user intervention to work.
IH How can HCI be Used to Enhance User Intervention Mechanisms?
Using HCI research as a background we wanted to approach the problem of security not
being the primary course of action from a different perspective. As shown in subchapter 5.6
it is possible to achieve effects of non-blocking user intervention mechanisms that have been
designed making use of HCI research and principles. In case of this project we wanted to see
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whether we could use the findings from HCI research to raise the general security awareness
in favor of non optimized user intervention mechanisms by lowering the users’ trust towards
the content area of the browser. It seems as if this does not work out.
IM How can User Intervention be Measured?
In case of this study we used many different evaluation techniques to find out whether the
security indicators received more attention than without our website changes. Using an
eye-tracker we looked at the real eye movements of the users and were able to see pretty ac-
curately whether the security indicators were focused for a longer time or not. Self-reported
data of participants is usually off to a certain extent and if the participants are asked whether
they looked at the security indicators there is always the possibility of a slight bias that users
report to have looked at the indicators because they think that this is desired behavior. In-
stead of asking for this directly we tried to challenge the users’ memory. In case they would
have had noticed the security indicators and discovered a possible attack they would hope-
fully had remembered this. With our eight websites being within the standard memorability
range of 7± 2 [197] this should have worked out. Despite that newer research suggests a
memorability of only four chunks of information [58], this would have still been enough to
remember our four phishing attacks.
In case an eye tracker is not available other computer metrics can be taken into account.
Mouse cursor movements for example might be used to some extent as a replacement [46].
Using a within-subjects study for all different cases we only had two websites that used no
plugin modifications and if our plugin had caused a general change in mind of our partici-
pants this would possibly also have effected the conditions that did not have any modifica-
tions. To make sure that such side effects cannot happen a between-subjects study should
perhaps be preferred for future similar studies.
IE How to Enhance User Intervention Quality?
Throughout this thesis we used blocking, non-blocking and semi-blocking approaches for
user intervention. As non-blocking security indicators are easily overlooked by the users,
because security is never their primary goal, we tried to look at if this primary focus can be
loosened in favor of security. In fact the website content seems to be so dominant towards the
user that although we were able to confuse the users about the content to some extent these
kinds of modifications to not create a focus shift towards security indicators. We conclude
that security indicators have to attract the user’s focus by themselves by delivering a high
quality user intervention. Over time only the acknowledged advantages of such indicators
can then lead to a more frequent access of users towards security interventions.
172 5 Nine Research Projects on Phishing and Usability
5.8 Visual Image Comparison For Phishing
Detection and Reporting
This chapter is based on the work that was part of the bachelor thesis “Using Visual Image Com-
parison to Detect Fraudulent Websites” by the student Dennis Herzner [128] and the master the-
sis “User Interfaces for Indication of Visual Website Similarity for Fraudulent Websites” by Marc
Mühlbauer [192]. Some parts of the project also led to a publication at the 30th SIGCHI Conference
on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI2012) by Maurer and Herzner titled “Using Visual
Website Similarity for Phishing Detection and Reporting” [185].
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In the last subchapter we already saw the major importance of the
content area of a website being more important to the users than
the security indicators and tried to enhance this problem from a
user intervention perspective. Within this chapter we want to turn
the tables on this issue and want to use this fact as an advantage
as well as an HCI parameter to develop a detector that is based on
the visual look of the content area.
Most phishers try to make their phishing websites look the same as
the original website they are impersonating which is in many cases done by simply copying
large amount of the HTML content. If a website looks the same, a user will more easily
fall for it. On the reverse, this also means that if a website looks the same it can be easily
compared visually to other content images of websites. This is exactly the approach we want
to take within this chapter.
Within the first part of the chapter we describe our development of a detector mechanism
that uses visual comparison between screenshots of websites to find similar looking websites
that are potentially impersonated. We compared many different image comparison methods
within a huge detector test carried out using the test set presented in subchapter 5.1.
To make this HCI-based approach complete, we also co-develop a user interface concept
for this approach that makes use of the visual comparison properties and other findings that
were generated throughout this thesis. Finally this user interface has been evaluated in an
interactive online study with participants from around the world.
5.8.1 Concept: Detecting Phishing Through Visual Similarity
Our general concept is based on the fact that due to branding and design not a single company
website – or rather its exact graphics representation – exists twice. In case we would be
able to find a website that does look exactly like an original website but is not affiliated
with that website in any way, the other website will most certainly denote an impersonation
attack. This project makes use of this effect in a twofold way: firstly, we can use it to
design and evaluate a detection methodology that will yield similarity scores for unknown
websites a user visits by comparing them to already known websites. Secondly, in case the
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Figure 5.38: Examples for direct and indirect visual detection methods to find an at-
tacking website either by looking at a whitelist of original websites or at a blacklist of
known phishing websites.
impersonation is most likely, the visual similarity can be shown to the user and hence be
used as means to create an understandable user intervention mechanism.
The Detection Process
The actual detection mechanism we imagine would work as follows: Whenever a user visits a
website, a screenshot of the content area is generated and then compared against a huge list of
known websites. This can be used for two different kinds of detection (see figure 5.38). The
first way of finding phishing attacks is to “directly” compare an unknown website against
a list of known original websites (whitelist). In case a high similarity is found, between
two different URLs, the detector knows which website has been potentially attacked. The
“indirect” detection method uses a blacklist of known phishing websites and searches for
matches on this list. In case an unknown website is very similar to a known phish it will most
likely be a copy of this attack. Linking the known phishing websites with their respective
original website makes it again possible to know which original website has been attacked.
Comparing the visual similarity of websites might at first sound complicated and one might
argue that HTML content based approaches would be much easier but the HTML content is
only indirectly associated with the graphically rendered image. The problem that multiple
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Figure 5.39: First draft of how the warning dialog of the user intervention method for
visual similarity detection could look like [185].
versions of HTML code may lead to the same visual representation might be exploited by
phishers to avoid detection (cf. phishing page polymorphism [158]).
Whatever kind of visual comparison is used, the detected elements are always returned with
a similarity score. A user intervention mechanism has then to decide up to which threshold
of the similarity score a similarity is non-critical. Similarities above this threshold trigger
the user intervention warning.
Visual Similarity-Based User Intervention
Having the visually similar screenshots of websites, additional information about those web-
sites and a visual similarity score, a lot of data exists that can be used to create a usable user
intervention method. When thinking initially of this concept we already created conceptual
warning designs that can be seen in figure 5.39. A general concept of the dialog design is to
make use of the screenshots to express the general observation of two different websites be-
ing very similar in the warning dialog. The user can compare the screenshots and then verify
which website she really wants to visit. As the screenshots change with every warning the
dialog is also less prone to habituation.
5.8.2 Detector Architecture
Our detection process is carried out as a client-server-architecture. This is necessary as the
data that needs to be checked is generated on the user side whilst the black- and whitelists
of other websites take up large amounts of data and can hence not be stored on the client
computer. We start by describing two different possible server architectures. Depending
on the architecture the concept will by more or less privacy invasive at the cost of white-
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Figure 5.40: The client-server architecture of the more privacy-relevant version (based
on [185]).
and blacklist quality. We will first describe the more privacy-relevant concept of the server
before explaining the client architecture and talk about the privacy tradeoffs afterwards.
On the server side three different main components have to be available that are used by
the detector component (see figure 5.40). The most important component is a number of
different visual similarity indexes that contain image information depending on the visual
similarity detector. These indexes are then used for quick lookups on image similarity. Al-
though our concept would in general work with one image detector the server should be
able to host multiple detector indexes. In case of our project we used these multiple detec-
tion indexes to compare the detector performance. In practical use, it would be possible to
combine the results of multiple detectors to enhance the detector performance. Besides the
image fingerprint data itself the indexes also store an ID for each website that can be used
to look up additional website information that is stored in an extra database (second main
component). This reduces the size of the indexes and ensures that additional website data is
not stored multiple times for each image comparison index. A third component on the server
that is actually not necessary for the pure detection process are the original screenshots that
have been used to generate the comparison indexes. The website detection process would
also work without those but the server would then be unable to transfer them to the client to
be displayed in the user intervention dialog.
On the client side, a browser extension is used to carry out the detection process. This
extension takes a screenshot of the website that a user is currently visiting and computes a
fingerprint value out of the screenshot that can later be handled by the respective detector
on the server side. It would also be possible to transfer the screenshot to the server and
compute the necessary fingerprints on the server-side. Such an approach would protect secret
fingerprint computation code but on the contrary this would take up much more bandwidth
and would denote an extensive privacy threat as the screenshots yield much information
about the user’s current actions – as opposed to the hash-like fingerprints.
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Figure 5.41: The client-server architecture of the more performance-optimized and less
privacy-relevant version (based on [185]).
Once the fingerprint has been received by the server it can compute a list of visually similar
websites and send those back to the client together with the respective screenshots, website
data and similarity scores. On the client side the plugin can then compare whether the
submitted fingerprint is nearly equal to one of the websites and in case a website matches
but the URL is different from the original URL a warning can be displayed.
The big advantage of this architecture is that the user only has to submit the fingerprint of the
website screenshot which makes it impossible for the server to track the user’s website visits.
A downside of this approach is that the check for an eventual matching phishing website has
to be done on the client side and hence requires much more data to be transmitted back to
the client.
In a less privacy-relevant version of our architecture (see figure 5.41) we would transfer the
URL that the user is currently visiting together with the image fingerprint to the server. This
has two major advantages. On the one hand the server can immediately reason about whether
the visited URL might be phishing or not and include this result in its answer to the client.
The second big advantage lies in the maintenance of images on the server side. In case the
server receives a fingerprint for a website that is not yet known in the servers’ database it
can add the respective URL and fingerprint to its database for future searches. In case the
URL is already known to the server and the fingerprint mismatches the one being stored on
the server this could mean that the design of the stored website has changed and that it needs
to be reindexed by the server. In both cases the server has to make sure that the submitted
information by the clients can be trusted to not fall for attacks submitting faked fingerprints
on purpose.
5.8.3 Evaluating the Detector
For the evaluation of our method we did not want to create our own image comparison algo-
rithm as this is a huge research area in itself. Instead, we wanted to test the applicability of
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different image comparison methods towards our concept. Comparing website screenshots
should in many dimensions be relatively easy compared to photo comparison in general as
our screenshots are known to be mostly distortion free (e.g. not rotated, no clipped images,
same camera angle).
Different Detectors Tested
Four our tests we used eleven different image comparison features that could be easily tested
as we used a software framework for image comparison called LIRe [171] that has all eleven
different features already on-board and can also be used to generate large image indexes for
future image comparison that we needed on our server-side. The eleven features chosen for
our evaluation are:
A first set of of three features have their foundations in the MPEG-7 standard for media
description [50, 180]:
1. Scalable Color (SCD) is a color histogram using the HSV color space that character-
izes the global color distribution of an image.
2. Color Layout (CLD) describes a spatial distribution of the YCbCr color values of an
image by dividing it into 64 single regions.
3. Edge Histogram (EH) computes the spatial distribution of five different types of
edges throughout the image.
Three other detectors use combined approaches and are hence called compact composite
descriptors [43, 44]:
4. Color and Edge Directivity Descriptor (CEDD) combines a 24-bin color histogram
together with texture-information.
5. Fuzzy color and texture histogram (FCTH) works similarly as the CEDD descriptor
but uses a different type of color information gathering.
6. Joint Composite Descriptor (JCD) combines the information from CEDD and FCTH
into one new. feature with even more texture information
Besides these descriptors we also use an HSV and RGB-based (7) histogram descriptor;
a descriptor based on the JPEG coefficients (8) and their histogram and the Auto Color
Correlogram (ACC) [131] (9) descriptor that makes use of spatial correlation of colors.
The last two descriptors consist of one descriptor that is based on the Gabor [175] (10)
filter and a descriptor that makes use of the textual features corresponding to human visual
perception found by Tamura et al. [281] (11).
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Test Set Recapture
As an input to our detectors we made use of the test set described in subchapter 5.1. It
consists of 10,030 phishing URLs that have all been reviewed and assigned to one of 1,152
original websites. Removing phishing websites that could not be used for different rea-
sons 3,603 verified phishing websites remained. 348 additional phishing URLs had to be
neglected for this evaluation as they did not attack a specific brand. In such cases the phish-
ing websites had no similarity towards a specific website and could only be detected by the
“indirect” method.
Testing Methodology
When testing the performance of our detector we were mainly interested in the detection
rate depending on the image comparison method used. In general this means the true pos-
itives (phishing websites detected) and the false positives (original websites accidentally
detected as a phish). As an additional metric within our measurements we were not only
able to determine whether a detector was able to correctly detect a phishing website but we
could also check whether the website was matched to the correct parent website or brand
– please see section 5.1.3 for an explanation of the differences between parent websites and
brands. Using this brand matching as a metric we did several different measurements to find
out about the detector performance: For the direct and indirect conditions we checked for
each phishing website whether a lookup against the list of phishing websites (indirect) or
original websites (direct) would return the most similar result from the same brand as the
website tested. We also did a third test where we tested half of the elements of the phishing
list (randomly selected) as a subset against an index consisting only of the other half of the
phishing websites to see how the index size would affect the result. All those tests only gave
us a number about the true positives that are achieved with each given comparison method.
To get to know something about the false positives too, we had to use a combined index of
phishing and original websites. In case of such a test the similarity threshold value is of
great importance as depending on the threshold one could always achieve that every phishing
website would be detected at the cost of having a lot of false positives. A good metric here is
to find the equilibrium threshold at which the number of false positives and false negatives
is equally high as this point can be taken as a standardized value to compare detector quality.
It has to be noted that in some cases the query image has also been part of the test set when
querying some indexes. In such cases we ignored this first result – as it was always a perfect
match – and used the second search result for our measurements.
Besides all those detection performance measures we also tested other parameters that play
an important role when building such a system. These were: the average time needed to
create a search index entry from a given screenshot; the index size an added entry had
on average and finally the time a similarity query towards the index took. When adding
images to an index we always provided a full resolution screenshot to the indexing function
of LIRe. If the image descriptor needed a smaller resolution of the images the computation
of this image was part of the insertion time measured. All our computations were done on
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Windows 7 machines having an Intel i7 860 CPU and 8 GB of RAM with no other major
tasks running in the background.
Detection Results
A huge problem that we faced when doing our detection was that LIRe does not return a
similarity score within a predefined range (e.g. from 0 to 1) but instead returns a distance
value of the compared images that is dependent of several parameters of the image compari-
son method. A distance of 0 denotes two equal images in the reference system of this image
comparison method. A maximum distance value does not necessarily exist as this can be
dependent of many factors. To still be able to compare the results of the different detectors
against each other we chose to normalize our detection results. To do so, we calculated all
distance values for our different indexes and measurements. Afterwards we identified the
maximum distance value for each feature and used it to assign a final similarity score by
dividing each distance by the maximum of all distances and subtracting the result from 1:
similarity f eature(i) = 1− distance f eature(i)max_distance f eature . After doing this we had a similarity score ranging
from 0 (not at all similar) to 1 (equal).
Looking first at the results besides detection performance, the different image descriptors
performed very differently. Whilst an average addition of an image to the Gabor index took
only 55 ms on average addition to the JPEG coefficient index took more than a second. When
adding thousands or millions of entries to an index this may play an important role. Looking
at the size of the inserted entries Tamura and CEDD outperformed all other detectors having
in average only 0.15 KB of data per image in the index while the Auto Color Correlogram
needed more than 4 KB per indexed item. Querying the indexes seems to be very related to
the size of the index as Tamura was again fastest here (2.8 ms/query) and ACC again slowest
(87.8 ms). The results for all detectors can be found in the first three columns of table 5.15.
The rest of table 5.15 shows the results of our different performance tests using different
features. Testing all phishing websites against an index containing the original websites
the color layout descriptor performed best, finding the correct parent website for 31.7%
of all phishing websites (Gabor was worst). Comparing the phishing websites against the
phishing/blacklist index using the indirect approach, the ACC feature returned a phishing
website of the same brand in 90.9% of all cases. Using half of the phishing websites as a
potential blacklist it still achieved a performance of 87.5%. When using an index containing
both types of websites (phishing and original) the ACC feature returned a website of the
same brand in even 92.2% of all cases.
All these values looked at the most similar of all websites that were returned without taking
the exact similarity scores into account. We hence tested only phishing websites against
those indexes. To get a real comparison about how the false positives and false negatives
would look like, one has to look at the detection rates dependent of the similarity scores.
Using a threshold of 0.81 using the ACC feature one could achieve an equilibrium where
11% of all phishing websites would stay undetected and 11% of all original websites would
cause a wrong phishing alert. The false positive and false negatives values according to the
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Add Add Query Original Phishing Phishing All Opt. Opt.
Feature [ms] [kb] [ms] [%] [%] split [%] [%] Thresh FP/FN
SCD 68 0.27 3.7 6.69 50.9 48.83 41.22
CLD 69 0.49 6.3 31.67 89.45 85.96 90.2 0.86 0.13
EH 91 0.32 5.0 24.76 86.98 82.91 87.73 0.81 0.15
CEDD 127 0.15 5.5 22.37 87.32 83.57 85.9 0.95 0.14
FCTH 158 1.51 13.8 11.99 82.79 80.24 80.52 0.96 0.14
JCD 220 1.32 13.2 22.81 87.76 84.35 87.43 0.96 0.14
Histo 66 2.01 46.2 16.79 89.43 85.57 89.79 0.97 0.13
JPEG 1157 0.76 8.3 10.63 86.12 81.58 86.29 0.98 0.14
ACC 698 4.02 87.6 21.51 90.87 87.51 92.15 0.81 0.11
Gabor 55 0.48 10.9 4.47 75.13 70.48 72.69 0.99 0.23
Tamura 165 0.15 2.8 6.74 79.54 75.19 79.07 0.99 0.16
Table 5.15: Performance measurements and detection rates for the eleven different im-
age features. From left to right: average time of adding an image to an index; average
space needed by an image in the index; average time taken for performing a similarity
query; percent of phishing websites correctly assigned when testing against the index
of original websites (direct); percentage when testing against the phishing index (in-
direct); percentage when splitting the phishing test set into halves; percentage when
testing against phishing and non-phishing; equilibrium threshold and resulting false pos-
itive/negative value at this threshold. The best value of a given test is colored green the
worst red.
moving threshold can be found in figure 5.42. The same results plotted as a ROC curve can
be found in figure 5.43. Please refer to section 1.4 for an explanation of the diagram types.
Detector Discussion
Looking at the performance values only, Auto Color Correlogram (ACC) outperformed the
other image comparison features in most cases. Only in case of the original websites it
ranked fifth. Taking the non-detection parameters into account ACC was by far the slow-
est detector and took double the time of second slowest detector (Histogram). Combining
those findings with the findings of the Color Layout Descriptor one can see that this one
performed quite well in terms of speed and was even ranked best when checking against the
original websites. In all other detection domains CLD was only a little worse than the ACC
image comparison. We would hence recommend to use the color layout descriptor (CLD)
for practical use.
Looking at the false positive and false negative thresholds an equilibrium rate of 11% is not
acceptable for a practical field deployment. Missing one out of 10 phishing websites would
be critical but still somehow okay, but seeing an erroneous warning at every 10th website
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Figure 5.42: False positive and false negative percentages (y-axis) according to the the
varying detection threshold (x-axis) for each of the different image comparison features.
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Figure 5.43: True and false positive ratios of the different detectors depending on dif-
ferent thresholds plotted as a ROC curve.
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would be too much. By shifting the thresholds it would get possible to reduce the number
of false positives – original websites denoted to be phishing – close to zero when using a
threshold of approximately 0.5 (see figure 5.42). In return this would mean for most detectors
that they also would miss nearly all of the phishing websites. Only the JPEG and ACC based
detectors would still work to some extent. We believe that the problem here arises due to our
test set missing important images. Although we already tried to test everything with a large
test set, it is simply not enough to have only one screenshot of each original website in the
database. Login pages, start or landing-pages of websites look often a lot different from the
other pages of a website. We argue that in case one would increase the size of this testing
environment to a real world sample the approach would lead to remarkably better results.
When we looked at undetected phishing images in detail we saw that for a lot of attacks only
a specific screenshot was missing on either the black- or whitelist. Since the results from
our queries to the indirect indexes showed a high detection potential it would make sense
to use only this kind of detection in case no proper set of original websites is available as a
whitelist.
Another severe problem to this detection methods are websites that have elements that
change often. The Microsoft Bing19 search engine is one such example. It uses a full screen
background image that is changed every day. In such a case an image-based detector would
not work. Websites containing videos or other time-dependent media would also be a prob-
lem as the time the screeenshot is taken would influence the detection result. For such cases
one could use masking to filter out certain image regions before adding an image to the
database and reusing the same mask whenever comparing those images.
Another option to raise the detection results could perhaps arise from the combination of
different features or by the use of a feature specially crafted for website comparison.
Using the LIRe framework for the detection process the image comparison is still done
against all fingerprints of all images in the index. Even for our test set with over 5,000 images
the results were still available within milliseconds but the query time would rise linearly
(O(n)) as the number of stored images rises. Other practical projects like the Google image-
based20 search show that this can be done fast even with millions of images in a database.
If the structure of the image feature itself is known, it can be possible to arrange the image
fingerprints in a tree-like fashion and bring down the search time for a single image or
multiple similar images down to a tree lookup time that is usually O(log(n)).
The architecture that has been presented within this project would easily support all those
changes as the detection component can easily use other features or even be replaced by
another query method.
19http://www.bing.com
20http://google.com
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5.8.4 User Intervention Design
All prior efforts made to detect possible similar websites are useless if the results cannot
be properly reported towards the user, using a user intervention method. Given the visited
website, a similar website and its similarity score a lot of information exists that can possi-
bly help the user to take a final decision of whether or not she was tricked into visiting an
impersonating website. A first interface draft for our concept was already developed at the
beginning of the project and resorted to suggestions about designing usable security inter-
faces (see figure 5.39). To develop a final user intervention methodology we also conducted
a focus group to refine the design ideas before creating two final warning designs that were
evaluated afterwards.
Focus Group
In a focus group consisting of six participants (two female, all HCI students) we wanted to
find out which expectations these users would have towards such a kind of user intervention,
based on visual similarity of websites.
We started to discuss their general feelings about browser warnings with them before asking
them how they judge websites and which metrics they use when looking at similar pictures.
In case of websites professionalism, the layout, colors and fonts played an important role for
our participants.
After presenting the concept of our idea, the participants were asked to create their own
warning draft in the second phase of the focus group. We had not shown them any of our
previous drafts up to that point and only provided them with diverse kinds of pen and paper
material to craft their designs. After finishing the design phase we showed our first drafts
and discussed pros and cons of all designs.
The popup style of our drafts was disliked by most of the participants as they felt annoyed
by appearing popups no matter what kind of information was contained in such a window.
They still wanted to see less text and were unsatisfied that the dialog’s confirmation options
were of equal importance. They wanted to have a dialog design that would make it harder to
choose the unsafe option without annoying users too much. A few participants of the focus
group found it confusing to have two screenshots visible within the warning window at once.
Final Designs
Taking all the findings from the focus group into account we finally created two different
warning designs for our user intervention method. The main difference between both inter-
faces was that one showed the screenshot of the currently visited website at first sight while
the second design hid that screenshot in a pop out section and users saw only the safe option
in the beginning. Figure 5.44 shows these two different final designs. The final dialog that
we created is not a popup dialog as in our first drafts but is instead loaded in the content area
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of the browser instead of the website that should actually be loaded. Using a large red back-
drop the warning can immediately be recognized. In the first version of our dialog (A) we
show the screenshots of the website the user has tried to reach and the website that is most
similar to that one side by side. As a safe option the found original website is shown larger
with a green bar and a checkmark attached to it. The website that is suspected to be phishing
is shown smaller, semi-transparent and with an information icon to state that this is not the
suggested option. To acknowledge the change of plans and switch to the safe website the
user only needs to click once on the suggested thumbnail. If she wants to stay on the current
website two clicks are needed. The first click on the semi-transparent option enlarges the
screenshot and makes it 100% visible. With a second click this option can finally be chosen.
In case of our second design (B) we only show the suggested original website at first glance.
To ignore the warning the user has to open up a hidden part of the dialog – that contains
additional information – where she can find the screenshot of the current website. In this
case two clicks are again needed to override the warning when not choosing the safe option.
For both warnings we also needed to create a dialog depicting the “indirect” case in which
the original has been found because the phishing website looks similar to another already
known phishing website from a blacklist. In those cases we showed both phishing images
next to each other. The similarity score is placed differently in such a case as the similarity is
measured between the two phishing websites and not between the original and the phishing
website.
5.8.5 User Intervention Evaluation
To evaluate this user intervention methodology we wanted to not only find out which version
of our dialog would be better but also measure how well the concept of the visual similarity
comparison would help people to decide correctly they should stay on a misclassified phish-
ing website (false positive) or change towards the original website in case they landed on an
impersonation attempt (true positive).
Evaluation Methodology
We did not use a lab or field study in the surroundings of the university this time but tried
an interactive virtual online study using Amazon Mechanical Turk21 instead. We prepared
a within-subject experiment with three different independent variables. The dialog version
(A or B) was the first independent variable. Besides this, we had direct or indirect phishing
detection that was tested and finally a warning could be true positive or could have appeared
in error (false positive). These three independent variables with two levels each, led to a total
of eight different test cases.
As dependent variables we measured the final decision a user took when seeing our warn-
ings and a lot of other parameters, like the clicks that were carried out, or the time frame
21http://www.mturk.com
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A (direct) A (indirect)
B (direct) B (indirect)
Figure 5.44: The two final designs of our warnings derived from the findings of the
focus group. Version B does not show the current website at first sight an instead hides
it in an additional section of the warning. Both warnings had two different versions to
illustrate the possibilities of direct or indirect phishing detection.
our warning was visible before it was dismissed. To show our warnings to users online, it
was not simply possible to install the complete plugin within their browsers. Instead, we
created a virtual browser window within the users browser that was then used to display
the warning screens and the websites. The browser was not fully interactive. Instead, the
browser chrome was created by using a screenshot of a browser looking just as if the user
would be visiting a certain URL. All security indicators and the URL looked as if the user
would be visiting a real website. For the content area of the virtual browser we also used a
screenshot of the whole content of the respective website. With such a setup the participants
could scroll through the content in case it was larger than the browser window. However,
the virtual browser itself did not allow any interactivity (like clicking on links or buttons). It
had a size of 1023x766 pixels and hence fitted completely in the browser window of users
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having resolutions above 1280 by 1024 and even on 1024 by 768 users were still able to
experience the virtual browser window if they set their own browser to fullscreen. We mon-
itored the participants’ browser resolutions and did only display our virtual browser if their
browser window was large enough to fully display our virtual browser. In other cases we
displayed instructions about how to enlarge the browser window and what resolution would
be necessary.
After a user had seen the virtual browser pointing to one website for a total of four seconds
we opened our warning dialog. As we saw with our detector evaluation, the whole detection
process using our client-server architecture could easily take a small while which was sim-
ulated by that. The warning message was fully interactive as it would be in a final browser
implementation and stayed in front of the virtual browser until it was dismissed by either
leaving to the recommended website or by choosing the icon of the current website to stay
on that website. After having chosen one of the options the participants received a confir-
mation code they needed to go on with the study and had to answer two free text questions
about what they experienced and why they took their decision.
We presented our eight different cases in random order using eight different websites for
testing that are regularly suffering from phishing impersonation attacks (see table 5.16).
Browser images for a phishing and an original state of all websites were used. In case the
user was on a phishing website the only safe option to choose was the original website. In
case of an original website our warning appeared in error and hence choosing to stay on
the website would have been the more logical option. However, in any case choosing the
safe option of changing to a trustworthy website would never denote a risk for the user. In
such error cases we randomly picked another website that was proposed together with a low
similarity score.
As always we hid the original purpose of the study and advertised it to be about “The Future
Web Browser”. We only asked our participants to use an interactive demo of a new web-
browser the same way they would, when browsing the Internet for themselves. Prior to
the real tasks we always displayed a first test task showing google.com as a website with a
standard popup that appeared that had to be dismissed. We did this so our participants could
get used to the interactive browser setup.
A major difference to other studies was that we did not set a goal for the participants that
they should achieve. In prior projects we used our “grandma is ill” scenario for example
to justify why people should carry out some tasks online. Instructing people directly to
carry out a task is often seen as forcing them to deliberately ignore security problems [271].
Within this study people did not know whether their goal was to actually stay on the current
website, so they had to reason about it when seeing our dialog.
The whole study process was guided by a survey that started with some demographic infor-
mation questions and finally debriefed the participants and asked questions about the concept
and the different designs.
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# Brand Type URL
Original httpsLDDwwwvpaypalvcomDukDcgi7binDwebscrEcmdN_home%localevxNen_GB
Phishing httpsLDDwefixmoneyvcomDtrackingDbunDsigninvhtml
Original httpsLDDsigninvebayvcomDwsDeBayISAPIvdllESignIn%ruNhttpACAAHFAHFwwwvebayvcomAHF
Phishing httpLDDwwwvzealcomcapitalvcomDK40K40K40K40KD
Original httpsLDDeuvbattlevnetDloginDenDErefNhttpsACAAHFAHFeuvbattlevnetAHFaccountAHFmanagementAHF
Phishing httpLDDeuvdiablovnetvyo7loginvinDloginvhtmlEappNwam%refNhttpsLDDwwwvworldofwarcraftvcomDaccountD%
Original httpsLDDwwwvhsbcvcovukD DHDPutDpDc!DW1_SB4K4xLLMKMSSzPy4xBzKCPWosCgDgzAfSycDUy4LAzND
Phishing httpLDDwwwvradiorisalahvcomDnewDpluginsDcontentDdataDhsbcDIBloginvhtm
Original httpsLDDwwwvnwolbvcomDdefaultvaspxErefereridentNCCK!FF DAADW A0 A WHF1B5KWFD0HE5BH5EH4
Phishing httpLDDwwwvsbdithailandvcomDwp7includesDimagesDcrystalDindexvhtm
Original httpsLDDwwwvwellsfargovcomD
Phishing httpLDDtandavkrishnavcomDextrasDwwwvwellsfargovcomDindexvhtm
Original httpsLDDsteamcommunityvcomDloginDhomeDEgotoNappsACFlACDenglish
Phishing httpLDDusersvatwvhuDlCCtD
Original httpsLDDretailvsantandervcovukDLOGSUK_NS_ENSDBtoChannelDrivervssobtoEdse_operationNameNLOG
Phishing httpLDDherfschoolingvorgDglobal7education7themeDsitesDdefaultDfilesDsantandervphp
NatWest
WellsBFargo
Steam
Santander
2
1 PayPal
eBay
Battlevnet
HSBC
8
7
6
5
4
3
Table 5.16: A list of the eight different brands and the respective URLs used within the
user study to evaluate the user intervention concept for visual similarity. For each brand
an original URL and a phishing URL was needed as the brands were randomly used as
phishing or non-phishing between the participants.
Evaluation Results
We had 50 turkers (the Amazon Mechanical Turk users) that finally completed our study (in
case someone dropped out mid-way through we recruited another person). 18 participants
were female. Most participants came from the US and India with an average age of 31 years
(20 to 64). In average they used the Internet for 7 hours per day and had diverse occupations.
They stated to have good Internet knowledge (average 4.3 SD 0.8) on a Likert scale from
1-“strongly disagree” to 5-“strongly agree”.
As each participant had to take eight decisions of staying or leaving on the website we
collected 400 decisions in total. 277 decisions could be classified as correct (meaning the
participants chose the option that was best for the given case). This leaves us with 123
“incorrect” decisions that have to be split again as only cases where people deliberately
wanted to stay on a phishing website were really problematic. We only had seven of those
(3.5% of the incorrect decisions). In all other cases people chose to change the website to
the one suggested although staying would have also been safe and would have made more
sense.
In nearly all phishing cases (97%) the participants correctly chose the suggested option to
change the website but even more interesting is that they still chose the discouraged option
in 42% of the error cases of our warning. Despite we had not provided the participants with
the goal to navigate to a certain web page they still were able to reason about the current
situation of the warning correctly in many cases and did not blindly click on the preferred
option.
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For the phishing cases we did not find a difference between version A (97% correct) and
version B (96% correct). In case of the error cases version A seemed to work better (49%
correct) than version B (35% correct). Direct or indirect warnings did also not play a big
role (correct decisions: 69.5% direct vs 69% indirect).
Looking at how long the dialogs stayed open the decisions using version A were usually
done faster (19.9 seconds average vs 21.7 seconds for version B). Incorrect decisions were
also done faster due to some participants that had seemed to have skipped through the ques-
tionnaire as fast as possible.
Compared to the data type based study in subchapter 5.5 a lot more people unfolded the
hidden section in our dialogs this time (103 times in total; 68 times for version B; 35 times
for version A). The higher number for version B results from the fact that in those cases this
section was needed to skip the warning.
Asking people after the debriefing for their favorite dialog style 68% favored version A.
Considering the very good measurements of version A we had actually expected an even
higher number. One participant that chose A over B put it like this: “[Using A one can]
see the problem and does not have to read about it.” Version B was seen as being less
complicated and drawing the users attention more towards the safer option.
Analyzing our results statistically using the Cochrans Q-Test for within-subject tests with
binary outcomes, the detection measurements differed significantly (Q = 150.7, p < 0.001).
With a McNemar posthoc test (Bonferroni corrected) we found that the dialog version (χ2 =
5.30, p = .030) and the provided correctness of our detector (χ2 = 99.7, p < .001) were
significant whilst direct or indirect detection had no significant influence.
As a last evaluation step we looked into the reasons for the incorrect decisions of our par-
ticipants by classifying the textual reasons they had given after each decision. 21% of the
123 incorrect answers had to do with participants being in a hurry. One comment said for
example: “just clicked the green option to get the confirmation code”. We did not remove
those participants from the results as we thought that real users could also behave in such
a hurrying way. Fear was the biggest reason for wrong decisions (26%). The participants
sometimes were so convinced of our browser mockup that they “chose the safe option to not
get any problems”. In 11% of the wrong decisions of version B the participants did not find
the option to stay on the website that they were actually looking for.
5.8.6 User Intervention Discussion
The use of visual similarity as an explanation for impersonation warnings seems to work
very well. Although we did not provide a specific goal to our participants they were in many
cases able to find the situations when it did not make sense to follow the prominent option.
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Although our study used eight repeated exposures to relatively similar looking warnings the
average time a warning was opened did not decrease throughout the study and was always
approximately 20 seconds. This confirms that the warning generates low habituation.
Within most measurements the warning design A showing all screenshots next to each other
outperformed the design B. In some cases the hidden option to stay on the current website
was not found by our participants in version B. Although some participants mentioned that
version A could confuse people more easily we did not find any hints for that when looking
at the interaction times or the number of correct and incorrect decisions.
5.8.7 Research Results
Within this project we looked at an overall concept for phishing detection and user interven-
tion using the visual content similarity as means for both. Especially the user intervention
concept worked very well and the participants were even able to handle simulated error cases
quite well. In case the detector accuracy could be increased more by using different detec-
tors or a larger screenshot set, such a kind of phishing detection and user intervention will
definitely be very understandable and robust.
DD What is Phishing Detection?
Within this project we used the very classical approach of measuring false positives and false
negatives when detecting phishing websites. To help the users in understanding the attack
more closely and guide them towards a safe exit an additional parameter can be used in the
phishing detection, namely the brand of the impersonated party. If a detector is not only able
to distinguish between malicious websites and original websites but can also find out what
original website is associated with each attack it becomes possible to automatically redirect
the user towards the intended goal.
DH How can HCI be Used to Build Detectors?
As seen many times in this thesis before, the visual channel and the content area of the
browser is the most important means of legitimacy judgments for Internet users. This makes
it not only a perfectly suited property for user intervention but it can also be used for the de-
tection process. On the opposite having the same means for detection as for reporting makes
it possible to easily align the user’s conceptual model and the implementation model [54].
As security is always a construct that is hard to understand this kind of model alignment can
be very helpful when developing security measures.
DM How can Detectors Be Evaluated?
Instead of evaluating let alone our detection concept, we tested a variety of different image
comparison features for their suitability towards detecting phishing websites. In case of this
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project the false positives and false negatives were not the only sensible measurement that
could be taken and even in case of these measurements the interchangeable threshold played
an important role. Knowing the exact brands that were assigned to each of the test websites
it became possible to measure how well the brand recognition did work using a whitelist for
direct comparison and a blacklist for indirect comparison.
Besides these measurements about the detection quality other metrics can also play an im-
portant role for the evaluation of a detector. How long does it take to generate the image
detection indexes? How much space do these need depending on the detector? How long
does a query to such a detector take? Although these questions might be somehow sec-
ondary at first sight, phishing detection is a time critical process and could not be used in
case a detector would take several seconds for the detection.
DE What Kind of Detection Works Best?
Within this project we were not able to prove that visual similarity based detection is evi-
dently the best working detection method so far, but it has several properties that make it
stand out of other detectors that have been developed. By using the most important criterion
for a user to judge a website it gets possible to use detector information directly to inform
the user about the result in a way that is easily understandable. Another advantage of such an
approach is that there are no technical means an attacker could take to adapt to the detection
process without also lowering the impersonation quality of his attack.
DR What Detection Overhead and Thresholds are Reasonable?
For each of our detectors we calculated an equilibrium threshold that could would lead to
an equal number of false positives and false negatives. These values were very high for all
detectors. A false positive that would appear on every 10th website would greatly disturb the
user during his browsing routines. Even when changing the threshold towards less frequent
appearing false positives the number of correctly detected phishing websites also drops to a
large extent.
For detector comparability the equilibrium threshold is actually a good measurement but
normally it should not be used as a threshold for the user intervention method. The user
intervention method itself should always try to minimize the number of errors that appear
on original sites to a minimum even if that means that a few more phishing websites stay
unreported. If too much habituation towards a user intervention method occurs it can easily
happen that none of the interventions will be regarded anymore by the users rendering it
completely useless even in the correct cases.
We suppose that by using a more complete data set and a better detector component these
values can be easily brought down and in combination with other means like URL whitelists
the computing and error overhead could also be reduced easily.
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IH How can HCI be Used to Enhance User Intervention Mechanisms?
The visual channel and the content representation are the important properties when a user
judges the authenticity of websites. Using these parameters to explain possible security flaws
can hence greatly enhance the understanding of warnings. Within this overall approach we
used these parameters for both the detection of phishing websites and the user intervention
method.
IM How can User Intervention be Measured?
Within this project we did not conduct a local lab or field study but performed an online study
using Amazon Mechanical Turk instead. With a virtual browser that was displayed within
the participants’ own browsers we tested how people would react to the displayed warning
messages. To make such an online test feasible we had to use a more abstract browser repre-
sentation than we would have been able to use in a real world study. However, the warning
messages themselves were not affected by that in any way. Whenever possible the browser
interactivity should not be reduced as this limits the users’ access to browser functions they
might have eventually used to resolve the security issue. As we were exclusively interested
in the user behavior within our warning screens such a kind of study became possible and
hence yielded a lot of other advantages. Using an online study a large base of test users
can be quickly recruited. Being Internet users from around the world they denote a proper
sample of the target audience for such a test.
IE How to Enhance User Intervention Quality?
For a user intervention method to be successful it is important that the users can understand
the problem that has occurred to make them able to take a correct decision. Using a metric
that is well understood by them – visual similarity in this case – is a great example for a well
working user intervention method. Another important design decision for better quality is
to offer the safe option of a dialog more prominently without making it too complex to ever
reach it in case of errors that could appear. In our case a first click plus a short time for an
animation to complete was needed to activate the less secure option before it could finally
be chosen. Completely hiding an option from a user (as we did in version B) may introduce
problems for some users that are confident of skipping the error message but are then unable
to find this option.
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5.9 The User Study Web Browser
This chapter is based on the work that was part of the bachelor thesis “Creating a Web Browser for
User Studies on Security” by the student Alexander Gundermann [114].
Definition
Measurement
Enhancement
Reason
HCI
Phishing
Detection
User
Intervention
DH
DM
DH
IE
ID
IM
IR
DE
DR
IH
Many of today’s developed anti-phishing tools are browser based.
The related work chapters 3.5 and 3.6 reported about some of those
projects and other projects in this thesis also created browser user
interfaces that had to be evaluated (see subchapters 5.2, 5.5, 5.6,
5.8). When evaluating such tools and interfaces in a user study
researchers want to see how people react when the tool warns them
about a potential phishing website and whether they are stopped
from disclosing their private data – in other words whether the
user intervention works.
5.9.1 Web Browsers Usage in Today’s Experiments
Generally speaking one could simply present the user with real existing websites and monitor
the users’ behavior when visiting those. When doing this, a lot of parameters are important
(e.g. not disclosing the fact that security is the main goal of the study). Many of those pa-
rameters have been discussed earlier (see section 3.7) and recommendations for their correct
use will also be given later (see section 7.2). In this section we will present a solution for the
problem that using existing websites for such a study is not as easy as it might look like.
Sending the user to non-malicious websites within a study might not denote a big problem
in general, but as phishing tries to gather personal data the original websites that would be
needed for such a study usually contain login or order forms. If the backend web server
of such a study is not under the control of the researcher, it might get hard to carry out
such a study, as a login with a username and password could fail and depending on the
scenario of the study the user will need to perform actions within such a website (e.g. buying
something). Making all this happening on real websites will sooner or later yield problems.
Another possible problem would be a change of the website functionality or design while
the study is in progress. Such an uncontrollable change may affect the experiment outcome.
Summing this up, it would be best to have full control over the non-malicious websites.
For phishing websites the same problems exist and additionally it would definitely not be a
good idea to have participants loose their credentials to real phishers within a research study
context. Instead of design changes it is also most likely that a phishing site will go offline
during the course of a running experiment.
To solve all those problems researchers have come up with various solutions for their exper-
iments in the past:
• Screenshots: In some user studies the researchers tested their new concepts with
screenshots of browsers rather than with an actual running browser. People are shown
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screenshots of different situations and have to reason about what they think and what
actions they probably would perform next. Biddle et al. [29] did such a kind of study
when evaluating a new kind of SSL certificate information window. A big advantage
of the use of screenshots is that the websites and imagery used can be best controlled.
In case it is needed to have a different URL than the one of the page actually pho-
tographed it is possible to simply merge different kinds of screenshots or introduce
changes using a photo editing software. A big problem with such a kind of evaluation
is the missing interactivity. The participants cannot interact with the browser as they
normally would and actions they would possibly take, have to be described verbally
instead of just recording what interactivity would really be performed.
• Simulated Browser: A more advanced option is to create a simulated browser. Wu et
al. [324] created such a ‘virtual browser in the browser’. They used HTML to generate
a real looking browser within a browser window that users could interact with. Using
this method they had full control over the browser interface and the content, whilst
still having a certain degree of interactivity. Such a simulated browser was also part of
our project evaluation in the previous subchapter 5.8. The downside of this method is
that it will never get possible to model all different aspects of a browser within such
a graphical fake browser and even if it was possible, it would still run inside another
larger browser window finally distracting the user.
• Registering Own Domains: In case the experiment only needs domains that are not
yet registered by other companies the researchers could simply register those domains
and host their own (phishing) websites there. For legal reasons the access to those
websites should still be restricted to experiment participators in a way (e.g. using
an IP-whitelist). The problem with this method is that for most experiments original
non-malicious websites should also be used which are already registered. Egelman et
al. [78] used this approach and registered their own phishing domains.
• Rerouting Contents on Network Level: The most prominent idea used to display
arbitrary websites within a real world browser, is by using network traffic diversion in
various ways to make the browser load different content than it would normally load.
One possibility is to use a proxy server that sits between the experimental browser and
the target websites and diverts all traffic in both directions. A proxy server is gener-
ally able to modify the content of every request and result that passes it. Requests that
should go to a non-malicious website can be intercepted and replaced by answers com-
ing from another source instead – used by [259]. A problem with proxy servers is that
they cannot alter the content of an encrypted connection without the browser noticing
it. This means that for SSL connections this is not really an option. The same effect
as with a proxy server can be achieved using the hosts file [304] of the experiment
computer. This file can be used to divert HTTP requests to other IP destinations than
they would usually go to in case of using the answer from a standard DNS request. A
request to an existing domain could hence be diverted to a different computer answer-
ing this request. In this case the connection can even be encrypted with a self-signed
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certificate to simulate an encrypted connection. This approach has been used in our
project described in subchapter 5.5 and by other researchers (e.g. Dhamija et al. [67]).
The only downsides of this approach are that the effort for changing all the necessary
settings is relatively high but even worse is still the fact that it is impossible to fake
extended validation certificates and that the certificate info will always show that the
certificate is not the same as the one from the original website.
• Building an Own Browser: In some cases researchers built a whole web browser for
their experiment or modified the code of existing web browsers to change the behavior
in the way they needed it. Sobey [269] modified the source code of the open source
Firefox browser to integrate custom designs in different own builds whilst Sunshine
et al. [280] replaced the warning screens of the Internet Explorer browser which are
stored in a library of the browser. Even though these attempts are a lot of work, they
provide the most original interactivity whilst fully integrating the experiment aspects
that are investigated. These approaches are also similar to what we will present in the
current chapter.
5.9.2 Universal Browser Manipulation
As one can see from the previous examples, diverting website traffic and faking security in-
formation on a network level is very hard and sometimes even impossible. This is by design
as network security and certificates should be able to guarantee that the traffic originated
from an intended sender. We argue that such manipulations can be done much more easily
on the software more specifically the user interface level.
For the purposes of future user studies and as a proof-of-concept we tried to build a browser
extension that can be used to make any browser security or connection indicator look like
as if website traffic originated from any other given source. We called this developed plugin
“certificate faker extension”.
The three main goals when building the plugin where:
• URL Spoofing: With a URL spoofing component it is possible to make any website
look like as if it has been loaded from any other given source. This can be used to
make websites loaded from a lab web server look like as if an original website has
been loaded or it can even be used to create perfect phishing websites by changing the
URL of an original website to something that looks like a phishing website.
• Certificate Spoofing: Making the security indicators of a browser look like as if they
have a certain status was the biggest problem of the methods used by researchers so
far. For experiments it should possible make the security indicators look like if any
arbitrary certificate is loaded and the indicators should all represent the respective
security status (e.g. an EV-SSL certificate has been validated).
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• Customizability: Finally it was of importance to be able to customize all these options
easily without having to recompile the browser for every change or even to support a
large number of different websites throughout a longer user study.
5.9.3 Developing the Extension
To achieve our goal of such a browser modification we saw three different possibilities with
different advantages and disadvantages:
• Recompiling the Browser: Since the Firefox browser is open source and as previous
researchers had also had success for their research by recompiling the browser with
extensions to suite their needs [269] we considered this option first. The trusted certifi-
cate authorities for example are precompiled within the browser source code and can
only be changed by recompiling it completely. In fact, recompiling such a large piece
of software is a tough piece of work and each modification to the code would have to
be reapplied with each new version of the browser that would be released. Although
such a modification would have worked out, we found out that there was no need at
all to replace the certificate authorities since we were only interested in manipulating
the visual appearance of the security indicators.
• Changing JavaScript Browser Components: The whole visual appearance of the
Firefox browser is produced by a JavaScript based frontend. This code is not com-
piled into the executable at compile time but is instead loaded from an additional file
called “omni.jar” at runtime. This archive can simply be opened and altered and if
the files are extracted into the root directory of the browser they are even used in the
uncompressed state. The problem here still is that modified files in this archive would
be changing in future version of the browser and hence the changes would also have
to be reapplied with each new browser version.
• Building a Firefox Extension: Firefox extensions are plugins that can be installed
into the Firefox browser and add certain functionality to the browser that can be be-
yond what standard JavaScript of a website is allowed to execute. An API documenta-
tion22 of Mozilla reports the functions that can be used to access for example cookies
or the stored history or even write to files or databases. After some tests we found out
that the JavaScript code of Mozilla and the JavaScript code of extensions are executed
with the exact same security privileges in the exact same context sharing all variables
and namespaces. As extensions are loaded after the main browser components have
been loaded it gets even possible to shadow23 existing functions and replace them with
22https://developer.mozilla.org/
23 In programming, variables or functions can shadow previously created definitions of the same name [313].
In our case we shadowed existing functions of the browser such that the browsers own routines would call
our new methods instead.
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own code. This is also true for functions related to the visual appearance of the se-
curity indicators. With those findings it gets easy to build a Firefox extensions that
would change methods in all internal JavaScript functions of the “omni.jar” wherever
needed. This will work for all future Firefox versions as long as no changes to the ex-
ecution policy of extensions or changes to the architecture of the respective functions
would happen.
Implementation
The most important handler for our plugin was to detect every change to a website that was
currently loaded in any of the windows or tabs of the browser. Whenever the website or the
URL changes, the visual indicators displaying the URL or the security indicators were then
adapted if necessary. Where possible we used officially documented listeners and otherwise
simply created our own listeners by overriding the native Firefox functions and calling the
overshadowed parent function with adapted parameters.
Spoofed Indicators
Throughout the browser we spoofed a lot of different security and location indicators to
make sure that the browsing experience is completely spoofed. In the address bar these
have been aside from the URL, the color, the label and the status of the site identity icon.
The site identity icon is the colored area next to the URL bar that changes its size, text and
color whenever the user is connected to a server using a secure connection. In addition
to that we also had to spoof the mouse-over text that is displayed when the user hovers
over this area (see figure 5.45 for the spoofed indicators). When clicking the site identity
button the user sees an identity popup window that provides more information about the
encryption of the connection (see figure 5.45). A “more information” button within this
dialog brings up a detailed dialog with properties of the security certificate. This window
and all its properties had to be spoofed as well (see figure 5.46). Besides all this SSL related
information the website URLs had to be replaced in all other places. Whenever the user
hovers a link in a website the target URL is displayed in the lower left corner of the browser.
This link target indicator also had to be spoofed as well as all links in the HTML source
code window.
Controlling the Spoofing
Controlling the plugin was either possible by a user interface (see figure 5.47) or by
JavaScript code (e.g. from another plugin). In both cases the user can specify two different
types of configuration components to setup the plugin:
• Certificate entries: The user can configure arbitrary virtual certificates (without hav-
ing them to be actually trusted by any certificate authority). In the configuration dialog
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Figure 5.45: Three different examples for the spoofing done with the certificate faker
extension. For these screenshots the loaded website is the usually SSL secured login
website of amazon.com. The URL in this case is rewritten to look like ebay.com and
the certificate status is set to either insecure (with mouse over [top]; popup identity
dialog [center]) and extended validation [bottom].
the certificate status can be easily selected ranging from the standard “insecure” con-
nection over the standard SSL-DV certificate and the extended validation (EV) cer-
tificate. The error states “security exception” and “mixed content” can also be used.
By setting other virtual certificates that have been previously created as a parent. It is
possible to construct a whole virtual certificate chain.
• Website entries: Using regular or wildcard expressions the user can define URLs that
are matched and afterwards replaced by a target URL. The part of any URL that is
matched by the expression is then replaced by the new URL part. Setting the expres-
sion to “ebay.com” and the target URL to “amazon.com” would result in eBay pages
looking like as if the were loaded from “amazon.com”. For each of those entries it
is also possible to set a fake certificate that overrides the certificate of the actual con-
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Figure 5.46: This dialog shows a spoofed certificate dialog window with a spoofed
PayPal certificate. The issuer fields have been filled with other text.
nection. As the replacement of the URLs is only done on the user interface level the
browser won’t report any errors that the certificate URL does not match the loaded
URL.
5.9.4 User Study: Validating the Extension
To test whether our modifications did work out and whether users would be able to recog-
nize the spoofed indicators in any way, we conducted a user study testing whether phishing
websites can now be shown as perfectly believable original websites (type 4) and whether
authentic websites can now be disguised as phishing websites (type 3). As control condi-
tions we additionally had unmodified original (type 1) and phishing websites (type 2) (see
table 5.17).
Besides the type of fake we used four different websites for our tests that were overall well
known and also popular phishing targets: paypal.com (A), facebook.com (B), ebay.de (C)
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Figure 5.47: The certificate faker user interface allows to create fake virtual certificates
entries that can afterwards be assigned to arbitrary websites. For each website URL
rewriting can also be configured.
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1 Authentic website 2 Phishing website
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Table 5.17: The four different conditions of spoofed
and unspoofed, authentic and phishing websites used
for our within-subjects experiment.
Original Phishing
A paypal.com pajpal.de
B facebook.com facebqpk.com
C ebay.de eblay.de
D amazon.de amazqn.deW
e
b
si
te
s
Table 5.18: The domain names
and corresponding phishing do-
main names used for the user
study.
and amazon.de (D). We assigned a possible phishing domain to each of the websites (see
table 5.18).
Study Methodology
We did a within-subject study with eight participants. Each participant saw each type of
website modification (1 to 4) combined with one of the websites (A to D). The design was
counterbalanced using two Latin squares that were combined and swapped for the second
half of the participants.
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The study was conducted in the lab on a standard computer running Windows 7 and Fire-
fox 8. Since we didn’t want to confront people with live and online phishing websites
(type 2) we created phishing websites on a local server and used the DHCP server of the
local network to divert the traffic to our local servers. This did not affect plugin testing.
We configured our plugin to not intercept the user interface for any websites in the original
conditions (type 1, type 2) but removed any encryption indicators when displaying original
websites as phishing (type 3) (as phishing websites are usually not encrypted). For phishing
websites we wanted to make look like the original we replicated the complete certificate
chain the original website has with our plugin (type 4).
Since we wanted to find out whether the most security aware user would be able to find our
modifications to the browser we primed our participants for security by telling them that this
study was about phishing. What we didn’t disclose to them in the beginning was the fact that
we had modified the browser with our plugin.
After signing a consent form and filling out a demographics questionnaire we calibrated
the eye tracker and let the participants examine each website. In between the websites we
wanted them to rate whether the website was phishing or not and how confident they were
with their decision (5-point Likert scale). They were allowed to interact with the browser in
any way they wanted.
Study Results
Three of our eight participants were female with an average age of 26 years (19 to 31). All
but one participant used Mozilla Firefox as their primary browser. On average the partici-
pants spent 6 hours on the Internet per day. All of our participants could explain the term
phishing but had never fallen victim to a phishing attack.
On average it took participants about 160 seconds to judge each website they were presented
with. Phishing websites were judged faster (avg. 95 seconds). Table 5.19 shows an overview
over the judgments that participants gave. Looking at the results one can see that for all
but two ratings our modified browser was able to fool people into thinking phishing sites
were originals or vice versa. In case of the phishing sites being manipulated to look like
the originals two people correctly decided that this website was phishing. But looking at
the assessments of the original unmodified website one can see that people also rated two
websites as being phishing here. We think that having primed our subjects for security and
to look out for phishing pages, they were in general more likely to rate websites as being
phishing. Two of the 32 decisions made had to be disqualified: as people were allowed
to freely use the browser two of them accidentally changed the website they had been on
navigating away from the phishing website to the original website. They then judged this
website instead of the one we had initially brought them to.
Concluding one can see that besides the random noise, people were not at all able to tell the
spoofed websites apart from the unmodified ones.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 Realrauthenticr
website PayPal amazon facebook eBay PayPal amazon facebook eBay
4 Phishingrfakedrtorlookr
authentic amazon PayPal eBay facebook amazon PayPal eBay facebook
2 PhishingrWebsite
facebook eBay PayPal amazon facebook eBay PayPal amazon
3 Authenticrwebsiter
fakedrtorlookrliker
phishing
eBay facebook amazon PayPal eBay facebook amazon PayPal
Participant
Correct Decision Wrong Decision Disqualified
Table 5.19: Decisions of the eight participants of the user study for the certificate faker
extension. In most cases participants answered correctly for the websites that have not
been modified and incorrectly in cases that had been modified by the extension.
5.9.5 Research Results
Although we were not able to use this study browser throughout the work that has been done
within prior projects of this thesis, this work clearly shows that there is a simple way of
conducting authentically looking phishing studies without having to compile ones own web
browser.
IM How can User Intervention be Measured?
Whenever building new methods of user intervention in the phishing domain it is important
to validate the work with a real user base. This means that users have to be confronted some-
how with potential malicious websites to see whether the intervention mechanisms work and
with original websites to see whether eventual errors in the intervention mechanisms can still
be detected by the user.
Over the last years researchers have come up with a wealth of mechanisms to create such
study situations (presented in section 5.9.1): Ranging from screenshots instead of real
browsers to completely re-engineered open source systems they all have their downsides by
either missing interactivity or validity. Although applicable in some situations, we showed a
more general solution in this chapter that is even easier to implement.
The core idea to this type of browser plugin is not to try to evade the network security
mechanisms on the network security level. As they are designed to withstand most attacks it
is close to impossible to successfully fake something like an extended validation certificate.
Since the user interface of the browser only shows a graphical representation of the network
traffic that is going on, it is much easier to change the visual indicators without affecting the
network traffic. We showed that this type of modification works well for all different kinds
of security indicators, hence allowing for most accurate experiment setups.
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Take Home Messages
å 5.1 Phishing Website Test Set: Phishing test sets are vital to understand the land-
scape of possible attacks and to test phishing detectors. A phishing test set should
cover many of the possible input variables a detector could make use of to make it
applicable to as many detectors as possible. The most important of these are URL,
HTML content, screenshots, domain info and linked content. Having a standardized
test set structure can make test sets interchangeable. The complete coverage of the
phishing landscape is another important point of a good test set: too small test sets
might suffer of grouping effects and tests missing original websites are not suitable
for testing false positives.
å 5.2 SecurityGuard Website Status Rollup: To find and evaluate new user interven-
tion concepts it is not always necessary to build a huge new kind of detector. Starting
off with a user centered design process by gathering ways that the users might want
to assess website security can yield new forms of user intervention and finally even
new forms of detectors. A rudimentary implementation of such a detector can already
help to gain a lot of insights for both the user intervention mechanism and the detec-
tor. Besides this, qualitative evaluation methods and field studies are very good means
to assess certain problems a specific concept might have, but in the end it does not
provide any insights about hard performance facts of the detection method or the user
intervention mechanism. Such measurements should always be done in combination
with another type of study.
å 5.3 Community-based Rating Intervention: Although the idea of community-based
website ratings for security and trust assessment of websites is already in productive
use we were not able to find large effects that our plugin score or even appearing warn-
ings were able to change or influence the participants attitude towards the websites.
This certainly does not have to mean that the concept does not work in general. It
could have also been due to the user intervention feedback in form of a small indi-
cator that we used. For future user interventions based on this a much more visible
feedback mechanism would be needed, especially in the case of critical ratings. Other
important findings here were that one simple value for such a security recommenda-
tion is not enough. The users want to see more reasoning for the given values. Who
was it who gave this rating and why? Individual comments might help in such cases.
Another example would be to include a kind of testimonial for each website written
by someone else.
å 5.4 Spell Checking to Detect Fraudulent Websites: URLs are a type of Internet
data that allow to detect phishing attempts to some extent. As many phishers apply
specific modifications to their domains to make them look more trustworthy this can
be used to detect those URLs that try to be similar to original URLs. A detection rate
of about 51% as achieved within this project is by far not enough for a stand-alone
detector and hence such a concept would need to be enhanced or coupled with another
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detector. Interestingly, the quality of a phishing attack seems to play an important
role for the evaluation of a phishing detector as some detectors might be able to detect
more attacks of higher quality (as in our case).
å 5.5 Data Type Based Security Dialogs: The involved data types within a website al-
ready tell a lot about whether a website can at all be an attack. Using such context data
makes it possible to ease detection a lot and bring down false positives. The number
of websites involving critical data is much more limited than the overall number of
websites that a user visits. Together with the concept of semi-blocking dialogs well
reasoned warnings can be brought up at the right moment in time at the right place.
However using the concept only with the data type filter and an empty whitelist, results
in too many false positives in the beginning that need to be reduced by other means.
å 5.6 Enhancing SSL Awareness in Web Browsers: Non-blocking indicators can in-
fluence users but a large area for the user feedback is needed such that the changes
of the indicator can be easily noticed. Since this feedback area is not needed for user
interaction the space of other interaction elements can be reused. We used background
images in the browser (Personas) in case of this project. Rolling the concept out as a
security plugin showed that more security professionals manage or dare to download
new security extensions than novice users. With such a kind of deployment it is hard
for new technologies and prototypes to reach the target audience of security novices.
å 5.7 Diminishing Visual Brand Trust: Getting the users’ focus towards non-blocking
indicators is hard but can be done from the outside of their focus attracting the users’
attention from there. Diminishing the users’ trust to the content area of the browser
where the actual focus is, did not bring any security improvements in our test. Alter-
ing the browser contents by changing logos and text did have an effect of confusing
participants but this confusion did not lead to more security attention.
å 5.8 Visual Image Comparison For Phishing Detection and Reporting: Visual simi-
larity as means for phishing detection already is able to detect a large number of phish-
ing websites by comparing the user’s current screen contents against a list of known
attacks and original websites targeted. However, this part of the protection process still
needs some future enhancements to end up at detection rates that are desirable. On the
user intervention side this concept seems to be the ne plus ultra as participants can eas-
ily understand what is going on and generate mature decisions out of the warnings, not
only leaving malicious websites but also recognizing detector errors to a large extent.
å 5.9 The User Study Web Browser: When testing user intervention methods in the
browser the way the user is presented with the new intervention concept is vital.
Screenshots of browser windows lack interactivity and do not allow the user to ex-
plore the concept to the fullest. Real web browsers were used in certain experiments
so far but usually with the downside that changes to the network traffic flow and the
security can often be detected by the participant. Using modifications to the visual
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notifications of the browser it is possible to create indistinguishable spoofed websites
that can then be used for any type of intervention experiment.
Chapter6
Aggregated Results and
Derived Recommendations
During each of the nine subchapters in chapter 5, I already gave project specific answers
towards each research question wherever applicable. Within this section I want to summarize
those findings again and paint the big picture of the answers to all the research questions. For
some of the research questions these findings lead to derived recommendations. Afterwards
I will take a brief look on how the results taken in the light of detecting phishing attacks,
can be transferred to more general problems of usable security. Finally, I will highlight the
important interaction that exists between detector and user intervention development and the
different stakeholders, presenting a new model of these dependencies in the last section of
this chapter.
6.1 Answers to the Research Questions
Figure 4.2 in chapter 4 gave an overview over the different research questions of this thesis
on both dimensions – phishing detection and user intervention. For convenience it is again
included within this chapter (see figure 6.1). The research questions of this thesis tried to
bridge the two often separated worlds within computer research of finding security solutions
and creating usable interface concepts – the user intervention. To bridge these two worlds
using an HCI perspective I looked at them on five different levels (definition, HCI, mea-
surement, enhancement and reason) and in the following I want to summarize the research
findings for each single one of those questions. I want to invite the reader to have a short look
back to chapter 4 to go over the details of these research questions again. I will reference the
involved projects by subchapter numbers (see figure 6.2 for a quick reference).
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IE
DD IDDefinition
Phishing
Detection
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Intervention
Measurement DM IM
Enhancement DE
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What is Phishing 
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How can Detectors 
Be Evaluated?
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Detection Works Best?
What Detection Overhead 
and Thresholds 
are Reasonable?
How can HCI be Used
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How can User Intervention
Be Enhanced?
What Is 
User Intervention?
How can User Intervention
be Measured?
When Should Intervention
Be Perfomed to Which 
Extent?
How can HCI be Used 
to Enhance Intervention 
Mechanisms?
Figure 6.1: Overview of the ten main research questions of this thesis being split up in
two dimensions on five different levels (duplicate of figure 4.2).
6.1.1 Phishing Detection
Phishing is not like many other computer security threats. It has a social engineering com-
ponent. This creates new problems but also offers new possibilities when creating detectors.
This section will provide answers towards the five research questions of the “phishing detec-
tion” dimension.
DD What is Phishing Detection?
In section 2.1 I already gave a lot of examples for the definition of phishing and included
my own definition of phishing for the course of this thesis. I understood phishing detection
within this thesis as the ability of a certain piece of software to automatically discriminate
given websites between being a phishing attack or being a non-malicious website.
In project 5.4 for example this piece of software was a detector that classified URLs into
potentially phishing or not. The piece of software hence solves a binary classification prob-
lem with using input parameters – here a URL. In project 5.8 the input towards the software
were screenshots of websites while project 5.2 used domain specific parameters. Detectors
presented in the related work chapter 3 used other means as an input. In sum these all are
attributes of a given website. A second component that might be used by a detector is the
user’s context – if known. In project 5.5 we used it as a filter for possible websites. Taking
all this into account phishing detection can be understood as a function mapping website
attributes and user context to a phishing result:
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5.7 Diminishing Visual Brand Trust
The content area of the web browser is the most important place for users to 
assess the trustworthiness of a website although it is easily impersonated. In 
case of this project we looked at whether small website content changes lead 
to a stronger focus on other security indicators in the browser.
5.8 Visual Image Comparison For Phishing Detection
The visual similarity of impersonating websites towards their original websites 
makes users often trust into these faked websites. We built a detector for 
phishing websites using visual similarity and tested different image features as 
well as a user intervention method for this kind of detection.
5.6 Enhancing SSL Awareness in Web Browsers
Non-blocking indicators are usually said to remain unnoticed by the users. 
This has been proven for lock icons and other smaller security indicators. 
Within this project we test this again by using the whole background of the 
browser user interface to report the SSL status. 
5.5 Data Type Based Security Dialogs
In this subchapter we take the advantage of the fact that phishing only 
happens if critical types of data (e.g. credit card numbers) are involved. This 
can be used for ltering incoming attacks and allows to create a user interven-
tion method that takes the users’ context into account. 
5.3 Community-based Rating Intervention
In real life people often ask others for security and privacy advice even about 
Internet websites. Can such a concept be used online and is it more attractive 
to users as they make use of it ofine? Within this project we built a user 
intervention method as a browser plugin and evaluated possible effects.
5.4 Spell Checking to Detect Fraudulent Websites
URLs are an important indicator for detecting phishing attacks as they cannot 
be as easily impersonated. Can similar looking URLs be used to detect phish-
ing attacks automatically? In this chapter we present a detector and its evalu-
ation that is based on URL similarity.
5.2 SecurityGuard Website Status Rollup
What technical properties of websites are interesting for users and how can 
they be offered towards them within a user intervention mechanism? Within 
this project we built a rating and reporting systems that displayed technical 
data concerning the current website within a status bar in the browser.
5.1 Phishing Website Test Set
Having an extensive phishing website test base is important for getting valid 
results for detector testing throughout the research. This chapter introduces 
into the important aspects of such a pishing test set and reports the process 
of a test set that has been built up during this thesis. 
5.9 The User Study Web Browser
Using live original and phishing websites in user studies brings along a variety of 
problems in a study setup that needs to fulll certain parameters. Within this 
project we built a browser plugin that makes it possible to mimic arbitrary secu-
rity situations and nally tested whether those changes can be detect.
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Figure 6.2: Overview of all projects carried out throughout this thesis each showing
which research questions have been covered (duplicate of figure 4.3).
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f (attributes(website),context info) =
{
1 if is phishing
0 if is NOT phishing
attributes(website) =

URL
HTML content
screenshots
domain info
linked content
· · ·

While we had this strong binary classification in project 5.4 the detector in project 5.8 was
able to return intermediate values of the website similarity. In case of such a detector out-
come a threshold value has to be defined that converts the results back to a binary result.
In many cases I was able to use the intermediate results of the detection process to explain the
binary detection result to the user (e.g. the different module results in project 5.2). Another
example for such an additional detection result can be a suggested original website (for a
detected phishing website). The detector that we developed in section 5.8 delivered possible
matching original websites that made it possible to present a safe escape path to the user. I
hence argue that the more intermediate values and details can be delivered by a detector the
easier it gets on the user intervention side to transform this data into working and meaningful
user intervention methods. Detectors that are built should offer access to intermediate values
generated.
Pre- and postfiltering of inputs and outputs of a detector may also be part of the phishing
detection process. In project 5.5 we filtered the website inputs only based on type of data
that was entered on the website and used a white-list as a second way of filtering. Although
no other means of detection were used the number of appearing warning messages quickly
reduced to 4.5% without other means of detection.
I think that these different aspects of phishing detection present the most important aspects
of what phishing detection is about. The final compiled model in subchapter 6.3 takes these
aspects into account.
DH How can HCI be Used to Build Detectors?
Taking the definition from the research question above into account no direct human in-
teraction with the detector is part of the detection process. However, I argue that the HCI
should be an integral part of detector development as usability observation can yield to better
detectors in two different ways:
In project 5.4 we developed our URL-based detector looking at the way the human attackers
craft their URLs by introducing typos and placing original URLs and brand names within
the URLs of their phishing websites a detection style that seems especially suitable for high
quality attacks. Project 5.8 made use of the observation that phishers most often try to closely
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mimic the look and feel of original websites. Looking at the behavior of attackers and how
they set up their attacks can hence be very useful to finding new kinds of counterattacks.
The second use of HCI in detector development is based on the fact that each detection
result in the end has to be presented to the user to take a final decision. We deliberately
extended many of our detectors within this thesis to yield results that can be used for the user
intervention method (cf. research question DD). The best results were achieved in project 5.8
where we used similarity scores, tentative original websites and website screenshots that
would be delivered from a detector and achieved 97% of true positive and even 49% of true
negative decisions for our warning design A. In project 5.2 we found the subdetector values
to display by interviewing users prior to creating the detector.
I recommend to take human properties of users and attackers into account the moment a
detector is developed. Incorporating the human properties already at the stage of building
a detector can greatly help to achieve model similarity between the implementation and the
conceptual model [54] and make the detector results more understandable towards the user.
Possible points of action to detect phishing are all the aspects of Internet communication in
general and most of them have been already taken into account by either research or practical
development. Within this thesis I often used properties that are very close to the actual user
interaction. No matter which properties are used it might make sense to take a look at what
the users think. Which properties actually are best for the detection and finally the user
intervention process will be subject to future research.
DM How can Detectors Be Evaluated?
Throughout this thesis different detectors have been built (projects 5.2, 5.4, 5.8). A gen-
eral measurement for the quality of such a detector is to use true and false positives and
negatives. Depending on the kind of detector different types of inputs towards the detec-
tor are necessary. In project 5.8 we used screenshots of the websites as an input while in
project 5.4 the URLs were the only necessary input variable towards our detector. The de-
tector in project 5.2 took mostly technical properties (e.g. traffic encryption, domain age)
but also some user based properties into account (e.g. number of prior visits). This shows
that depending on the detector a lot of different input variables are necessary.
For a lab testing of a detector hence a stable set of those inputs is needed (e.g. to test a
different detector over and over again). Testing with live data will mostly be problematic
as websites and especially phishing attacks change quickly which would result in different
testing results independent of the changes to the detector. In case a test set covers input types
for multiple detectors (as we did in project 5.1) it can be even used for direct comparison
between two different types of detectors.
I also found that although detector testing is very technical, qualitative feedback of users
can also be a property for detector evaluation. In combination with the test of the user
intervention method in project 5.2 the users mentioned that the location data was one of the
most important types of information for them. Location information was not used by our
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detector within this project but according to these results it possibly should have been used.
The target group of a detector result in a way is always the user, which is why the users’
expectations towards a detection process play an important role within the detection process.
The “quality” of an attack also has an influence on the detection result (as we saw in
project 5.4). In this case we had experts rate the “visual quality” of phishing attacks and
found different detection results for the different quality groups of our detector. This shows
a tendency towards attack quality being an important factor to include in detector evalua-
tions. However, future studies will be needed to show whether the quality of an attack really
has an impact on how well people fall for the attacks and how “phishing quality” can exactly
be defined.
In project 5.8 we also used the FP and FN equilibrium threshold value as a measure for de-
tector quality. I propose to use this value as means for detector comparison when reporting
detector results in scientific articles as it combines information from both FP and FN perfor-
mance in one value. Whether this value is a well working measure of detector quality will
need to be tested in further studies to see whether it reflects detector quality well enough.
From the experiences and findings within this thesis I compiled a list of recommendations
of how a test set should optimally look like – most of which I tried to fulfill in project 5.1:
1. A test set should always test the detector not only for true positives and false negatives
– how well it detects phishing attacks – but also for its behavior with original websites
– false positives and true negatives.
2. The number of test entries within the test set should also be rather high (I recommend
several thousand test entries) as collecting phishing websites over shorter periods of
time may introduce bias towards certain brands (see project 5.1).
3. Test set data should be collected as snapshots of the state of each website as the web-
sites and especially the availability of phishing websites change within minutes. Hav-
ing a snapshot can guarantee that the same test results can be reproduced during dif-
ferent executions of the testing process.
4. The test set should also be as unbiased as possible towards a detector. It should not
contain test sites that are specifically suited to pass the tests nor should it contain more
impossible test cases than would exist in a real world setting.
5. As the phishing landscape is always changing, it should be as up-to-date as possible
not using test data that is several years old.
6. If possible the data that is collected for a test set should contain more parameters than
needed by the intended detector to enable the testing of other detectors with the same
test data later on.
7. Linking each website to a respective brand name where possible extends the whole
testing framework to make it even possible to judge how well a detector is able to
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detect a matching brand. Using this in project 5.8 made it possible to find out how
many brands were correctly identified by which detector.
8. Taking quality ratings for the different websites makes it possible to see whether a
difference exists in the detector performance for high-quality or low-quality attacks.
Our URL detector in project 5.4 worked better for high quality websites. The definition
of quality in this case is a highly debatable topic. As the users are the critical target
group the quality ratings should resemble somehow the likeliness of falling for a phish.
However, the likeliness of falling for a specific phish is not easily determined. The
most important aspect for a user to judge the authenticity of a website is the visual
content. Since visual similarity is a more graspable concept I argue it is the best match
for determining phishing attack quality.
Some of these aspects are to a small extent contradictory: having an up-to-date test set on
the one hand contradicts with the principle of reusing test sets for similar tests. To solve
these problems in future tests it would be best to introduce some kind of standard for test
sets that specifies which data needs to be collected for a test set and how it can be accessed
by testing frameworks. Taking this idea further, a standard test set acquisition and execution
framework would be best. The framework and its test set snapshots could be easily shared
and compared between researchers and their different kinds of detectors.
A test set to stand up towards the testing needs of most detectors that have been presented
so far would need to include a broad range of different properties. Besides the URLs of
the test websites and their classification as phishing or non-phishing, stored HTML contents
are important for many detectors. Complete website snapshots with a certain link depth
should be available to contain all linked files like CSS information – information about the
styling of the website –, JavaScript, images and the sub pages of a URL. Technical details
about the domain should also be available (e.g. when was the domain registered?, who is the
owner?, reverse IP-lookups, server locations, the SSL certificate any many more). Different
screenshots of the respective website content, the browser or the overall rendered page –
possibly even using different types of browsers – can make it possible to evaluate detectors
based on the visual appearance. Finally quality scores and brand identification could be
assigned to all test data where possible to enable the aspects seven and eight presented above.
DE What Kind of Detection Works Best?
Throughout related work and this thesis many kinds of detectors have been tested using
different input parameters.
In our project 5.2 we used mainly technical properties of the connection or domain (e.g.
the time a domain is registered, country, SSL status). Although we displayed partial results
for smaller amounts of data to our users I argue that these kinds of detectors will only work if
they combine several attributes. In our project we identified those types of data that seemed
interesting to the users and determined how they would like to see them in a user intervention
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method. Garera et al. [104] (see section 3.5.2) used such features with a stronger focus
towards the detector.
I see the URL as a special kind of technical property as the user is more in touch with –
seeing or typing it in the address bar. Even only looking at spelling mistakes and brand
names within URLs we were already able to mark more than 50% of the phishing websites
as suspicious in our project 5.4. Being small pieces of data, URLs can be quickly handled by
a detector using millions of them in milliseconds. Even though we used a very complicated
and slow approach sending different portions of them one by one to a server not traditionally
suited for this kind of detection, our requests could have been easily optimized when building
a professional detector instead of a prototype.
In related work HTML content is often used for detection. Due to phishing page polymor-
phism [158] I chose to use final rendered images that are generated out of the HTML code
for evaluation in project 5.8. Within the project we achieved good results finding websites of
the same brand in 92% of the cases. These results are not yet perfect but given the success of
the user intervention methods for such a detector I argue that further improvement of such a
concept will lead to a well working final detector.
To conclude the answer to this research question I would like to discuss the optimization
possibilities of the different detector types but also the way attackers could possibly react.
To find the optimum detector using technical properties it will be necessary to try out many
different technical parameters and find the best way to aggregate them towards a final detec-
tion result in the future. Perhaps machine learning algorithms are best suited to find optimal
thresholds and adapt to changes of the attacks over time. Once the quantifiers for the dif-
ferent parameters have been found, phishers still have the possibility to adapt to the detector
mechanism by changing their attacks at the parameters having the biggest weight, usually
without the user noticing. This is why I would not recommend using technical properties
as the only means of detection. URLs are already more user-oriented technical properties
which is why I think they are suited better for the detection process. Although part of the
browser UI they are usually also not in the users’ focus making them to some extent also
prone to phishers adapting in case detectors are based on them. Although HTML-content
offers a lot of different properties that can be used to compare different documents the huge
problem of phishing page polymorphism will make it easy for attackers to adapt towards
detectors being based on the markup that is invisible from the user. I hence recommend to
use the visual channel for detection as it is in the focus of the users at all times [229]. For a
detection method based on the visual content it will get much harder for the attacker to adapt
to the detection method. Looking into the amount of noise that can be added to the visual
channel of a website without the user noticing and whether that is enough to counter visual
detectors will be subject to future research.
DR What Detection Overhead and Thresholds are Reasonable?
Answering this research question is very easy and yet impossible. The goal of any detector
should be to have a false positive and false negative rate of zero as well as a runtime close
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to zero. However, this is not possible. The detection rate of today’s blacklist-based browser
approaches seems to be at about 15% of false negatives [219] or 85% true positive detection.
As phishing is still on the rise this value does not seem to be high enough. In most cases the
prototypes built in this thesis were also not able to outperform this value by far. The visual
comparison prototype in project 5.8 achieved 92% of true positives without taking a specific
threshold into account. Examples from the related work section reported even higher values.
Common sense dictates that as long as no false positives are created by a detector each true
positive result that can be found should be used to protect the user.
This might perhaps also be used as a recommendation for setting detectors thresholds. A
threshold value should be chosen in a way that it results in nearly no false positives while
still capturing as many phishing attacks as possible.
No matter which detector is used, filtering and dynamic whitelists can help to accomplish
such a goal more quickly. In case of our project in subchapter 5.5 we used data type based
filtering that already reduced the number of false positives to 22.4% of the original 100%
input. Combining this with a dynamically growing white-list the false positive rate went
down to 4.5% of all websites within one week – still without using any detector at all.
Another interesting result was that the number of new websites a user visits having critical
data involved, drops much faster than the number of new websites a user visits in general.
6.1.2 User Intervention
During my research I applied the same five research levels also to the process of develop-
ing and testing user intervention mechanisms. The following sections will summarize my
findings for the five main research questions concerning this area.
ID What is User Intervention?
In the introduction section 1.3 I defined user intervention as the step after detection taking
the results towards the user. Within the project of this thesis this mostly meant developing a
suitable user interface to display the detector outcomes to the user and enable here to decide
whether to stay on a website or leave it. In project 5.2, 5.3, 5.5, 5.6 and 5.8 we built user
interfaces for different kinds of detector data and in measured their success.
Although the design of the user interface – or a warning – is a central aspect of user inter-
vention it is more than that. The data coming from a detector might need to be preprocessed
or converted before getting a sensible output for the user (e.g. the location data in project 5.2
was converted to a more user friendly map representation which helps the user a lot. Deter-
mining the right thresholds and feedback type from the detector result might also be subject
to the user intervention method depending on the type of detector use (e.g. in the privacy en-
abled concept in project 5.8) whereas in other cases this judgment might already be done by
the detector itself (see the second detector architecture in project 5.8). This example shows
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the tight coupling of user intervention systems and the detectors that in some projects of this
thesis also led to a detector development based on a user intervention concept and not vice
versa (e.g. projects 5.3, 5.5 and 5.8).
IH How can HCI be Used to Enhance User Intervention Mechanisms?
As a lot of HCI related work has proved (see section 3.3) security is not the primary goal
which is why a lot of security advice is overlooked. In project 5.3 we experienced this
ourselves. For most of our user intervention methods we achieved well working results after
we had used a user centered design process using interviews (e.g. project 5.2), focus groups
(e.g. project 5.7), paper prototyping (e.g. project 5.2), iterative development with in-between
evaluation (e.g. project 5.5) and field evaluations (e.g. project 5.6). So taking user properties
into account is very important to ensure that a warning is being seen, understood and finally
that a correct action is taken.
When creating a user intervention mechanism I recommend such a design process. Starting
off with user research or a literature review about usable security can already yield interesting
information about best practices and real life situations. Focus groups within this thesis to
gain further insights and feedback for general ideas or to generate new user intervention
ideas with the participants. Expert interviews can help to find the corresponding security
counterparts of what the user’s understanding is. Is it possible to match both worlds within
the planned user intervention method?
In case of the data type based approach (5.5) and the visual similarity based project (5.8)
I started with developing a user intervention method sensible for the user before even con-
sidering the detector development. Especially within the project on visual similarity we
achieved a high amount of correct decisions of the users. Using such an approach it is pos-
sible to develop a detector that on the one hand has the advantage to fulfill the needs of
providing data that can be understood by the users. On the other hand it also gets hard for
attackers to subvert it as they would have to change a central part of the spoofing. I argue
that the visual content channel is one of the most important for the user and as the results of
project 5.8 showed users can make extremely mature security decisions in case it is used to
explain security issues.
IM How can User Intervention be Measured?
Evaluating user intervention methods has been performed in a lot of different ways within
this thesis. In case of our data type based alert dialogs (project 5.5) we used several lab stud-
ies to evaluate whether people would respond “correctly” to our appearing warning dialogs.
This means that we measured whether they would accept warnings pointing out dangerous
websites and leave the site (true positives) and turn down warnings that appeared in error
(true negatives). Whilst the first measurement makes it possible to see whether the user
intervention method is able to protect users’ in case of a critical website the second mea-
surement makes sure that people are not overly scared by the user intervention method and
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still able to find detection errors. Comparing both measurements for a condition using our
plugin and a baseline using only a standard browser made it easily possible to compare both
types of user interventions against each other. For example the fact that participants found
55% of all phishing attacks within the first lab study of the project 5.5 compared to 14%
in the control group proves that our concept significantly increased the user protection. We
also measured these decisions within an online study in project 5.8 to compare two different
designs of our warning. A big advantage of such studies is that using a lab setting the actual
detection process can be decoupled from the measurement of the user intervention results by
setting the different detection results as independent variables.
In case of the projects 5.3 and 5.6 I measured whether the user intervention methods were
suitable to change the participants’ security opinion towards the websites to a larger degree
than the values that were measured for a standard browser configuration. If a user interven-
tion method manages to influence the users’ security opinion towards the right direction, a
necessary step towards a more correct security decision is done. However, it is still neces-
sary to prove that such a change in security opinion will make the user refrain from using
dangerous websites and how strong the opinion change needs to be.
In project 5.7 we measured the participants’ recall of security indicators like the URL to
see whether they had noticed the indicators on critical websites. As related work showed
that these indicators are overlooked by the users, a change towards more indicator attention
would also be a necessary step to better user intervention. As with the previous measurement
the exact connection between both cases still needs to be found in the future.
In a few cases we also used field studies for the evaluation of our user intervention methods
(e.g. project 5.5, 5.6). One downside of this kind of measurement is that it usually needs
to be done with a detector in place. This makes the measurement of the user intervention
method dependent of the detector results and an overall decision measurement would only
be a compound value. A second problem with such a kind of study is that phishing attacks
only happen very rarely when looking at a small user sample and even if attacks happen it
would be hard to extrapolate them from the recorded data without affecting the participants’
privacy to a large extent. Instead I used field studies to measure other parameters a lab study
cannot yield, for example: how many warnings appear in the real world? how do users
interact with the user intervention methods after several days of use? (see project 5.5). The
special case of a software rollout as a field study has been then used in project 5.6.
Although they are to some degree artificial I recommend using lab studies as a main eval-
uation methodology combining them with other measurements were possible. To still get
valid results a lot of parameters within the lab studies need to be carefully controlled (see
section 7.2 for a list of recommendations for evaluations).
In project 5.7 we also used eye tracking to find subtle unconscious user behavior towards
the security indicators or user intervention methods on the website. Those measurements
should always be correlated with self reported answers to see whether the participants real-
ized where they have been looking at. Mouse cursor tracking is a cheap alternative to using
an eye tracker.
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IE How to Enhance User Intervention Quality?
When creating warning indicators for user intervention methods two different approaches
existed up to now: non-blocking indicators and blocking dialogs:
So far related work has shown that non-blocking indicators most often fail to be noticed by
the users, an effect that we also saw in our project 5.3. But non-blocking dialogs are not
completely unnoticed. In project 5.6 we used browser Personas to communicate the security
status in the whole browser background area and were able to influence the users’ security
opinion successfully. In the project using a combined status bar (see subchapter 5.2) we used
different security indicators that took up a lot of space. Some participants saw screen real
estate being wasted here and they did not want more than 5% of their screens to be occupied.
In project 5.8 we used fully blocking warnings for cases when visual spoofing of websites
has been detected. In case of our project 5.5 our warnings were triggered by and during user
input. A blocking warning in such a case would have been immensely disturbing. For this
reason I invented a third type of warning I called semi-blocking warning that opens a warning
that blocks everything but not the current interaction. Blocking upcoming input but not
interrupting the ongoing interaction combines positive aspects of blocking and non-blocking
warnings. This semi-blocking way of user intervention performed significantly better than
the standard browser. Together with the semi-blocking concept we also introduced other new
properties that can be useful for warnings. The warnings appeared in-context of the users’
actions (time- and location-wise) and tried to preserve most of the the current UI appearance
were possible. Future studies will be necessary to find out which type of enhancement
contributed in which way to the good result of the semi-blocking warning type.
Although all different types of warnings seem to work if applied in the right way I rec-
ommend to use blocking warnings for critical situations changing to a less disturbing form
of warnings whenever possible. Semi-blocking warnings whenever its needed to block the
process in the end but a immediate interruption is not suitable and finally non-blocking indi-
cators for less critical situations and positive reinforcement. Creating non-blocking warnings
that are noticed within the accepted boundaries of used screen space is challenging. I rec-
ommend using background imagery of other UI components as a solution for that.
Besides the type of warning (non-blocking, blocking, semi-blocking) a lot of other parame-
ters play an important role. Changing imagery in user intervention methods seems to be well
accepted by users as the map module in project 5.2 was highly accepted. In project 5.8 we
even used screenshots of the similar websites as a main element of the user intervention and
we found that even after repeated exposure to eight warning messages the interaction times
with the warnings were not reduced. Within our focus groups, for example in projects 5.5
and 5.7 we gathered interesting design input on warning design. The warnings should be
to some extent unique and form an own group of warnings such that the the underlying
user intervention mechanism can immediately be recognized. On the other hand all warn-
ings should look differently such that habituation is prevented and each new dialog is noticed
again. This largely depends on the contained information in form of text, imagery and layout.
Whereas the focus group results were in most cases congruent the focus group participants
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had different opinions on the color scheme of a user intervention. Some wanted very subtle
colors in the style of the operating system and others wanted to have flashy colors to make a
warning stand out.
In project 5.5 we used a green coloring of form fields whenever the user had previously
entered critical data on the same web site to reinforce them positively. True negatives can
also help to convey a positive attitude towards security as users don’t experience that every
time something security-related is displayed it might denote a catastrophe.
A last option for user intervention are community-based approaches (see subchapter 5.3). In
the real world security advice is often acquired from other people but I experienced some
hurdles when testing this concept on the computer: understanding security ratings is hard for
the average user as they do not exactly know what a security rating is about. What does it
contain or state? Another important issue was that we used solely aggregated security opin-
ions of a community. In the real world inter-personal recommendations and security advice
is given. These relationships would need to be resembled more closely on the computer (e.g.
by including personal comments).
No matter which kind of user intervention mechanism is developed it always has to be com-
bined with proper reasoning. The upcoming research question IR deals with this.
In project 5.7 we introduced errors into the content area of the web browser to make the
users look more after the security indicators around. We observed that participants only got
more confused about the content than it reminded them of looking towards other security
indicators. This means that visual content of the website drags a lot of attention away from
other more important security indicators, but reducing this effect is hardly possible.
In subchapter 5.5 we displayed warnings only on websites asking for critical data. This
already reduces the number of websites that possibly need a warning to at least less than 23%
of all websites and besides this provides a good reason for why the user intervention method
appeared. Context-based filtering hence can also lead to more understandable warnings.
IR When Should Intervention be Performed to Which Extent?
Within this thesis I worked with all different kinds of warnings – non-blocking, blocking,
semi-blocking – within many different user intervention methods. For each type of warning
we achieved results that showed some kind of change towards more secure user behavior.
But looking at related work habituation to warnings is an important problem that needs to be
addressed by reasoning about the amount of warning users should be exposed to in different
situations.
Especially in some of our lab studies (e.g. in project 5.5) where we purposely had a lot
of consecutive warnings showing up, our participants complained about the high number
of appearing warnings. As a contrast our web evaluation testing visual similarity based
warnings had no such complaints and also had a constantly high viewing time of about
20 seconds for eight similar warnings in a row. This shows that it is hard to report exact
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measurements on when warnings start to annoy users and how this may lead to warning
habituation in the future. To get more insights here it will be important to have a look at
different parameters of warnings that could be able to slow down the habituation process.
Another possible point of reasoning is the level of detail that is used for explaining a security
problem within a warning message. In project 5.5 we experienced that making a lot of
different sub-detection results publicly available can also lead to confusion. If one sub-
detector classifies a website as malicious while another one says a website is not and both is
displayed towards the user how should a final decision be made?
From the research done within this thesis so far a possible recommendation could be that crit-
ical situations need critical warnings, but the more interrupting a user intervention method
is, the worse is the habituation effect caused by false positives of the warning. In the worst
case this error does not only lead to users distrusting this specific kind of user intervention
but it can also lead to a general distrust in computer warnings per se. In case of less crit-
ical situations or if the underlying detection is not very accurate, a non-blocking indicator
might be better suited than a blocking warning causing habituation. In some other cases in-
terrupting the user’s current task might not be a good idea (e.g. while typing). In those cases
semi-blocking warnings can help by only blocking the completion of a final critical action
but not immediately interrupting the user’s current action. In case of the data type based user
intervention other properties like the positioning of the warning also made it possible that
the warning was less invasive and hence was seen as less disturbing.
In many cases the user intervention method has to define thresholds for the detector values
that will finally fire certain kinds of warnings. These thresholds should always be tweaked
towards having a really small number of false positives (see research question DR for de-
tails).
A researcher or developer of user intervention mechanisms should always think about what
bad consequences could arise in case of overuse of a given intervention. Security protection
is important but productivity and usability of the primary task has to persist. When designing
user intervention methods it is important not to loose focus on this topic in favor of the formal
success of the own method. User intervention always needs to be regarded in a larger context.
In some cases researchers already proposed to get rid of all phishing protection to gain better
productivity for the rest of the users not being affected by attacks [123]. There certainly is a
valid point in this kind of related work but it mainly addresses the point that it is important
to match the right balance of security measurements in favor of usability.
As mentioned before positive reinforcement of non-critical cases can also help to create a
positive mood towards security and to make users being less frustrated about appearing warn-
ings. Positive reinforcement should always be done using non-blocking indicators compared
to blocking or semi-blocking approaches for the error cases. In the ideal case a missing pos-
itive reinforcement could already cause the user to perform security inspection by herself.
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6.2 From Phishing To General Security
Although the projects and research findings within this thesis all have their focus on phishing
detection and the user intervention thereof, it is possible to apply a lot of the findings made
to general computer security and perhaps even beyond.
Other security detectors and disciplines should also look out for how a user centered de-
sign of user intervention methods and detectors can enhance the final results. Starting from
looking at what a user can understand and then deriving a detector mechanism out of this.
Another valuable principle that can be applied on a broader scope is to look out for what
actions users undertake when security critical things happen. Where is their focus? Can this
focus be used to explain the security issue better? An example could be setting up Firewall
restrictions the moment a new software component is installed instead of not being noticed at
all or being noticed in case the software tries to access the Internet for the first time (perhaps
without even having the user know). Mobile operating systems like Android1 already ask
for specific permissions a user has to grant its apps whenever they are installed on the phone.
The concept of semi-blocking dialogs could also make sense for other tasks. An office soft-
ware for example could create semi-blocking notifications when asking to create a backup
copy, or collaborative working systems could withhold changes other users have made up to
a point when the user stops typing and focuses on the screen again.
These are only a few examples of the more generalized application areas of the research
findings of this thesis. In many cases I already tried to phrase the findings in the previous
subchapter 6.1 more universally.
6.3 Detector and User Intervention Model
Based on the aforementioned research findings I created a summarizing model that shows the
different influencing factors of the detection and user intervention flow. Using this model it is
easier to recognize important properties that need to be taken into account when building new
detectors and user intervention methods for phishing. The model is depicted in figure 6.3.
The most important aspect is to understand detection and user intervention as an overall
combined process where neither the detector nor the user intervention side can be examined
without considering the respective counterpart. The global context and the user and attacker
properties are influencing factors towards each system. Despite that the importance of the
attacker decreases towards the user intervention methods (whereas the user importance in-
creases) both parties have to be considered throughout the whole process.
The detection process can make use of pre- and post-filtering to reduce the result load that
is passed on to the user intervention method. The detector itself can make use of a variety
1 http://www.android.com/
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Figure 6.3: Model of the interplay of detection and user intervention, its important
parameters, evaluation processes and stakeholders.
of inputs to calculate a final assessment value that is at best combined with a recognized
brand. The user intervention makes use of the passed values and by using certain thresholds,
warnings of different kinds can be displayed.
Both parts of the system need to be separately evaluated. For detectors test sets are most
often used while a combination of lab and field studies makes most sense for the evaluation
of the user intervention strategies.
Take Home Messages
å 6.1 Answers to the Research Questions: Phishing detection and user intervention
are closely coupled. It is not only possible to identify research domains that overlap
but even central concepts are shared between the two areas. Definitions of detection
and intervention can be made along true and false positive measurements. HCI and a
user centered development process play an important role for both dimensions and a
development process should take user intervention into account from the beginning or
even reverse the development process to start with the intervention before the detector.
Detectors that make use of user-distant properties might also work well but will most
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often allow attackers to adapt to the detectors. User centered detectors should hence
be preferred.
å 6.2 From Phishing To General Security: The general idea of combining detector
and user intervention development with a focus on the user’s attack models and the
attacker’s adaption possibilities will be easily applicable to a much larger field than
phishing protection itself. Besides that a lot of other findings of this thesis are appli-
cable beyond phishing.
å 6.3 Detector and User Intervention Model: The interplay between attackers, users,
detectors and user intervention easily fits into a straightforward model presented in
figure 6.3. This model should be taken as a basis for the everyday development of
protection methods.
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Chapter7
Recommendations and
Guidelines
Getting anti-phishing right has been a goal for researchers and companies for many years
now and the perfect anti-phishing method is still to be found. This thesis also does not
contain a perfect final product but offers parts of the secret recipe for such a perfect system.
I was able to find a large number of interesting findings and results that were discussed in
chapter 6. During those studies I gathered a lot of knowledge concerning good and bad
practices and I want to include them within this chapter.
Beginning with a utopia of how phishing detection and reporting should perhaps look like,
I take another look on whether or not it seems at all possible to create an Internet without
phishing and how the cornerstones of such a web would need to look like. I conclude this
chapter with guidelines for conducting a good phishing user study by discussing lab vs. field
studies, providing an optimum scenario for a lab study and giving an overview on statistical
methods for evaluation of such experiments.
7.1 A Utopia of Anti-Phishing
Looking at the model of phishing detection and user intervention given at the end of the last
chapter (see section 6.3) combined with the rest of the findings of this thesis one can try and
guess how a perfect detector and a perfect user intervention method could eventually look
like.
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7.1.1 Achieving the Best Detection
The utmost perfect phishing detector would be a detector with a zero false positive and a zero
false negative rate – every website would be classified correctly. Creating such a detector is
rather impossible because websites do exist where the classification in malicious and non-
malicious cannot finally be determined. Imagine a shady retailer offering faked clothing and
storing the users’ payment information on servers that are virus infected and the data itself
can be downloaded by others. Would such a website by malicious? Would it be phishing?
Perhaps even knowing what the website is all about, it could be that some people explicitly
want to interact with such a website. This clearly shows, no matter how perfect a detector
would be, some kind of final user decision will always need to be possible.
However, promising approaches for detectors have already been found. In related work
many different technical parameters have been taken into account and have been analyzed
by machine learning to come up with detectors with relatively high detection rates. Combin-
ing such an approach with other findings made within this thesis (data type based filtering,
URL spell checking, visual comparison), it seems possible to get a detector that is able to
take the right decisions for nearly all websites. To find the perfect balance between those
features machine learning will be valuable at some point (see [1] for a machine learning
comparison for phishing). A danger that has to be considered when using machine learning
is the way attackers could adapt towards the algorithms – even machine learning needs to be
secure [22].
Besides the high accuracy I found other properties that need to be taken care of when building
such a detector. Is there an interface of the detector results that can be used for the later user
intervention mechanism? Will the users be able to understand and heed the warnings, and
will they be able to still detect false detection results in case some exist?
A second important aspect that needs to be considered is what would happen if attackers
change certain parameters of their attacks. In case the adapted attacks would get through
the detector without loosing their effect on the user the detector has to be changed to be
able to handle such evasion attempts. Assuming a perfect detector for phishing attacks to
exist and to be available to web users, the only way for attackers to continue would be to
add a large amount of random noise to channels, which in turn would be relatively easy
to be recognized by users. In other words this means, if high quality phishing attacks are
detected by the detector the users will hopefully recognize or ignore the low quality attacks
that remain.
In summary this is why reversing the development process and starting off with the user
intervention methods will often lead to detectors that automatically lead to working detectors
that last. In case a good detection accuracy can be achieved using such a user intervention
method, the result will be close to perfect detection.
Throughout this thesis I have used many HCI related observations to come up with my
detector ideas. For future detectors valuable methods for finding new detection possibilites
will be the following: Looking at how security problems are dealt with in the real world,
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how attack strategies of the phishers work or how users judge trustworthiness and understand
security.
Finally let me mention the potential introduced by pre- and post-filtering of detector input
data. In case a detector needs high computational load, filtering can be used to get rid of
cases that need no computational check for different reasons.
7.1.2 Optimal User Intervention
The three main types of user intervention (non-blocking indicators, blocking warnings and
semi-blocking intervention) have been extensively discussed within this thesis and they all
add their share to good user intervention in different contexts.
An optimal user intervention method would make use of those different concepts in a
way that the indicators are correctly noticed without annoying users by their existence.
Non-blocking indicators could communicate positive security reinforcement while block-
ing warnings are used for the definite problems found by the optimal detector described
above. If applicable, semi-blocking intervention could be used as an alternative.
The general design properties of an Internet browser warning have been changing throughout
computer history from small gray dialog boxes popping up in the center of the screen, to
small yellow warning bars that unfold in the web browser on to red colored warnings similar
to websites in the content area. These designs couldn’t be more diverse and we could confirm
this during the focus groups for our different projects. Some people see decent gray colors
as being more appropriate for an operating system and that flashy colors would just look like
advertisements. Others think that a warning needs to be flashy to stand out.
My personal thoughts here are that in general there is no optimal solution to this problem
as warning messages need to be something special the user is not habituated to. Hence,
changing the design from time to time can help in keeping up the interest in such dialogs.
The more the habituation causes (e.g. false positives) are avoided the longer a warning
design will last.
Habituation effects can be further reduced by using warning contents that contain many
unique and understandable elements within the warning dialog. Within our project concern-
ing visual similarity (see subchapter 5.8) we made use of large screenshots and held the
user concentration towards our dialog up during a repeated exposure to eight similar looking
warnings in a row.
A perfect user intervention will bother the user only if necessary and will in those cases
supply her with the best information necessary to quickly understand the situation and take
the right decision. Such understandable pieces of information can be for example screenshots
of involved websites or maps showing a security problem. In case of security critical original
websites a positive reinforcement of the user can be used to not only amplify the trust in the
current action but also mitigate trust in case the reinforcement is missing in future situations.
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7.1.3 Future Proof Methods
Security is usually about playing cops and robbers. Whenever security experts bring up a
new technology to protect the users from a threat, attackers are starting to develop counter
measures and vice versa. So how can we make sure that the steps illuminated in this thesis
will not only work until the next type of attack is developed?
In fact it is not possible to guarantee this as new technologies might always arise that allow
new forms of phishing. However, taken the rules above into account the developed anti-
phishing mechanisms should be quite reliable. The way users perceive and judge things
and the possibilities of social engineering haven’t changed a lot since their very beginning.
Only the used technology and the applied principles of the attackers have changed. Using
the proposed findings for future protection, they should be mostly free from technological
singularities and should focus on the cornerstones where social engineering targets the users
exactly.
At the moment it is extremely easy for attackers to impersonate companies at points where
users perceive and judge the trustworthiness of a company. In case this easy impersonation is
hardened the number of phishing attempts will durably decline no matter which technology
is behind.
If everything else fails the way of developing anti-phishing measures as explained within
this thesis should still be applicable to new kinds of technologies and threats.
7.1.4 A Web Without Phishing?
While the previous subchapters took a future look towards detection and user intervention
which was in the center of this thesis I also want to step back a little to look again at the
future of the bigger picture of phishing. All anti-phishing methods that have been presented
in the last decades have one issue in common. None solves the issue of phishing protection
completely and none managed to significantly bring down the number of phishing attacks
that exist. So will it ever become possible to create an Internet without phishing or should
one just cope with the status quo and make the best of it?
From a more economic perspective to stop phishing completely it would be necessary to
lower the profit that can be gained from phishing below the costs phishing causes (Schechter
and Smith [258] looked more detailed into this). These costs are in general relatively low:
hosting can be done using free webhosters or hijacked servers and only the personal spare
time of the attacker is needed. The biggest efforts in phishing are to reach potential victims
and finally monetize the collected confidential information.
In fact several ways could lead to a phishing free web by achieving to raise the costs over
the revenue: When imagining a well working anti-phishing detector and user intervention
system that would drop the number of gained correct credentials close to zero, the costs
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of phishing would be no matter what they actually are higher than an incoming revenue of
about nothing.
Changing this cost vs. revenue relation can perhaps also be achieved by other means af-
fecting different steps of the whole phishing process (please refer to figure 2.2). Reducing
the possibilities for email spoofing for example, would also effect the phishing process as it
would get hard to sent out impersonated email messages.
Besides this, changes in the technical properties like HTTP, DNS and HTML could also
help to make it harder to impersonate other websites. Using a different access structure to
the web instead of URLs could for example help to make it easier for users to recognize the
case when they are visiting an impersonating web service instead of the original one – the
Convergence Research Project [107] for example proposes such an architecture. Another
possibility is proposed by Markham [177] using image hashes together with a domain name
for easier recognition of typing mistakes. A few researchers work on methods to counter
identity theft with digital uniqueness [223] or better password technologies [326] to achieve
such a goal.
In many of these areas research is carried out to find solutions for such problems. However,
the scope of this thesis was limited to the detection and reporting of browser based phishing.
7.2 Evaluation Recommendations
As already stated in the related work chapter (compare section 3.7) user study methodology
is a huge area within usable security research. Planning, executing and evaluating usable
security tools is especially hard due to different reasons. One example would be that security
may not be the given primary goal of a study although it is in the center of evaluation. In
table 3.3 I already gave an overview over different aspects of different usable security studies.
Within this section I want extend on that and provide some advice about best practices I have
developed throughout the different studies concerned with this thesis by combining them
with methods that have been approved in related work. Within this section I will refrain
from including backward references to the projects that yielded these insights.
Most of this section refers to user intervention user studies as the testing of detectors is much
easier and straight forward having the right test set (see subchapter 5.1).
7.2.1 Preparation
When trying to explore user behavior on phishing or when evaluating anti-phishing tools
for the web browser, many different aspects have to be taken into account already from the
beginning of the preparation of a user study.
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Real World Vs. Lab Studies
One of the most important basic decisions that have to be made is whether to test a concept
in the lab or in the field. Field studies to evaluate anti-phishing concepts are extremely hard
to conduct (including ethical and legal reasons). However, in addition to a lab study, it is a
good idea to conduct some field testing that does not rely on actively induced attacks [183].
Even if one could create a study with a large number of participants, the number of oc-
curring attacks would still be too small for significant assessments. Additionally, finding
those attacks would require an enormous amount of data logging and post-processing – only
Florênico and Herley were able to measure such values once [92]. Field studies may still be
useful when trying to measure other variables besides anti-phishing success.
Lab studies in contrast allow for a precise control over when and how phishing attacks will
happen and can also guarantee that the setting of the whole studies remains unchanged.
A problem here is that the study environment may bias participants [271]. Hence, many
precautions have to be undertaken to avoid such effects wherever possible.
Comparison vs. Direct Collection of Data
A lot of the studies conducted in the field so far have been dedicated to evaluate how and
why people fall for phishing. In some of those cases, this restricts research to collecting
direct data only – e.g. what percentage of phishing websites is detected. For other cases it
is possible to collect data for two different cases and compare them against each other – e.g.
comparing one anti-phishing concept against another one. Since the lab situation in itself
may have a certain influence on peoples’ behavior, the success of a concept should not be
measured as a single value but as a comparison against a control group where possible. A lot
of studies were conducted in this manner [78, 126, 324, 325]. In case the lab setting has had
any influence on the study results it then would hopefully have influenced the control group
to the same degree. This means that in a comparative study, the result of the comparison
should still be valid even if the absolute number of detected phishing websites for a study is
potentially higher than in a real world setting.
When comparing new concepts, three different options exist: Comparing two different ver-
sions of a concept, comparing against a similar concept that has been developed in the past as
part of other research or, if no similar tools for comparison are available, to compare against
a standard browser as a baseline.
Between vs. Within Subject Studies
Research that does not compare two concepts directly often uses a within-subject approach
for the different independent variables [67, 126, 166, 294, 324]. For work that compares
concepts against each other a between-subjects or even a mixed-design – combining both –
has to be used [64, 157, 183, 280, 325].
Using a between-subjects approach, the baseline and the new concept are distributed among
different participants. That is, the same websites, data, etcetera can be used for both con-
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ditions without causing learning effects. Another important point is that when switching
between two different concepts for one participant – as it would be with a within-subjects
design – the concept would would get much more accentuated than having it silently run
during a whole session. Having a second control group using a different concept makes it
also possible to gather their opinion on the concept without them actively using it. This can
result in interesting findings compared to the participants that actively used the concept.
Websites
Please refer to the extensive discussion of possible test set websites in subchapter 5.1.
The Scenario
Security is never the user’s primary goal [296]. Therefore, it is important to hide the real
purpose of the study from the users before they complete all tasks. Whenever telling partic-
ipants beforehand that the study is about security, the results will change dramatically [166]
and all results can just be taken as an upper bound of what the participants would be able to
detect in the best case scenario. Computer or website usability are topics that are often used
to disguise the real purpose of the study in related work [72, 294]. Other bogus topics used
can be found in table 3.3 in row 3a. The real purpose of the study should always be revealed
afterwards [89].
During the study, participants will be usually asked to expose data at some point to validate
whether they would have fallen for an attack or not. This data can either be their own real
world data or some imaginary information provided to them in advance. This role-playing
technique is often used but has been criticized for changing the result of the study [259].
Apart from pure authentic information and pure role-playing, there is a third option we call
“diverted role-playing”.
Authentic Data: Using the user’s real data during the study is the only way to guarantee
that the participants will be worried about losing this data to an attacking party. But this
technique also has several disadvantages: It is always possible that the participant does not
have the type of data needed (for instance, someone not owning a credit card). This would
then disqualify her in participating in the study. Apart from this, anxious people might drop
out of the study due to the fact that they have to provide their real information. Those people
are an important user group for security studies. In the worst case, the remaining people
will have the tendency to trust the lab situation more, reverting the effect that should be
achieved using authentic data. Whatever way is used, the participants’ demographics and
the perceived risks should be as real as possible [259].
Role-playing: In a role-play study, the participant is told to impersonate the identity of a
third person that usually does not exist. She is handed out information about the role she is
going to play, together with information about this person. Role-playing studies are often
criticized for the fact that the participants do not care for the data as much as they would for
themselves because they know that they are just playing a certain character [259]. Another
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problem here is that since participants are told to change their own perspective, they will
probably stop using their own set of ethical values for completing the tasks.
Diverted Role-playing: A way to solve this problem is the “diverted role-playing” tech-
nique as used in several studies [183, 324]. Here, the participants complete the task for a
third imaginary person – usually some close relative, like the grandmother. They are just
given information about that third role but use their own decisions and set of ethical values
to solve the task in the interest of that character. In our “grandma is ill”-scenario we told
the participants about their grandmother being in hospital for a couple of days and that they
should take care of some important online transactions for her.
Participants
When selecting participants, it is hard to draw a perfect sample of the target group for phish-
ing attacks. Usually, the number of security experts should be as small as possible and any
kind of security study should not be conducted with participants recruited at the security lab.
On the other hand, using arbitrary participants from the street is a potential problem as well.
Their degree of Internet security knowledge will usually be very low but perhaps they do not
use email or the Internet and are therefore no tentative phishing victims. A sample of par-
ticipants should be most similar the average Internet user that is exposed to phishing threats
from time to time. Not all papers published in the past reported on this or took special care
but some explicitly state their recruitment process for the participants [78, 139].
The number of participants is always dependent on several factors like the number of inde-
pendent variables. A dozen people for a condition may already be enough to get significant
results and will usually also make it possible to assess qualitative feedback besides the quan-
titative measurement. With some studies being conducted online, a larger sample size can
be achieved. Conducting studies in such a way still makes it very hard to ensure identical
conditions with every participant besides the selected independent variables.
Whatever the degree of the security knowledge of the participants is, they should be evenly
distributed to the different subject groups based on that criteria. Since the real purpose of
the study should not be told in advance, it is important to assess this with other questions.
Asking for “internet knowledge” instead of “online security knowledge” for example might
be a way although the knowledge level can still differ.
Collecting demographic data in advance may help to distribute or refuse participants before
the actual study is conducted. After the study – when participants have been debriefed – it is
then possible to ask people directly for specific demographic data on security and phishing
or measure this explicitly. The collected data can be used afterwards to see whether the
distribution was correct or which other demographic factors might have had an influence.
Tasks
Since it is important that participants do not know the real purpose of the study in advance,
the experiment needs tasks that fit the fake purpose and the scenario that was selected. For a
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study that is supposed to be about “website usability” this could be several shopping tasks.
Tasks should also be built up to quickly lead to the actual point of testing without making the
fake purpose too obvious. For a shopping task, not the selection of the product is the critical
part but the entry of personal data. Existing phishing websites can provide insights on how
to do this.
Dummy tasks: To be able to disguise the study purpose, it is important to include several
dummy tasks that make the scenario more believable. Usually, those tasks should be similar
to the attacking tasks to keep them from standing out. To be able to create a proper balancing
(see upcoming section) the number of dummy tasks need to be multiples of the the number
of phishing tasks – this means that usually at least half of the tasks will be dummy tasks.
To make sure that those tasks do not have any effects on the study outcome, they should
be balanced together with the attacking tasks. To achieve this, a possible solution would
be to create two fraudulent tasks per level that will be measured. Secondly, for each of the
fraudulent tasks, a legitimate version is needed. Having this portfolio of websites, it is now
possible to present one legitimate dummy task and one attacking task per level whilst it is
still possible to balance everything. Please refer to the section on balancing below for more
details on how to achieve this.
Real Interaction vs. Images: A lot of studies just use screenshots instead of a real web
browser setup that the participant can interact with [72, 126, 261]. This increases the artifi-
ciality of the lab setting since people are not able to interact the way they do at home. A
participant that watchfully checks for phishing websites could try to do many things to verify
the genuineness of a website, like checking the SSL certificate details, or setting up an extra
search for that company. If the target of the study is beyond just assessing the visual impact
of a screenshot, a real environment has to be preferred.
How to Get People to the Websites
Discovering phishing attacks can happen in many stages of an interaction with data from
the Internet. Using emails with links, for example, may already produce dropouts because
people are going to notice the fake URL already at this point. In case a browser-based
concept is compared to another browser-based concept, the dropouts due to link detection
in an email will not matter because they would be more or less equal. In such cases, it is
possible to use bookmarks during the study that the user has to visit, or by simply remotely
opening the websites for the user. This reduces the number of interception points that are
independent of the concept that is tested.
7.2.2 Ethics and Privacy
In many countries, studies have to be approved by an Institutional Review Board (IRB)
before being conducted. Other countries just have the rules for this kind of research laid out
in the law. In any case, one has to take care of doing the best to anonymize the collected
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data of the participants and to protect them from potential harm through phishing websites.
Whatever steps are taken to ensure proper privacy of the participants, should be documented
and published together with the results of the study itself. Finn et al. [89] describe this in
detail in their paper.
Whenever a study purpose is fake, it should be made clear to the participant after the study
what the real purpose of the study was and all questions regarding the process should be
answered. For the research, this again can be used to get valuable input from the participants
on how the study looked like from their perspective.
7.2.3 Execution
When the study is finally performed, a lot of new questions arise. How to technically conduct
the study? Which hardware to use? How to balance the study results?
Balancing
As already stated in the preparation chapter, it is extremely important to have a balanced
study setup. This makes sure learning effects in case they occur may not influence the
study results. As mentioned earlier, for each website used in the study one phishing and
one real website should exist. Since each participant needs to have at least one legitimate
website and one attacking website for each part of the concept that is tested this results in
four different websites that need to be prepared. An example: If a banking website should
be part of the study and the chosen brands are for example “Barclays” and the “Bank of
America” (BoA) one participant would get the pair of a legitimate Barclays site combined
with a phishing version of BoA, whilst the next participant would see a phishing Barclays
version with the legitimate BoA website. To make sure the order of the two websites did not
induce any effect it is hence also necessary to reverse the order of the two websites. Using
more websites makes reordering more complicated.
With this rule, one can already compute the minimum number of required participants per
group. Basically this is Pg = nl ∗ (wp +wl) ∗ 2 (with nl being the number of within-subject
levels to test; wp the number of phishing websites per level and wl the number of legitimate
websites per level). Using one phishing and one legitimate website (wp+wl = 2) this results
in the fact that the number of levels has to multiplied by 4. If multiple concepts are tested in
a between-subjects study Pg should be used for each of those groups. The number of tasks
to perform will always be half of this. To get a good task order for the minimum number of
participants a latin square [109] can be used two times inverting the phishing attacks in the
second set. Figure 7.1 shows an example for a possible task order for two phishing and two
legitimate websites, used to test two different within-subject factors. This task order is then
used for each of the concepts that are tested between-subjects.
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Figure 7.1: Example for balancing two within-subjects levels using four different web-
sites – all available as legitimate and phishing. A Latin-Square is used two times switch-
ing the last two columns in the second set and inverting phishing websites.
Measuring Detection Rates
During the study, the experimenter has to measure the number of fraudulent websites that
have been detected by the participants. It is very important to lay out strict rules what counts
as detection and what does not count as detecting an attack. Those rules should be reported
together with the results of the study. In real life, a simple thought of “that URL looks
weird” might also not be enough to stop the user from entering data on a phishing website.
In fact, the experimenter must neither encourage nor discourage participants in any step
of the decision process but it is important that the participants know somehow that they
have the option to drop a task. This should be made clear during the introduction of the
scenario without emphasizing it too much – otherwise it could again switch the user’s focus
to security.
A good threshold for having detected a phishing website is when the participant has un-
doubtedly pronounced the website as attacking or aborted the task. In case the user makes
any comments that she has any smaller doubts those can still be recorded for later qualitative
234 7 Recommendations and Guidelines
reporting. There should be no obvious possibility in the user study to report fraud as this
might bring security to the user’s focus.
True and False Positives Besides measuring the number of correctly identified attacking
websites (true positives), it is also very important to count the number of false positives – the
number of legitimate websites that have been accidentally reported. If only true positives are
measured or reported, a concept that is just frightening enough will receive high true posi-
tives and hence look good. In fact, it would also scare people off using legitimate websites
which is an important fact to report.
Hosting the Study
Independent of whether the legitimate websites are coming from real servers or not some
kind of fake hosting has usually to be set up to divert the browser during the study to fake
websites. Please refer to subchapter 5.9 for an extensive discussion about hosting websites
for a study.
Data Recording
Besides measuring the absolute performance of the concept and additional questionnaire
evaluation, more data can optionally be recorded.
Video or Audio recording: Performing video or audio recording of the participants helps
to identify smaller stages in the decision process more clearly after the study was conducted.
The problem of video recording usually is that the user feels even more monitored than with
the sole presence of the experimenter.
Eye tracking: More subtle and sometimes even more accurate recordings of the partici-
pant’s behavior can be done by using eye tracking hardware. Modern eye trackers can be
perfectly integrated into the study setup without disturbing the participant. Especially when
it is important to measure whether a specific screen region and hence a specific feature of
the concept was noticed by the participant or not, eye tracking may be used. Whalen and
Inkpen used eye tracking extensively in their study [294]. Due to the expensive hardware,
mouse tracking can sometimes be used as an alternative.
Mouse Movements: Mouse movements of a participant often closely relate to the eye move-
ment of that person [46]. Especially in the browser, it is easy to set up mouse movement
recording in the background [18]. The data gathered here can also give advice which screen
regions were considered by the user for reading or clicking and which ones were not.
Hardware and Software Setup
Although web browsing in general does not have any high hardware requirements, the hard-
ware setup of the study might be of importance. Especially screen size and screen resolution
influence how large the security indicators will physically be on the screen which can corre-
late to how much they will be noticed. Input devices can also play an important role as this
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may influence how much time the user can spend reading screen content. In any case, the
whole study has to be conducted using the same hardware setup and it should be documented
to be able to report on it later.
It is possible that the participants are not used to the specific setup in terms of operating
system or to the type of web browser. Instead of providing every participant with the setup
she is used to, we recommend to simply use the most common configuration the average
participant would have while asking every single one for their standard configuration. Hav-
ing their usual configuration recorded makes it possible to rule out significant dependencies
due to the unaccustomed setup afterwards.
7.2.4 Analysis
After having conducted the study, the data needs to be analyzed. Firstly, this makes it pos-
sible to report on the participants’ performance for the different levels of the independent
variable. With different statistical tests it is also possible to find additional effects. This sec-
tion reports on the different analyses that can be made after the study has been conducted.
Before applying a specific statistical test it should be checked whether it is really applicable
towards the current data set. In many cases inferential statistics are not correctly used in
HCI [40].
False and True Positives and Negatives, Accuracy and Precision
Besides the qualitative data that has been acquired before, during or after the study using
questionnaires and semi-structured interviews, the main dependent variable that is quantita-
tively measured is the number of attacks that have been detected by the user or in other cases
a detector (true positives). As mentioned earlier, it is also important to keep track of false
positives that have occurred (cases where an original website has been misclassified as being
phishing). Please refer again to section 1.4 in the beginning for details about these terms.
The ROC-curves diagram and my false positives/negatives plot are simple diagramming
techniques to see detector results in dependency of different thresholds (see section 1.4).
Statistical Tests
Having those values, the results of the analysis can be checked for statistical significance.
Depending on the type of the study, the study design and other factors, different statistical
methods have to be used. The ones most commonly used in past experiments are shortly
explained here. This chapter is not though of as a replacement for a textbook on statistical
test but is rather meant to report a list of statistical tests that turned out to be especially useful
for evaluations within the area of this thesis. The data collected throughout my experiments
is usually parametric. Hence, parametric statistical tests are used for statistical analysis of
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the data. In fact many statistical tests do not work well for boolean outcomes that have been
measured (e.g. detected a phish or not). For each test this should be checked in advance.
t-Test The t-test is used for comparing two experimental situations and has the ratio between
means divided by an estimate of the standard error as result [87]. Depending on the type of
design – between-subject or within-subject – the independent or dependent t-test is used. In
the evaluation of "WebWallet" [325] a t-test has been used to compare the standard browser
and WebWallet condition.
ANOVA In case an independent variable has more than two levels, the t-test does not work.
Here, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) is usually used. In this case, the null hypothesis tests
for the same mean through three or more means [87]. If this test has a significant result, it is
still not sure which level of the independent variable had which importance. Post-hoc testing
is needed for that. A two-way ANOVA can also be used if multiple independent variables
overlap. An example here is the moodyboard study where two variables where tested using
ANOVA [64].
Chi-Square Test For the analysis of categorical data, other ways have to be used. Pearsons
chi-square test can be used for this [86]. Downs et al. [72] put the responses and the proper-
ties of their participants in categories and hence use the test for the analysis. A problem with
this test is that it assumes data to be near the chi-square distribution and hence needs large
samples (232 participants in case of [72]).
Fisher’s Exact Test Fisher’s exact test computes its own chi-square probability for the pro-
vided data and can therefore be used on smaller samples too [86]. Egelman et al. [78] had
some results in their categorical analysis that appeared less than five times. They used this
test for the categorical analysis.
Pearson’s Correlational Coefficient To measure the relationship between two variables
and to find out whether they are associated, the Pearson Correlational Coefficient can be
used [86]. Dhamija et al. [67] used this to measure whether the age of participants correlated
with the participants’ scores.
Cochrans Q test Combined with McNemars Post Hoc Tests Cochrans Q test is more
or less an ANOVA for binary outcomes with multiple levels. As it is an extension of the
McNemars test it can be used for post-hoc testing of the separate level dependencies [86].
Take Home Messages
å 7.1 A Utopia of Anti-Phishing: Relying on the findings and methods of this thesis
and of related work found so far perfect detectors and a perfect user intervention seems
achievable and future proof. In a joint development process detectors that are close to
the user’s understanding of security and her mental models can be built that auto-
matically resist the efforts of attackers to adapt towards the detection. In the optimal
case this will lead to an economic state where phishing is not profitable anymore and
phishers will have to move on to other types of crime or hopefully become faithful.
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å 7.1.4 A Web Without Phishing?: If phishing becomes uneconomical for the attackers
will they refrain from phishing in its current way but will that last forever? Although
technology is moving fast and new technologies offer new possibilities for different
tactics, phishing is in the end a social engineering crime that exploits the same models
of human behavior since its very beginning. In case protection is based on these “so-
cial weaknesses” of the user the protection should be mostly free from the technical
background.
å 7.2 Evaluation Recommendations: Conducting user studies around usable security
is a hard thing to do especially as security must not be an obvious aspect of the study.
Throughout preparation, execution and analysis a lot of important steps have to be
planned and executed. Before conducting such an experiment the different aspects
should be checked against existing recommendations as the ones presented here.
238 7 Recommendations and Guidelines
III
CONCLUSIONS

Chapter8
Conclusions and Future Work
As the last chapter of this thesis I want to take a short look back on what was covered, what
questions were asked and finally answered and where the journey of phishing protection,
detector and user intervention development and research in this area could perhaps move on
to in the future. A lot of this has actually already been covered in the chapter 6 and chapter 7
and won’t be repeated here. Instead, only a short reference to the most important findings
and a list of open points that lead to future research topics is presented to conclude this thesis.
8.1 Summarizing This Thesis
This thesis was based on two main and major issues: on the one hand the immense problem
of phishing attacks as a social engineering technique that produces loss of millions of US
dollars each year and on the other hand the growing field of usable security that tries to bring
together two research disciplines which were formerly disconnected but now are becoming
more and more closely interrelated.
In chapter 2, I looked closely at the phishing problem to lay a basis for the upcoming chap-
ters. What exactly is a phishing attack? What is its history and its current state and how do
current browsers cope with these attacks? From all the different steps of a phishing attack
I chose the phishing encounter of a website in the browser as the subject of my research
as this is a bottleneck where most of the phishing attacks are finally carried out and where
changes can be most easily made and tested. The related work chapter (see chapter 3) af-
terwards reported numbers and research about the phishing problem itself, about the reasons
why current systems fail and why users are blinded by the attacks before I finally presented
prior solutions in terms of detection and user intervention.
Taking the general attitude for this thesis that detection can be only effective together with
user intervention and vice versa, a twofold set of 10 research questions in five different levels
has been brought up (see chapter 4). Within nine different projects described in chapter 5,
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I used a multitude of different methods and techniques to find answers to subsets of the re-
search questions within each project. Besides the research findings and prototypes that were
developed, I also presented completely new approaches and ideas like pre- and postfiltering
of results based on the user context, using semi-blocking dialogs to reduce frustration, or a
new technique of “diverted role-playing” for better evaluation.
Before presenting those findings to guide future development and evaluation in chapter 7
the answers to the different research questions were summarized in chapter 6. This included
basic but extensible definitions of phishing detection and user intervention; showing how
HCI could be used to enhance both, detectors and user intervention mechanisms and their
quality, providing lots of examples of parameters that can be measured throughout both areas
and finally reasoning about how much of effort is worthwhile in these areas.
These findings could not only be combined into a final model (see section 6.3) but many
of them can also be applied to other domains of security detection than phishing alone (see
section 6.2).
Looking at the research results that have been proposed by other researchers and me within
the last years many promising ideas have been presented and proven to be successful but
as prototypes alone they do not have the power to counter the real world attacks out there.
Companies at the edge of the process (e.g. browser vendors) need to get hold of these
ideas and need to deploy them within their systems such that they can reach the customers.
Offering them as a downloadable upgrade is sadly not enough, as security is not the users’
primary goal and most of them hence do not actively look for security software.
8.2 Open and Future Work
In the end the philosophers stone of phishing detection or anti-phishing in general is yet to be
found and although I presented interesting concepts within this thesis more concepts should
be developed in the future, at best by taking the recommendations given in this thesis into
account. As outlined with in this thesis building a perfect technical detection mechanism
alone is close to impossible but developing a phishing protection combination that makes
phishing unprofitable is in my opinion possible when using the right means. I explored the
interplay of phishing detection and user intervention using various methods to a large extent
which already created a huge amount of possible future research in that area.
In section 5.8 I introduced the equilibrium value of false positives and false negatives of a
detector and used it to compare different detectors using one single value. In how far this
measurement really is a good measure for detector quality and whether it can hold for other
application areas of detection will have to be verified in the future. Looking at evaluation at a
broader scope it would be interesting to take a deeper look at evaluation techniques in general
and which kind of evaluation techniques fit best towards phishing detection. Another part of
the evaluation is the bridge between detector and user intervention evaluation. As already
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stated in the results chapter if field studies are used user intervention evaluation measure-
ments may be influenced by the detector performance itself. Future research should take a
closer look at this interplay to propose even better possibilities for a continuous evaluation
of detectors and user intervention methods.
In several sections – especially in project 5.4 – the quality of phishing websites played a role
within the detector evaluation. The definition of “phishing attack quality” and the role of
attack quality within the whole deception process would be a very interesting field for future
research. How should phishing website quality be exactly defined and what impact does it
have on the success of phishing attacks. Finally the potential arising from this measurement
to built better detectors should be taken further than it was done within this thesis.
Within the user intervention methods in the different projects of this thesis we presented a
wealth of different additional informations within the user interface dialog (ranging from
technical properties – like SSL encryption status – to visual screenshots of the websites
involved within the detection process). For future analyses it would be interesting to find
out which kinds of additional information are best for a user intervention dialog in terms of
habituation and correct decisions. What information is understood by the users and how do
they make sense of different presentation styles of such information?
Using the visual representation of websites for detection was discussed in project 5.8 and
found especially useful as this information could not easily be changed to avoid detection
without the user noticing. Future studies should take an exact look at how this interplay
works. So how much noise needs to be added to a visual representation of a website that a
detector based on that information will be effectively fooled and how will a user then really
notice the changes to the website or would she still fall for the attack? Such tests could back
up the general idea of this thesis and clarify the exact dependency between both. As we
already saw in the subchapter 5.8 the image comparison method chosen is important for the
success rate of the whole approach. Comparing screenshots against each other is in many
aspects different from classical image or photo comparison. Perhaps a special comparison
method can be found that focuses on the properties and problems of such an approach.
In some of the projects (e.g. 5.6) I measured the change in the users security opinion instead
of direct phishing website behavior. With the presentation of such an alternative measure-
ment it should be assessed in future work how large a change of security opinion of a user
needs to be to actually stop them from performing a dangerous action and whether this mea-
surement really can be taken as an identifier for user intervention performance. More or less
the same holds true for actions that try to bring more user attention towards existing security
indicators (e.g. what we tried in project 5.7). How can the users’ attention towards existing
indicators actually be raised and does such an additional arousal in the end lead to a more
secure behavior? Perhaps this might also be dependent of several factors like the security
indicator itself in combination with the awareness that it receives.
Within this thesis I introduced the new concept of semi-blocking warnings (c.f. 5.5) which
was successful for a special application area but introduced several new parts of a warning
dialog within one concept: semi-blocking, in-context appearance, preserve context. Future
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studies on that type of user intervention should find out how these different parts relate to
each other and how each of them add to a well working warning dialog.
Another topic that plays a big role within user intervention and that could only be tackled
to a small extent within this thesis is habituation towards warning dialogs. Although its
existence has been clearly proved in related work and I could confirm this effect in many
projects, it seems to be possible to prevent habituation with a good user intervention method
(c.f. the user intervention evaluation in project 5.8). For future research it would hence be
interesting to see what exactly causes habituation towards such dialogs and how habituation
can be reduced. Furthermore, does habituation towards one kind of warning affect other
kinds of warnings? This will certainly play together with the overall warning experience a
user has on her computer. Which kinds of warnings are experienced as belonging together?
What warnings are experienced as useful?
An important future improvement for research would be a more consistent way of evaluating
detectors. As already explained in the results section 6.1 at research question DM, a testing
framework that would standardize test set collection and use between different detectors
would be great to achieve more comparable results with less effort.
Future research should also include the more neglected paths of development and evaluation,
perhaps by focusing on the personal properties of an attacker or by conducting more eval-
uations using field trials [24] or software deployment. The most correct measurements for
anti-phishing software would be to generate success-reports of the real field use – although
this is very hard.
Concluding there is a lot to look at in future studies whether it is to look more closely at a
certain property of phishing detection and phishing user intervention or at detection and user
intervention within a broader scope and application domain.
8.3 A Final Take Home Message
Usable security as a tug o’ war between security and usability research is a great field to learn
an important research lesson that is applicable throughout all research domains: one should
never stop looking beyond one’s own nose to see where the own research is embedded in.
What is a perfect security detector worth if no user takes the advice?
IV
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AOL for free? Options
« Groups Home
alt.2600
 6 messages - Collapse all  -  Report discussion as spam
mk590  View profile   More options Jan 28 1996, 10:00 am
It used to be that you could make a fake account on AOL so long as you
had a credit card generator.  However, AOL became smart.  Now they
verify every card with a bank after it is typed in.  Does anyone know
of a way to get an account other than phishing?
-mk590
    Reply to author      Forward        Report spam
Weapon X  View profile   More options Jan 28 1996, 10:00 am
mk590 (mk...@access.digex.net) wrote:
: It used to be that you could make a fake account on AOL so long as you
: had a credit card generator.  However, AOL became smart.  Now they
: verify every card with a bank after it is typed in.  Does anyone know
: of a way to get an account other than phishing?
First off, WHY would you want to go back to AOL once you get a real inet
acct?  I was stupid enough to bother with that fake acct/phishing
period back in the day, but right now, from what i hear, the best way is to
use the generated cc#s, and use the maybe 5-10 minutes you have, and go
phishing...  Then from that phish, keep phishing from that one (use side
accts of coarse...)
--
Weapon X                [www:http://www.j51.com/~weaponx]
[email:weap...@j51.com irc:WeponEks] [finger for PGP key]        
    Reply to author      Forward        Report spam
mk590  View profile   More options Jan 29 1996, 10:00 am
On 28 Jan 1996 17:06:15 GMT, weap...@j51.com (Weapon X) wrote:
- Show quoted text -
Well, the only reason why I would want an account, is for a few of the
features that AOL offers...  However, as for the CC's, that's the
prob.  They no longer work!  Oh well..
- mk590 : Setting Da Standard
    Reply to author      Forward        Report spam
walt0101  View profile   More options Jan 30 1996, 10:00 am
In article <4eg0ho$...@news4.digex.net>, mk590 <mk...@access.digex.net>
wrote:
>It used to be that you could make a fake account on AOL so long as you
>had a credit card generator.  However, AOL became smart.  Now they
>verify every card with a bank after it is typed in.  Does anyone know
The old Google Groups will be going away soon. Switch to the new Google Groups.
Google Groups Home
About this group
Subscribe to this group
This is a Usenet group - learn more
Discussions
+ new post
Suche Bilder Maps Play YouTube News Gmail Drive Mehr Max Maurer
AOL for free? - alt.2600 | Google Groups https://groups.google.com/group/alt.2600/browse_thread/thread/73b93...
1 von 2 19.02.2013 11:06
Figure A.2: The full text of the newsgroup post of what is usually referred to as the first
official occurrence of the term phishing.
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>of a way to get an account other than phishing?
Why the FUCK would you even want AOL when freenets are better and they
are legitimately free?
    Reply to author      Forward        Report spam
FeaRzinPoD  View profile   More options Feb 9 1996, 10:00 am
damn! That's the fucking easy part for AOL is the Fake Accounts. only
reason why I'm on it now.
-RS-
    Reply to author      Forward        Report spam
BaLLa iNc5  View profile   More options Feb 10 1996, 10:00 am
ummmm dont you work for AOL?
    Reply to author      Forward        Report spam
End of messages
« Back to Discussions « Newer topic   Older topic »
Create a group - Google Groups - Google Home - Terms of Service - Privacy Policy
©2013 Google
AOL for free? - alt.2600 | Google Groups https://groups.google.com/group/alt.2600/browse_thread/thread/73b93...
2 von 2 19.02.2013 11:06
Figure A.3: The full text of the newsgroup post of what is usually referred to as the first
official occurrence of the term phishing.
280
Figure
A
.4:
L
arge
version
ofthe
security
indicatorfigure
2.12-
INDEX
AdaBoost, 60
Adware, 25
Alexa, 60, 117, 152
APWG, 14, 42
Attack Vector, 13, 19
Basedomain, 37, 86, 105
Basename, 124
Blacklist, 46
Bot, 25
Breadcrumb Navigation, 105
Browser chrome, 52, 67, 102, 159
Bzip2, 62
C-HIP, 50
Catch, the, 18
Certificate, 4, 37, 150
Extended Validation, 37, 150, 194, 201
Self-Signed, 100
SSL, 100, 211
Certificate Authority, 150, 195
Color Coding, 36
Common Name, 150
Contrast-Context-Histogram (CCH), 61
Corporate Schema, 26
Crimeware, 23
CSS, 211
Detection, 6
Dial-In Phishing, 23
Distributed Phishing Attacks, 29
DNS, 47, 193
DOM, 59, 138
Domain Highlighting, 37
Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD), 61
False Negatives, 8
False Positives, 8
Fast-Flux Network, 17, 29, 46
Firefox, 137
Frameset, 87
Gestalt Theory, 61
Hashing, 59
Homograph Attack, 26, 42
Honeypot, 16
Hook, the, 18
Host, 24
Hosts File, 139, 193
HTML, 165, 172
HTTP, 193
HTTP Status Code, 86
IDN, 42, 123
iFrame, 87
Impersonation, 25
Design Impersonation, 25
Process Impersonation, 25
URL Impersonation, 25
Internationalized Resource Identifier, 26
IP, 26, 46, 211
IRB, 69
JavaScript, 211
Keylogger, 24, 28
Latin Square, 140, 165, 199
Likert Scale, 68, 69, 108, 117
282 INDEX
Location Bar, 34
Lure, the, 18
LZMA, 62
Malware, 23
Man-in-the-Middle Attack, 21, 53
MD5, 59, 86
Mechanical Turk, 45, 69
Microsoft Outlook, 64
Multi-Factor Authentication, 23
MySQL, 96
N-grams, 59
NCD, 62
NCL, 17
NIC, 124
OCR, 60
One Time Password, 49, 135
P3P, 66
Padlock Icon, 36
PageRank, 57, 59, 63
Path-domain, 125
Persona, 105
PGP, 52
Pharming, 28
Drive-by-Pharming, 21
Phishing, 15
Clone Phishing, 20
Dial-In Phishing, 23
Kit, 26
Spear Phishing, 20, 28
Vishing, 23
Whaling, 20
Phishing Detection, 75, 78, 111, 205, 206,
224
Phishing Kit, 26
Phishing Page Polymorphism, 212
PhishTank, 17, 42, 60, 64, 85, 92, 126
PHP, 116
Picture-in-picture Attacks, 52
Protection, 6, 11, 30, 76, 83, 111, 218, 226
Proxy Server, 193
Public Suffix, 124
Punycode, 42
ROC curve, 8
Rootkit, 25
RSA, 49
Scam, 21
Scheme, 123
Screengrabber, 24, 28
Selenium, 87
Self-Signed Certificate, 193
Session, 24
Hijacking, 24
Shadowing, 195
SIFT, 62
Site Identity Button, 36
Site Identity Dialog, 36
Spoofing, 23
Email Spoofing, 23
IP Spoofing, 23
Web Spoofing, 23
Spyware, 24
SSL, 66, 197
Subdomain, 124
SVM, 60
TÜV, 160
TF-IDF, 58–60
Thunderbird, 64
TLD, 42, 56, 124
True Negatives, 8
True Positives, 7
TTL, 57
Two-Factor Authentication, 23
UAC, 52
URL, 122, 123, 212
URL Highlighting, 37
User Intervention, 6, 9, 49, 75, 79, 110, 205,
213, 224
Vishing, 23
VoIP, 23
W3C, 52, 67
INDEX 283
Warning
active, 53
passive, 53
Web of Trust, 113
Web Trojan, 24
Whaling, 20
Whitelist, 46
WHOIS, 57, 106
284 INDEX
Declaration 285
Eidesstattliche Versicherung
(Siehe Promotionsordnung vom 12.07.11, § 8, Abs. 2 Pkt. .5.)
Hiermit erkläre ich an Eides statt, dass die Dissertation von mir selbstständig und ohne un-
erlaubte Beihilfe angefertigt wurde.
München, den 27. April 2014
Max-Emanuel Maurer
